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INTRODUCTION

The new Iowa Criminal Code (Criminal Code) went into effect on January 1, 1978, having been finally passed in 1976 1 following three years of legislative process. The Criminal Code is the first complete revision since the
passage of Iowa's first criminal code in 1851. The lengthy interim period saw
many patchwork changes through "the process of ad hoc, piecemeal
amendment. "2

A. Legislative History8
With the impetus of pioneer work undertaken a decade earlier by a
1. S.F. 85, 1976 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1245 (66th G.A.).
2. Schantz, Objectives of Criminal Code Revision: Guidelines to Evaluation, 60 IOWA L.
REV. 430 (1975).
3. Unfortunately, few meaningful documents on legislative history of the new Criminal
Code exist, so that the researcher must pore through individual legislative journals and multitudinous proffered amendments during a three year legislative period to determine the legislative intent. This tedious task must be done without the benefit of any explanatory comments
either on the bill as proposed by the Criminal Code Review Study Committee or on the proposed Criminal Code as ultimately passed by the legislature. For an example of helpful illustrative comments on criminal code revision in another jurisdiction, see Proposed Criminal Code
for the State of Missouri 8 (West pamphlet 1973). The one piece of official Iowa legislative
history of any substance appears in the section-by-section commentary in Substantive Crim.
Law Subcomm. of the Crim. Code Review Study Comm., (Tent. Draft No.4, 1974) [hereinafter
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committee of the Iowa State Bar Association, the general assembly established a Criminal Code Review Study Committee in 1969. This committee
completed its task in December of 1972, and transmitted its final report in
the form of a proposed new criminal code to the general assembly near the
start of the legislative session in 1973. Extensive review of this report was
completed by a special legislative subcommittee in 1973. Early in the 1974
legislative session, a bill (S.F. 1150) drafted by that subcommittee was introduced, reflecting the work of that subcommittee on the study committee's
report and on other proposals. Some action was taken in the Senate, but
none at all was taken in the House during the 1974 session. The bill had to
be reintroduced (as S.F. 85) with the convening of a new General Assembly
in 1975. That bill was passed by the Senate in 1975 and by the House in
1976, and signed into law by Governor Rayon June 28, 1976.
The effective date for its general implementation was January 1, 1978.·
Three provisions, however, went into effect on July 1, 1976: (1) amendment
of the accommodation provision in the controlled substances law,1I (2) repeal
of the requirement that motorcyclists wear helmets,8 and (3) provision for
the Iowa Supreme Court to propose changes in the new Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure to the. General Assembly for the 1977 session. 7
Myriad corrective, as well as substantive, amendments were passed in
1977. Several additional changes were made during the 1978 and 1979 legislative sessions. s
B.

Contents of the Criminal Code

The entire revised Criminal Code is comprised of the Iowa Criminal
Code, the Iowa Code of Criminal Procedure, and the Iowa Corrections Code.
This Article is an analysis of the Iowa Criminal Code only. This part of the
Criminal Code contains general principles relating to substantive criminal
law, the law of complicity of the various parties to crime and the individual
crimes and defenses (both general and specific) to crimes. The latter topic is
included herein only as to specific defenses peculiar to particular crimes.
cited as STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT]. Unfortunately, this document related to the proposed code
in 1974 rather than to how it was submitted to the general assembly as S.F. 85 in 1975-76.
Moreover, this document is not generally available, but can be examined in the office of the
Iowa Legislative Service Bureau in Des Moines. An excellent unofficial source of legislative history can be found in J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, IOWA CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1979)
[hereinafter cited as J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON]. Professors John Yeager and Ronald Carlson
served as the reporters for the STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT.
4. S.F. 85, 1976 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1245, § 529 (66th G.A.).
5. [d. § 231, amending IOWA CODE § 204.410 (1975).
6. [d. § 527, repealing 1975 Iowa Acts 1st Sess. ch. 183 (66th G.A.).
7. [d. § 530.
8. See 1977 Iowa Acts 1st Sess. (67th G.A.); 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. (67th G.A.); 1979
Iowa Acts 1st Sess. (68th G.A.) (supplementing IOWA CODE §§ 701.1-732.6 (1978».

HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 241 1979-1980

242
1.

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 29

Substantive Content of the Criminal Code

Practically every crime was changed to some extent in the revision process which culminated in the new Criminal Code. Numerous crimes were
eliminated completely and several were added to the Iowa Criminal Code for
the first time. In addition to these substantive changes, a whole new legislative lexicon was created because many changes in terminology were made.·
a. Inclusivity of the Criminal Code. All crimes in Iowa are statutory,10
nevertheless the new Criminal Code surprisingly does not contain all of the
serious crimes included in the Iowa Code. The major omission is the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, which despite containing several felonies,
was left in chapter 204 of the Iowa Code.ll Numerous other felonies lll (either
Class C or D), as well as many aggravated misdemeanor offenses,18 were also
not transferred into the new Criminal Code. Similarly, nearly one hundred
serious misdemeanors,14 as well as hundreds of simple misdemeanors, remain scattered throughout other chapters of the Iowa Code instead of being
incorporated into the new Criminal Code itself. Coordinating amendments llJ
in the Criminal Code Revision Act conform the penalty provisions for the
above regulatory offenses to the systematic penalty schedules in the new
Criminal Code. Additionally, another approximately sixty-three criminal offenses remaining outside the Criminal Code have been declared to be fraudulent practices and thus punishable under the penalty schedules for that
major offense,18 which is a part of the Criminal Code.
In contrast, a number of minor offenses were surprisingly left in the
new Criminal Code. 17 These include a series of unrepealed pre-revised of9. For a discussion of archaic phraseology in the pre-revised code, see Schantz, supra note
2, at 434-35.-Regarding the retention of the term "tumultuous" in the revised statute defining
riot (now IOWA CODE § 723.1 (1979», Professor Schantz states: "Such language gives little guidance to the public or to the police who must enforce it, and, touching as it does upon rights of
expression and assembly, it is open to serious objection on policy grounds and to possible constitutional challenge." [d. at 435.
10. IOWA CODE § 701.2 (1979). See State v. Brighi, 232 Iowa 1087, 7 N.W.2d 9 (1942).
Thus, no uncodified common law offenses are punishable in Iowa. Regarding over-inclusivity
and under-inclusivity of the punishable conduct in the then proposed new Criminal Code, see
generally Schantz, supra note 2, at 440-46.
11. As Professor Schantz pointed out in analyzing the proposed criminal code (then S.F.
1150), it was not necessary to include the Uniform Controlled Substances Act in the revised
Criminal Code in toto. The central criminal provisions could have been "abstracted out and the
classification scheme incorporated by reference." Schantz, supra note 2, at 443.
12. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 321.281 (OMVUI-third offense); 422.25(8), 422.58(3) (tax evasion) (1977).
13. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 321.281 (OMVUI-second offense); 657.3 (Nuisance) (1977).
14. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 99B.6(4) (Gambling offense); 155.26 (Unauthorized Possession
of Prescription Drugs) (1977); 321.281 (OMVUI-first offense) (1979).
15. See 1976 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1245, pt. 4, §§ 1-531 (66th G.A.).
16. IOWA CODE §§ 714.8-.13 (1979).
17. See Schantz, supra note 2, at 444. Professor Schantz states:
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fenses relating to health, safety, and welfare,t8 infringement of civil rights,t'
blacklisting employees,lI0 labor union membership,l1 labor boycotts and
strikes,lIlI political activities,l8 weapons permits,lI. and advertising and selling
courses of instruction. lilt However, several other unrepealed pre-revised
crimes of a minor nature were transferred outside of the new Criminal Code.
These were offenses relating to storage batteries,lI8 professional boxing and
wrestlingll7 and door-to-door sales.1I8
The fact that the new Criminal Code is not all inclusive has been clarified by the Iowa Supreme Court. In State v. Rauhauser,1I1 the court held
that public intoxicationSO was still a punishable criminal offense in Iowa
even though it was not included in the new Criminal Code itself. The crux of
the holding was that this offense, which was outside the main chapters of
the pre-revised criminal code (in a chapter on liquor control),81 was not repealed as part of the revision process. The court pointed out that the revised
statute contained "a rather exhaustive listing of statutes repealed by the
new Criminal Code,"si with no mention made of the statute on public intoxication. The court stated that "[h]ad the legislature intended to repeal said
statutes, it is only reasonable to expect an indication of such intent where
other repealed statutes are enumerated. "S8 Having thus concluded that
there was no express repeal, the court also refused to find an implied repeal.
Invoking an established presumption against the implied repeal of statutes,
the court noted that "[s]uch repeals are not favored by the courts and will
not be sustained unless legislative intent to repeal is clear in the language
[i]n sum, the [then proposed] Code's relocation or elimination of the "regulatory"
statutes located in our present criminal Code seems rather thorough. However, one
might well take exception to nearly all of [the chapter on health, safety, and welfare
offenses]. Regulation of fireworks, x-rays and abandoned refrigerators, if needed at
all, surely belongs outside the criminal code. [d.
18. See IOWA CODE §§ 727.1-.10 (1979).
19. See id. §§ 729.1-.4.
20. [d. §§ 730.1-.3.
21. [d. §§ 731.1-.8.
22. [d. §§ 732.1-.6.
23. [d. §§ 721.3-.7.
24. See id. §§ 724.5, .10, .15, .16, .21, .22.
25." [d. §§ 714.17-.22.
26. IOWA CODE §§ 715.1-.5 (1977) (repealed 1978).
27. [d. §§ 99C.1-.9 (1979).
28. [d. §§ 82.1-.6. Additionally, the crime of maintaining pay toilets in public places was
transferred to § 135.21 pursuant to 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 147, § 136 (67th G.A.), after
originally being part of the new Criminal Code at § 727.11.
29. 272 N.W.2d 432 (Iowa 1978).
30. IOWA CODE §§ 123.46, .91 (1979).
31. IOWA CODE ch. 123 (1977).
32. State v. Rauhauser, 272 N.W.2d 432, 435 (Iowa 1978).
33. [d.
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used and such a holding is absolutely necessary."84 Another intriguing factor
in this implied repeal matter is that the public intoxication provisions were
not included in the coordinating amendments sections in the Criminal Code
Revision Act. 811
b. Decriminalization. Several pre-revised crimes were completely
eliminated from the new Criminal Code, in order to better reflect a modern
legal code of conduct. Among them were Treason86 and Misprision of Treason,87 totally unused and unnecessary state crimes presumably better left to
federal enforcement, since both crimes related only to treason against the
United States. 8S Dueling,S9 an archaic crime, was eliminated. In addition,
changing moral and sexual standards resulted in decriminalization of Adultery,40 Forcible Marriage and Defilement,41 and Seduction!a A growing recognition of constitutional rights to privacy explains the failure of the legislature to criminalize any private sexual activity among consenting adults in
the new Criminal Code,48 and the elimination of consensual sodomy between
adults in the revised crime of Sexual Abuse. 44 Serious federal constitutional
problems prompted decriminalization of four additional crimes:411 Criminal
Syndicalism,4e Libel,47 Profanity:e and Vagrancy.49 Finally, the crime of Destruction of Food ProductsliO was also decriminalized.
c. Expanded Criminalization. As Professor Schantz has pointed out,
"[t]he converse of the decriminalization issue is whether the criminal law
[d. at 434.
35. See 1976 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1245, pt. 4 (66th G.A.).
36. IOWA CODE § 689.1 (1977) (repealed 1978).
37. [d. § 689.3.
38. Insurrection, which essentially consists of physical violence toward or disruption of
state government or any subdivision thereof, is a more appropriate offense.
39. IOWA CODE §§ 692.1-.4 (1977) (repealed 1978).
40. [d. § 702.1.
41. [d. § 699.1.
42. [d. §§ 700.1-.3.
43. J. YEAGER, IOWA CRIMINAL CODE TRAINING MANUAL 51 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
TRAINING MANUAL).
44. IOWA CODE §§ 709.1-.10 (1979).
45. Professor Schantz has stated that "[a)t least a few provisions of the [then) current
Code are rather clearly unconstitutional, at least as drafted." Schantz, supra note 2, at 444.
46. IOWA CODE §§ 689.10-.12 (1977) (repealed 1978). See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444 (1969).
47. IOWA CODE §§ 737.1-.7 (1977) (repealed 1978). See Ashton v.. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195
(1966).
48. IOWA CODE § 728.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
49. IOWA CODE §§ 746.1-.25 (1977) (repealed 1978). See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
50. IOWA CODE §§ 734.1-.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). Professor Schantz states "[g)one, too,
but not forgotten, are chapters 733 and 734, which prohibit the sale of diseased plants and the
waste of food products to increase the price." Schantz, supra note 2, at 444.
34.

HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 244 1979-1980

Iowa Criminal Code

1979-80]

245

should be expanded to cover new areas."111 He concluded that systematic
consideration was not given by the drafters of the new Criminal Code to
even such timely penal concerns as expanding measures on consumer protection and environmental contropll However, several new offenses have
been included in the new Criminal Code, including but not limited to the
following: Indecent Exposure,lIs Public Indecent Exposure,M and the Sale of
Hard Pornography.1I11 The moral overtones of these new crimes indicate that
morality was a significant concern of the drafters of the Criminal Code.
The new Criminal Code has also given special protection to particularly
vulnerable classes of victims through the addition of such new crimes as
Feticide and related offenses,lIs Sexual Exploitation of Children,1I1 and Wanton Neglect of a Resident of a Health Care Facility.lls Similarly, the new
Code has focused attention on the special problem of weapons by adding a
new offense of Possession of Firearms by a Felon,1I11 and by expanding the
scope of the pre-revised offense of Carrying Concealed Weapons. eo Another
noteworthy development in the new Criminal Code was the criminalization
of three types of tortious conduct which heretofore had been left to civil
remedies: False Imprisonment,81 Malicious Prosecution,8l1 and Setting
Spring Guns. 8S Finally, the addition of the following new crimes has broadened extensively the general parameters of the criminal law: Solicitation,"
which criminalizes unsuccessful inchoate activity, and Accessory Mter the
Fact811 complicity, which criminalizes the rendering of assistance to an offender after a crime has been committed.
2.

Classification of Crimes
Practically all of the crimes in the new Criminal Code are categorized

Schantz, supra note 2, at 448.
52. [d. One commentator states that "Ii]f one were to identify important new concerns of
the penal system in America, they would be consumer protection and environmental control."
Dash, Means and Methods Employed in Penal Law, 10 CRIM. L. BULL. 571, 579 (1974) (footnotes omitted). See IOWA CODE § 714.16 (1979) which was transferred, without change, from
IOWA CODE § 713.24 (1977).
53. IOWA CODE § 709.9 (1979).
54. [d. § 728.5.
55. [d. § 728.4.
56. [d. §§ 707.7-.10.
57. 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1188 (67th G.A.).
58. IOWA CODE § 726.7 (1979).
59. [d. § 724.26.
60. Compare IOWA CODE § 724.4 (1979) with IOWA CODE § 695.2 (1977) (repealed 1978).
61. IOWA CODE § 710.7 (1979).
62. [d. § 720.6.
63. [d. § 708.9.
64. [d. § 705.1.
65. [d. § 703.3.
51.
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into various classifications88 of felonies and misdemeanors,8? with each classification carrying a uniform maximum penalty.88 There are four classes of
felonies and three classes of misdemeanors.
Ameliorative sentencing alternatives to confinement are available for
most felony offenses and for all of the misdemeanor offenses. These alternatives include a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended
sentence. 89
a. Felonies. (1) Confinement. Class A felonies?O are punishable by a
mandatory sentence for life imprisonment without probation or parole. Indeterminate 71 terms of imprisonment are prescribed for the other three classes of felonies,72 as follows: (1) a 25 year term for class B felonies, (2) a 10
year term for class C felonies, and (3) a 5 year term for class D felonies.
Whether or not a sentence of confinement is mandatory depends upon the
availability of ameliorative sentencing alternatives as well as upon the scope
of a new statutory provision?8 permitting a fine-only sanction on some felo66. The only unclassified crimes in the Criminal Code are those left unrepealed and
transferred into the Criminal Code. See IOWA CODE cbs. 729-32 (1979).
67. Under IOWA CODE § 701.7 (1979), a "public offense" is a felony when so declared by
the statute defining the crime. Coupled with IOWA CODE § 701.8 (1979), which defines misdemeanors as [a]ll public offenses which are not felonies," section 701.7 means that a public offense is to be considered a misdemeanor, indeed a simple misdemeanor, when the penalty
clause is silent as to whether the crime is a felony or a misdemeanor. Contrastingly, under the
pre-revised code, a felony was any public offense potentially punishable by imprisonment in
the penitentiary or adult reformatory, even though such imprisonment was not actually imposed. See IOWA CODE § 687.2 (1977) (repealed 1978). See also State v. Rauhauser, 272 N.W.2d
432 (Iowa 1978).
68. Professor Yeager states that "[t]he purpose of this system is to provide a more rational system of sentencing than is permitted under our present law [then the 1973 Code]."
Yeager, Crimes Against the Person: Homicide, Assault, Sexual Abuse and Kidnapping in the
Proposed Iowa Criminal Code, 60 IOWA L. REv. 503, 504 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Yeager
Note].
69. IOWA CODE § 907.3 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 1724-26.
70. IOWA CODE § 902.1 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1622.
71. Id. § 902.3. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1624. Iowa's indeterminate
sentencing statute "requires that the sentence, if it imposes a penitentiary term, shall not be
fixed by the court. The term is imposed by law." State v. Kulish, 260 Iowa 138, 145, 148
N.W.2d 428, 433 (1967). This means that a sentencing judge is limited (in his judicial discretion, if any) to determining whether or not to impose (and then whether or not to suspend) a
sentence of confinement. The judgment and sentence on any indeterminate term must be in the
statutory terminology ("not to exceed" the statutorily-prescribed term of years), with the responsibility for determining the actual length of the prison sentence, within the maximum set
by law, reposed in the board of parole. See State v. Peckenschneider, 236 N.W.2d 344, 347
(Iowa 1975). However, since the indeterminate sentencing law does not apply to misdemeanors,
a jail sentence for a misdemeanor offense "must specify a definite term. Otherwise it is uncertain and void." State v. Welfort, 238 N.W.2d 781, 782 (Iowa 1976).
72. IOWA CODE § 902.9 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1630.
73. Id. § 909.1.
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nies, all of which is discussed below. 74
(2) Fines. No fines are authorized on either class A or B felonies,70 with
the sole punishment instead being mandatory confinement. The maximum
level of fines possible on class C and D felonies is $5,000 and $1,000,78 respectively, with the exact amount, if any, a matter of judicial discretion for
the sentencing court. These fines apparently can be in lieu of a sentence of
confinement (or a suspended sentence) for non-"forcible felonies," but only
as an additional penalty for "forcible felonies"77 which apparently are all
punishable by mandatory imprisonment. 78
All of the ameliorative sentencing alternatives are unavailable, however,
for certain felonies: 78 (a) all class A felonies,80 (b) certain class B, C, or D
felonies of a violent-prone nature which are specially categorized as "forcible
felonies,"81 and (c) several of the major controlled substances offenses. sl Additionally, a deferred judgment and a deferred sentence (but not a suspended sentence) are precluded for an aggravated form of the crime of Lascivious Acts With a Child. sS
Statutory unavailability of any of these ameliorative alternatives for a
particular crime means that the prescribed term of imprisonment is
mandatory. All class A and B felonies clearly are punishable by mandatory
confinement ("A" felonies by ameliorative alternatives being expressly prohibited and "B" felonies by all being categorized as "forcible felonies").
Whether or not mandatory confinement is applicable to class C and D felonies depends upon the meaning of Iowa Code section 909.1, which is new to
Iowa law. Section 909.1 provides that upon conviction "of any public offense
for which a fine is authorized, the court may impose a fine instead of any
other sentence where it appears that the fine will be adequate to deter the
defendant and to discourage others from similar criminal activity."
Considered in isolation, section 909.1 clearly seems to authorize a judge
to impose a fine (instead of the more onerous sanctions of either a suspended sentence or a sentence of confinement) as the only punishment for
any crimes (class C and D felonies, as well as all three misdemeanor classifications) for which fines are authorized. Indeed, Professor Yeager states unequivocally that in pronouncing sentence for class C and D felonies, the
co~rt "may impose a fine, within the limits provided, without imposing 8
74. See generally text accompanying notes 84-102 infra.
75. IOWA CODE §§ 902.1, 902.9(1) (1979).
76. [d. §§ 902.9(3), (4).
77. [d. § 702.11. See text accompanying notes 1SO-203 infra.
78. See text accompanying notes 79-102 infra.
79. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 1724-26.
SO. IOWA CODE § 902.1 (1979).
81. [d. § 907.3.
82. [d. § 907.3. These offenses are Delivery, Possession With Intent, and Manufacturing.
[d. § 204.410.
83. [d. §§ 907.3(1)(a), 709.8.
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sentence of imprisonment."84
Reading section 909.1, in pari materia, with the felony penalty provisions in section 902.9, however, raises questions as to the "reach" of section
909.1. The applicable provisions read that "[a] class 'C' felon ... shall be
confined for no more than ten years, and in addition may be sentenced to a
fine of not more than five thousand dollars,"811 with the same approach
taken in the class D felony schedule. 86
The language of these penalty schedule provisions, read in isolation,
suggests that the prescribed indeterminate term of confinement must be imposed ("shall be confined"), subject, of course, to the availability of a suspended sentence. 87 In other words, confinement would be the primary, albeit
mandatory, sanction. Additionally, a secondary sanction of a fine could also
be imposed (together with the sentence of confinement), but not in lieu of
the prescribed confinement. The secondary nature of the sanction of a fine
is evident from the phrase "and in addition may be sentenced to a fine

"
By comparison, the terminology in the penalty schedules for all classes
of misdemeanors clearly permits a fine as an alternative sanction in lieu of
imprisonment. For the two indictable misdemeanors,88 the prescribed penalty is imprisonment or a fine or both, in addition to the three ameliorative
alternatives. Similarly, the prescribed penalty for a simple misdemeanorse is
imprisonment or a fine (but not both), in addition to the three ameliorative
alternatives.
The comparative penalty schedule provisions for class C and D felonies
and for misdemeanors read in pari materia suggest different approaches to
the question of a fine as an alternative sanction to mandatory imprisonment.
However, if section 902.9 is read as precluding a fine, then section 909.1 is
totally unnecessary, in light of a fine already being expressly authorized as
the sole sanction for misdemeanors in section 903.1. Because of the general
principle that every statutory provision is to be given effect90 with at least
84. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1772.
85. IOWA CODE § 902.9(3) (1979) (emphasis added). But see note 87 infra.
86. [d. § 902.9(4).
•
87. The Iowa Supreme Court has made it clear that the statutory provisions defining the
substantive offense and providing for ameliorative sentencing alternatives
[T)ogether comprise a legislative plan for the sentencing of those convicted of [a)
crime . . . . As used in this context, the word 'shall' does not require the trial court
to sentence defendant to a penitentiary term. It means only that if the court's discretionary power to defer sentence or grant probation is not exercised, defendant must
then be sentenced to the penitentiary. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that
all our sentencing statutes are couched in 'shall' language.
State v. Robbins, 257 N.W.2d 63, 69 (Iowa 1977).
88. IOWA CODE §§ 903.1(1),(2) (1979) (aggravated misdemeanors and serious misdemeanors, respectively). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1642.
89. IOWA CODE § 903.1(3) (1979). See text accompanying notes 103-11 infra.
90. City of Des Moines v. Elliott, 267 N.W.2d 44 (Iowa 1978).
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an implied presumption against any provision being meaningless, there must
be some intended application of section 909.1.
The conflict between sections 909.1 and 902.9 must be reconciled in order to resolve this matter. The usual approach to resolving irreconcilable
statutory conflicts is for the specific provision to control over the general
provision. 91 The problem here is in determining which is the specific
provision.
A reasonable approach would be to afford section 909.1 the status of the
specific provision only when there are no other specific provisions requiring
a contrary result. Accordingly, section 909.1 would apply to a class C or D
felony which is not a "forcible felony," since there is no other specific statute (other than section 909.1). In this circumstance, the penalty schedule
provision in section 902.9 is a general statute. On the other hand, the specific statute precluding ameliorative alternatives for a "forcible felony"
should control against the correlative specific provision in section 909.1. The
legislative intent clearly was to make sentences of confinement mandatory
for violence-prone offenses constituting "forcible felonies." It would certainly be ludicrous on "forcible felonies" to preclude a deferred judgment, a
deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence, and yet permit a fine instead
of a sentence of confinement. In other words, a sentencing judge, required to
enter a judgment of conviction and to impose sentence, could decide that a
fine was an adequate sentence. However, if he decided that a fine was not
adequate, then he would be left only with a sentence of confinement, since a
suspended sentence for "forcible felonies" is expressly precluded in section
907.3.
The fact that section 909.1 should not be interpreted as overriding the
provision for mandatory confinement under section 902.7 for use or possession of a "firearm" during the commission of any "forcible felony" is clear
on the face of section 902.7 itself.92 The latter provides that under such circumstances "the convicted person shall serve a minimum of five years of the
sentence imposed by law." A fine-only sanction under section 909.1 would
render this provision useless,9B since the defendant cannot serve "a minimum of five years of the sentence" by merely paying a fine. Moreover, the
phrase "the sentence imposed by law" should be read as "the sentenced required by law," since the language "imposed by law" implies that no judicial
discretion is intended in a particular case. Otherwise, the terminology
should be "the sentence imposed."
There is a contrary view, however. Professor Yeager, without detailed
analysis of canons of statutory construction, states: "[i]t is not clear whether
91. See, e.g., State v. Bousman, 278 N.W.2d 15 (Iowa 1979) (specific savings provision in
new Criminal Code, § 801.5(2)(b)(2), prevails over general savings provision, § 4.13, in the Code
generally) .
92. But see text accompanying notes 94-96.3 infra.
93. See note 90 supra.
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the court can avoid the minimum sentence provision of section 902.7 by imposing a fine only, but there appears to be no reason why the restrictions on
probation in section 907.3 will affect the court's exercise of this option, and
clearly the limitations on parole in section 906.5 do not."1H Addressing the
critical question, Professor Yeager recognizes that "the imposition of a fine
without imprisonment in such cases will seldom be indicated, and would violate the intent of those provisions."95
. This matter obviously awaits judicial interpretation in which the matter
is squarely presented in the context of a sentencing judge taking the position that he has no discretion merely to impose a fine on a "forcible felony."
The Iowa Supreme Court has already labelled section 902.7 as a mandatory
minimum sentencing provision in three cases,96 but the effect of section
909.1 was not argued or discussed in any of them. Nevertheless, the court
has made some fairly definitive statements, as evidenced by this observation
in State v. Holmes: 96•1 "We, therefore, hold that imposition of the statutory
five-year minimim mandatory sentence for involvement of a firearm in commission of a felony does not inflict cruel and unusual punishment."66.1 Additionally, the court said in State v. Powers:9 6.S "Here, the obvious legislative
purpose of section 902.7 is to deter the use of firearms by imposition of
mandatory minimum penalties . . . ."97
The crucial point, of course, is that a sentencing judge must exercise his
judicial discretion in imposing sentence. If a fine-only sanction is permissible for "forcible felonies," then a sentencing judge would commit reversible
error in taking the approach that confinement is mandatory.98 Instead, he
would have to recognize his authority to use the fine as an alternative penalty but refuse to do so in this specific case because of the particular surrounding circumstances of either the commission of the crime itself or the
prior background of the offender. 99
Sound public policy arguments support the aforementioned differential
approach to section 909.1, depending upon whether or not a "forcible felony" offense is involved. The typical non-forcible class C or D felony does
not involve violence. loo Contrastingly, all of the class C or D felonies which
94. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1772.
95. [d.
96. State v. Sanders, 280 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1979); State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa
1979); State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979).
96.1. 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979).
96.2. [d. at 829.
96 ..3. 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979).
97. [d. at 28.
98. "The trial court's failure to exercise the discretion the statute vests in him requires a
reversal for resentencing." State v. Robbins, 257 N.W.2d 63, 70 (Iowa 1977).
99. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 22(3)(d); State v. Luedtke, 279 N.W.2d 7 (Iowa 1979).
100. The class C felonies which are not "forcible felonies" are: IOWA CODE §§ 706.3 (Conspiracy); 709.7 (Detention in a Brothel); 710.5 (Child Stealing); 712.3 (Arson (2d»; 712.6 (Pos-
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are "forcible felonies" require violence.101 Certainly, it seems logical to focus
upon violence in establishing mandatory sentences of confinement. This focus is exacerbated by tying to "forcible felonies" the collateral five-year
mandatory minimum sentence for use or possession of firearms.102
b. Misdemeanors. A second level of indictable misdemeanor lOS was added to the new Criminal Code. This aggravated misdemeanor is punishable
by a definite term l04 of imprisonment not exceeding two years or a maximum fine of $5,000, or both. loa Many less serious pre-revised felonies carrying a maximum definite term of one or two years of imprisonment were
downgraded into this new classification, as well as some more serious prerevised felonies. l06 The other class of indictable misdemeanor is the serious
misdemeanor, which is punishable by a definite jail term not exceeding one
session of Explosive or Incendiary Devices); 713.3 (Burglary (2d»; 713.4 (Possession of Burglary
Tools); 714.2(1) (Theft (1st»; 714.9 (Fraud Practice (1st»; 715.6 (False Use of a Financial Instrument); 716.3 (Mischief (1st»; 718.1 (Insurrection); 719.5 (Assisting Prisoner to Escape);
722.2 (Accepting Bribe); 726.3 (Abandonment of a Dependent Person); 728.12 (Sexual Exploitation of Children) (1979).
The class D felonies, which are not "forcible felonies," include: IOWA CODE §§ 705.1 (Solicitation); 708.5 (Administering Harmful Substances); 708.8 (Going Armed with Intent); 709.8
(Lascivious Acts); 710.6 (Violating Custodial Order); 711.4 (Extortion); 712.7 (False Reports
Regarding Explosive or Incendiary Devices); 712.8 (Threats to Place Incendiary or Explosive
Devices); 714.2(2) (Theft (2d»; 714.10 (Fraudulent Practice (2d»; 716.4 (Mischief (2d»; 721.1
(Felonious Misconduct in Office); 718.5 (Falsifying Public Documents); 719.4 (Escape); 719.5
(Permitting Prisoner to Escape); 719.6 (Assisting Prisoner to Escape); 719.8 (Furnishing Controlled Substance to Inmates); 720.2 (Perjury); 720.3 (Suborning Perjury); 722.1 (Bribery);
722.10 (Commercial Bribery); 724.3 (Possession of Offensive Weapons); 725.3 (Pimping); 725.3
(Pandering); 726.2 (Incest); 726.5 (Nonsupport) (1979).
The one atypical "non-forcible" class D felony which involves violence is Involuntary Manslaughter Code § 707.5(1). This crime does not appear to be a "felonious assault." Nevertheless,
while a death must result, the nature of the offender's act is the unintentional causing of death
and thus is not necessarily a crime of violence.
101. The class C felonies, which are "forcible felonies," are: IOWA CODE §§ 707.4 (Voluntary Manslaughter); 707.7 (Feticide); 707.8 (Nonconsensual Termination); 707.11 (Attempted
Murder); 708.3 (Assault while Participating in a Felony); 708.4 (Willful Injury); 709.4 (Sex
Abuse (3d»; 710.4 (Kidnapping (3d»; 711.3 (Robbery (3d» (1979).
The class D felonies, which are "forcible felonies," are: IOWA CODE §§ 707.7 (Attempted
Feticide); 708.3 (Assault while Participating in a Felony); 708.6 (Terrorism) (1979).
102. IOWA CODE § 902.7 (1979). See text accompanying notes 94-96.3 supra.
103. An indictable public offense under the new Code, as under the pre-revised law, is any
offense more serious than a simple misdemeanor. See IOWA R. CRIM. P. 4(1), (2).
104. Since the indeterminate sentencing law is not applicable to misdemeanor offenses, a
sentence to jail on a misdemeanor offense "mlll!t specify a definite term. Otherwise it is uncertain and void." State v. Welfort, 238 N.W.2d 781, 782 (Iowa 1976) (misdemeanant's sentence to
jail for a period "not to exceed six months" is indefinite and thus void).
105. IOWA CODE § 903.1(1) (1979).
106. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 694.6 (1977) (repealed 1978) (Assault With Intent to InBict
Bodily Injury), replaced by IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979) (Assault With Intent to Do Serious
Injury); IOWA CODE § 321.76 (1977) (repealed 1978) (Operating Vehicle Without Owner's Consent) (replaced by IOWA CODE § 714.7 (1) (1979».
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year or a maximum fine of $1,000, or both.lo7 The lowest classification of
crime is the simple misdemeanor,lo8 which remains unchanged from pre-revised law. This crime remains punishable by a jail term not exceeding thirty
days or a maximum fine of $100, but not both. lOB All three of the ameliorative sentencing alternatives are available for every misdemeanor offense llO in
the Criminal Code. l l l
C.

Construction of the Criminal Code

In its first interpretations of the new Criminal Code, lllI the Iowa Supreme Court has indicated its unwillingness to declare a change from the
pre-revised law ll8 unless the legislative intent to make a sweeping change is
clear from the new statute on its face. ll4 In Emery v. Fenton, llI! the court
reiterated normal rules of statutory construction, stating that
[c]hanges made by revision of a statute will not be construed as altering
the law unless the legislature's intent to accomplish a change in its meaning is clear and unmistakable. An intent to make a change does not exist
when the revised statute is merely susceptible to two constructions. He

Similarly, the court specifically characterized the new Criminal Code as
"primarily a restatement" of prior law,1l7 and quoted Professor Yeager1l8
107. E.g., the penalty for the crime of Bribery in Sports was reduced from an indeterminate (felony) term of not exceeding ten years of imprisonment under IOWA CODE § 739.12 (1977)
(repealed 1978) to a definite (aggravated misdemeanor) term of up to two years under IOWA
CODE § 722.3 (1979).
108. IOWA CODE § 903.1(2) (1979).
109. [d. § 903.1(3).
110. IOWA CODE ch. 907 (1979) is applicable to misdemeanors. See id. § 907.1 (probation
applicable to "a public offense," which includes misdemeanors). Section 907.3 does not include
any misdemeanors within its provision precluding a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence or a
suspended sentence.
111. At least one simple misdemeanor outside the Criminal Code - Driving While License Revoked or Under Suspension - is punishable by a mandatory sentence, however. IOWA
CODE § 321.218 (1979). See State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Iowa 1979).
112. See generally IOWA CODE § 4.2 (1979) (statutory abrogation of common law presumption of strict construction of statute in derogation of common law).
113. See also State v. Wilson, 287 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Iowa 1980) (presumption of legislative intent that language used in statute have usual meaning ascribed by courts "unless the
context shows otherwise").
114. See also State v. Rauhauser, 272 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Iowa 1978) (presumption against
implied repeal of unrevised criminal statutes left outside the revised new Criminal Code),
which is discussed further in text accompanying notes 29-35 supra.
115. 266 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1978).
116. [d. at 10 (emphasis added) (citing Kelly v. Brewer, 239 N.W.2d 109, 114 (Iowa
1976».
117. [d. at 8.
118. Professor John Yeager of the Drake University School of Law, as reporter for the
STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, wrote the early drafts of the new Criminal Code.
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approvingly, stating that
lilt was not the purpose of this committee in drafting the code, to scrap
the existing criminal law, and, starting from scratch, to create new law
and new concepts. For the most part, the existing law was retained, clarified where clarification was needed by adapting statutory language to incorporate existing case law, and changed only where change was felt desirable. To the casual observer, it will appear that the criminal law has
been completely rewritten. However, the Criminal Code is primarily a
restatement of prior law, and most responsible studies of the code recognize this. 118
.

1.

Elemental Changes

It is, of course, axiomatic that the elements of a crime are determined
and changed by statute. IIO Thus, legislative elimination of the pre-revised
element of a taking in the crime of Robberylll means that the prosecution
no longer has to prove this element even though the common law name of
the crime was maintained. This is because it is within the legislative perogative to define a crime, subject only to substantive due process requirements
of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. This principle was made clear
by the supreme court in State v. Pierce,122 a Robbery prosecution under the
new Criminal Code. The defendant unsuccessfully contended in Pierce that
the new statutory definition of Robbery was unconstitutionally vague because of a lack of fair notice to a person that the revised crime, by not requiring a taking,1I8 included "conduct which was not robbery at common
law or under prior [Iowa] statuteS."II. This argument was dismissed out of
hand by the court. "The argument that a definition of crime which is otherwise clear is somehow made unclear because it departs from common law
and prior statutes is novel and without support either in reason or authority."ulI Continuing, the court wrote that "[d]ue process does not require the
legislature to give crimes the same elements they had at common law or
under prior statutes. "116 Concluding on a legislative lexiconical note, the
court noted that due process does not "bar a crime from being called robbery merely because the perpetrator does not succeed. It was not irrational
119. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43, at 1-2.
120. McAdams v. State, 226 Ind. 403, 81 N.E.2d 671 (1948). But see Virgin Islands v.
Williams, 424 F.2d 526 (3rd Cir. 1970) (legislative intent for abrogation of common law element
of specific intent must have been "clear").
121. IOWA CODE §§ 711.1-.3 (1979).
122. 287 N. W.2d 570 (Iowa 1980).
123. The statute itself certainly is clear on its face, providing, in pertinent part: "[ilt is
immaterial to the question of guilt or innocence of robbery that property was or was not actually stolen." IOWA CODE § 711.1 (1979).
124. 287 N.W.2d at 573.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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for the legislature to make a person as culpable for a bungled robbery as for
a successful one."127
2.

General Definitional Clauses

a. Overview. The inclusion of a separate chapter of several general definitional clauses l28 in the new Criminal Code, as a change from the pre-revised code, means that the courts must apply these statutory definitions in
place of prior common law definitions that had been developed by the courts
in the absence of statutory definitional clauses. Nevertheless, courts may use
common law doctrine as to the background and origin of a word or phrase if
the statute imprecisely defines the way a particular word is to be interpreted, creating doubt as to its meaning. uB The following twenty terms are
included in the chapter of general definitional clauses: act, animal, brothel,
child, controlled substance, dangerous weapon, death, deception, dwelling,
forcible felony, incendiary device, occupied structure, participating in a public offense, property, prostitute, reckless, serious injury, sex act, steal, and
viability. ISO
The general definitional clauses, unfortunately, are not uniformly applied throughout the Criminal Code itself. By the express terms of Iowa
Code section 702.1, these do noJ apply whenever a special definition of that
term is included in a particular provision. lSI "Child"l82 and "sex act"188 are
two major examples of terms with both general and special definitional
clauses. Moreover, three slightly different definitions of the otherwise general terms "animal"l84 and "sex act"ISIi are used within the individual chapters on animal and obscenity offenses, respectively.
Several of the general definitional clauses appear only once in the Criminal Code. These include the terms dwelling l88 and viability.187 Indeed, one
127. Id.
IOWA CODE ch. 702 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 21-47.
2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 268 (4th ed. 1973).
IOWA CODE §§ 702.2-.21 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 21-47.
See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 22.
IOWA CODE § 702.5 (1979). See text accompanying notes 144-155 infra.
133. Id. § 702.17. See text accompanying notes 296·310.2 infra.
134. Id. § 702.3.
135. Id. § 702.17. See text accompanying notes 296-310.2 infra.
136. Id. § 702.10. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 37. Unlike the pre-revised
law which followed the common law closely in this respect, the new Criminal Code does not
single out a dwelling house for particular treatment. For example, the degrees of the revised
offenses of Burglary and Arson do not depend upon whether a dwelling is involved. Instead,
more realistically, the focus of attention is upon personal injury or its potential. See IOWA CODE
§§ 713.2 and 712.2 (1979), respectively. This term is used only in the chapter on defenses. See
id. th. 704.
The replacement terms - "occupied structure" and "enclosed space" - are much broader
in scope. See id., IOWA CODE §§ 702.12 and 713.1 (1979), respectively. See also IOWA STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION, II IOWA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS ANNOTATED (CRIMINAL) (1978) (hereinafter
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
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defined term - steaP88 - does not appear anywhere in the Criminal Code
except in the definitional section.
That the chapter of general definitional clauses is not static is ~vi
denced by the fact that the term "sex act" was amended in 1978189 and that
two new terms, ("incendiary device"Ho and "viability"Hl) were added in
1978. Moreover, the Iowa Supreme Court has, in effect, added a new general
definitional clause for "felonious assault"142 by judicial interpretation of a
statutorily-undefined term.148
b. "Child." The general term "child"H4 refers to "any person under
the age of fourteen."144.l Essentially, this involves a reduction from the basic
age of under sixteen in the pre-revised Code. 14D Of course, the focus is upon
a "child" as the victim of a crime. He An entirely separate Juvenile Code,147
also recently revised, focuses upon juveniles as the perpetrators of criminal
activity.
A special definition of "child" is included in the Sexual Abuse chapter
to provide different penalties for sexual assaults on children under fourteen
(Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree)148 and on children under twelve (Sexual
Abuse in the Second Degree).149 On the other hand, the upper age of an
adolescent victim is raised to fifteen for two other types of non-forcible Sexual Abuse in the Third Degree. One type occurs when the defendant is a
member of the same household or is related to the victim (by blood or affinity) to the fourth degree lDO or has used a position of authority over the viccited as UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS); J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 39, 293.
137. IOWA CODE § 702.20 (1979).
138. "Steal" is defined as "to take by theft," yet this term is not even mentioned in the
chapter on Theft. See IOWA CODE § 702.19 (1979) and J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §
46.
139. 1978 Iowa Acts, ch. 1029, § 44.
140. 1978 Iowa Acts, ch. 1183, § 1.
141. 1978 Iowa Acts, ch. 148, § 1.
142. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979), in which "forcible felony" is defined as including
"any felonious assault." See also text accompanying notes 180-183 infra.
143. See State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979) and text accompanying notes 326-

331 infra.
144. IOWA CODE § 702.5 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 26.
144.1. See IOWA CODE § 702.5 (1979).
145. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 698.1 & 725.10 (1977) (repealed 1978) (Statutory Rape and
Lascivious Acts With a Child, respectively).
146. The general term "child" applies to the following crimes: Abandonment of a Dependent Person, Child Stealing, Lascivious Acts With a Child, Sexual Exploitation of Children,
and Violating a Custodial Order. See IOWA CODE §§ 726.3, 710.5, 709.8, 728.12, & 710.6 (1979),
respectively.
147. IOWA CODE ch. 232 (1979).
148. [d. § 709.4(3) ("child").
149. [d. § 709.3(2) ("under the age of twelve").
150. [d. § 709.4(4).
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tim to coerce submission to the defendant;lIH the other occurs when the defendant is six or more years older than the victim or other participant. 1I11
Each of these instances applies only when the other participant is either
fourteen or fifteen, and neither requires that the "sex act" be by force or
against the will of the other participant.
Four other crimes with adolescent victims or participants l118 are keyed
to "minors" instead of children. 111. The upper age limit for these crimes, age
seventeen, is set forth in a specific definition,!1111 as well as generally set out
in Iowa Code section 599.1 (outside the Criminal Code itself).
c. "Controlled Substance." A common sense approach is used in defining "controlled substance"1118 by incorporating by reference the definition of
that term in the one major pre-revised chapter of crimes not being included
in the consolidated Criminal Code. 1117 Indeed, the General Assembly took
essentially a hands-off approach to the entire subject of controlled substances, having comprehensively dealt with the subject a few years earlier.ll18
The only changes made in the Uniform Controlled Substances Act were in
applying the general penalty schedules and in establishing a mandatory
minimum sentence for certain offenses. IllS Moreover, the new crime of Furnishing Controlled Substances to Inmates 180 is the only reference at all in
the new Criminal Code to controlled substances.
d. "Dangerous Weapon." (1). Definitional Clause. Two classes of
"dangerous weapons" are established in Iowa Code section 702.7: 181 (1) per
se dangerous weapons "designed primarily for use in inflicting death or injury upon a human being or animal" and (2) other instruments or devices
with legitimate uses which nevertheless become dangerous weapons through
being actually used in par:t;icular circumstances with the intent to inflict
death or serious injury upon a human being. 181 A non-inclusive listing of
151.

152.

[d.
[d. § 709.4(5).

153. The crimes involving "minors" (under 18 years of age) include Admitting Minors to
Premises Where Obscene Material is Exhibited, Dissemination and Exhibition of Obscene Material to Minors, Nonsupport, and Wanton Neglect of a Minor. See IOWA CODE §§ 728.3, 728.2,
726.5, & 726.6 (1979), respectively.
154. One crime involving "minors" - Permitting Minors in Billiard Rooms - was included in the new Criminal Code but was repealed in 1979. See IOWA CODE § 725.13 (1978)
(repealed 1979); 1979 Iowa Acts, ch. 1187, § 1.
155. See IOWA CODE § 728.1(6) (1979).
156. IOWA CODE § 702.6 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 27.
157. See IOWA CODE ch. 204 (1979).

[d.
[d. § 204.413.
160. [d. § 719.8. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 1916-17; J.
YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 433. This crime is not discussed in this Article.
161. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 218; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 28.
162. Whether or not a particular device or instrument which is not per se a "dangerous
158.
159.
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eight per se "dangerous weapons" is included in the Code. It is interesting
that two of these eight, a razor and a knife having a blade longer than three
inches, also have legitimate uses. The apparent import of including these as
dangerous weapons per se is to automatically make them "dangerous weapons" whenever used upon a human being with the intent to injure, without
requiring proof of an intent for "serious injury" or death and without requiring submission of the crime to the factfinder.183
It is immaterial whether or not a per se "dangerous weapon" is loaded
or unloaded. In State v. Nichols,l84 the Iowa Supreme Court held that under
the new Criminal Code, as under the pre-revised law,188 the prosecution "is
not required to establish that a pistol was loaded at the time of the offense
to prove its character as a dangerous weapon in a prosecution for robbery in
the first degree. "188 Thus, it was proper for the trial court to instruct the
jury that a pistol is a per se "dangerous weapon," notwithstanding any prosecution evidence that the pistol was loaded at the time. 187
Involvement of "dangerous weapons" in certain criminal activity is significant in two respects. First, either being armed with 188 or discharging189
"dangerous weapons" is the requisite actus reus for three crimes. Secondly,
being armed with "dangerous weapons" during the commission of five other
offenses 170 ipso facto constitutes a circumstance for a higher degree of the
offense.
weapon" is nevertheless a "dangerous weapon" in the particular circumstances depends upon
whether it "is actually used in such a way as to indicate the user intended to inflict death or
serious injury and when so used is capable of inflicting death." UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
supra note 136, at No. 218. This instruction is supported by such cases as State v. Roan, 122
Iowa 136, 137, 97 N.W. 997, 998 (1904) ("[a] penknife mayor may not be a deadly weapon. If
the weapon is such that from the manner of ita use it is likely to produce death, it is, of course,
a deadly weapon.") and Hopper v. Dowling, 191 Iowa 57, 181 N.W. 759 (1921) ("[t]he pitchfork
was not used as a javelin to pierce the person of plaintiff. It was only used as a club or bludgeon, and the strokes delivered with a side motion. The pitchfork used as it was used is not a
'deadly weapon' per se ... ").
163. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 218.
164. 276 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1979).
165. State v. Ashland, 259 Iowa 728, 145 N.W.2d 910 (1966).
166. 276 N.W.2d at 417.
167. Similarly, an inoperable firearm has been held sufficient for armed robbery. "When a
person perpetrates a robbery by brandishing an instrument which appears to be a firearm, or
other dangerous weapon, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the law will presume
the instrument to be what his conduct represents it to be - a firearm or other dangerous
weapon." State v. Thompson, 254 S.E.2d 526, 528 (N.C. 1979).
168. These crimes are Carrying Weapons and Going Armed With Intent. See IOWA CODE
§§ 724.4 & 708.8 (1979), respectively.
169. See id. § 708.6(1) (Terrorism).
170. These offenses include Burglary, Interference With Official Acts, Kidnapping, Robbery, and Sexual Abuse. See IOWA CODE §§ 713.2, 719.1, 710.3, 711.2, & 709.3 (1979). Actually,
the similar term "deadly weapon" is used in the sexual abuse provision. See also text accompanying notes 1-171 infra.
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(2). Undefined Related Terms. The objective of uniform definitions
throughout the Criminal Code is weakened considerably by the inclusion of
several related statutorily undefined terms concerning weapons. These terms
or phrases include: "deadly weapon,"I71 "firearm,"172 "pistol or revolver,"178
"revolver, pistol, or pocket billy,"17. "rifle or shotgun,"1711 "spring gun,"17.
and "weapon."177 These all seem to have generally-accepted meanings in
common parlance, however. The only other related term with its own definitional clause, "offensive weapon,"178 appears in only two crimes. 178
e. "Forcible Felony." The key statutory term "forcible felony"180 is defined in the form of an exhaustive enumeration of specific crimes 181 which
automatically constitute "forcible felonies" in all circumstances. lSI This category encompasses a large group of felonies involving personal violence,
namely "any felonious assault,"188 Murder (in either degree), Sexual Abuse
171. See IOWA CODE § 709.3 (1979) (Sexual Abuse in Second Degree). This raises the
question of whether the legislative intent was to refer to some different type of weapon since
different language was used than in the general term "dangerous weapon." While, of course,
this is a standard canon of statutory construction, nevertheless there certainly does not appear
to be any public policy reason to differentiate between being armed with a "dangerous weapon"
during a robbery or kidnapping and a "deadly weapon" during a sexual abuse. See IOWA CODE
§ 711.2, 710.3, 709.3(1) (1979), respectively. In the absence of a statutory definition, the common law definition applies. According to Professor Yeager, this term "has an established meaning in the law, which is synonomous with 'dangerous weapon.''' J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra
note 3, § 209. This conclusion is borne out generally in 11 WORDS AND PHRASES 129-41 ("Dangerous Weapon") and 11 WORDS AND PHRASES 207·30 ("Deadly Weapon").
172. The term "firearm" is used in the definition of the following crimes: Assault, Carrying Weapons, Interference With Official Acts, and Possession of Firearms by Felons. See IOWA
CODE §§ 708.1(3), 724.4, 719.1, 724.26 (1979). See also UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCI'lONS, supra note
136, at Nos. 220·22 ("firearm").
173. See id. § 724.4 (Carrying Weapons). See also id. §§ 724.16, .17, .21 (diverse weapons
permits offenses).
174. See id. § 724.5 (failure while armed to have weapons permit in immediate
possession).
175. See id. § 724.22 (Sale of rifle or shotgun to minors).
176. See id. § 708.9.
177. See id. § 719.6 (Assisting Prisoner to Escape).
178. See id. § 724.1.
179. These two crimes are Possession of Offensive Weapons and Possession of Firearms
and Destructive Devices by Felons. See IOWA CODE §§ 724.1, 724.26 (1979).
180. IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 38.
181. One generic term, "felonious assault," requires interpretation to determine which
particular crimes are included within its rubic. However, the Iowa Supreme Court already has
established a definitive interpretational standard for determining which particular crime8 are
included. See text accompanying notes 326·31 infra.
182. Whether or not a particular crime i8 a "forcible felony" is strictly a legal question to
be decided on the face of the statute itself. If a particular felony offense necessarily includes an
"assault" as an element, then that crime is ipso facto a "forcible felony," without benefit of the
factual circumstances of the particular incident. See State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa
1979) and text accompanying notes 328·31 infra.
183. See notes 326·31 supra.
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(in all three degrees), Kidnapping (in all three degrees), Robbery (in both
degrees), Arson (only in the first degree) and Burglary (only in the first degree). The apparent reason for limiting the inclusion of the latter two crimes
to the highest degree only is that these are essentially property crimes, with
the higher degree reserved in part to arsons or burglaries involving personal
violence or at least to the reasonable probability thereof. The fact that an
offense is a "forcible felony" is significant in many ways.
(1). Mandatory Sentence of Confinement. The key significance of a
crime being included in this classification is that the ameliorative sentencing
options of a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence are foreclosed altogether for "forcible felonies."I84 This has the effect
of mandatory confinement for apparently all "forcible felony" offenses, with
no judicial discretion left to the sentencing judge in a particular case. Nevertheless, whether or not confinement is mandatory for class C and D "forcible
felonies" depends upon whether or not the special fines-only alternative
sanction in Iowa Code section 909.1 is determined to be applicable to these
crimes, as discussed above. 18& Only two other types of non-forcible felony
crimes carry a mandatory term of imprisonment. 188
(2). Parole Ineligibility. In addition to its mandatory confinement aspect, the "forcible felony" classification has potential follow-through consequences of establishing a minimum term of parole ineligibility in two limited
circumstances (but not ipso facto in all cases). With the exception of certain
major controlled substances offenses,187 there is no other statutorily-prescribed term of parole ineligibility. That is, a person imprisoned for any
other felony is immediately eligible for parole. 188
First, there is a five-year mandatory minimum l89 term of imprisonment
for any "forcible felony" crime involving use, possession, or representation
of possession of a "firearm."19o Thus, a "forcible felony," by itself, does not
carry any mandatory minimum sentence. Moreover, possession of a firearm
during the commission of a crime which is not a "forcible felony" (such as
Going Armed With Intentl91 or Burglary in the Second Degree l91 ) is not included within the purview of the mandatory minimum, or even mandatory,
184. IOWA CODE § 907.3 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 1724-27.
185. See text accompanying notes 84-102 supra.
186. These crimes are Lascivious Acts With a Child Under Twelve and the controlled
substances offenses of Delivery, Possession With Intent, and Manufacturing. See IOWA CODE §§
907.3, 709.8, 204.401 (1979)'.
187. IOWA CODE § 204.413 (1979).
188. See id. § 906.4, .5. See also J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 1696-1700.
189. But see text accompanying notes 84-lO2 supra.
190. IOWA CODE § 902.7 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos.
220-22 and J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1628. For the definition of "firearm," see
text accompanying notes 94-96.3 supra.
191. IOWA CODE § 708.8 (1979).
192. [d. § 713.3.
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provision.
Secondly, a recidivist's prior conviction for a "forcible felony" makes
him subject to ineligibility for parole until he has served one-half of the
maximum term of imprisonment imposed.19s Specifically, a person presently
imprisoned for any felony who has a previous conviction for a "forcible felony" must serve at least one-half of his sentence. Strangely, this mandatory
minimum term does not apply, on its face, to the situation where defendant
is presently imprisoned for a "forcible felony" and he has a previous conviction for a non-forcible felony. This latter circumstance seems more pertinent
for imposing a mandatory minimum sentence, since the emphasis should be
upon the severity of the current offense. A better legislative compromise approach would have been to apply the parole-ineligibility term when either of
the felonies is a "forcible felony."
(3). Definitions and Grading of Crimes. The concept of a "forcible felony" is also involved in either the definition of or grading of a few crimes.
For example, threats to commit any "forcible felony" constitute one of many
alternative ways to commit the offenses of Robbery in the Second DegreellN
and Terrorism. 19O Moreover, the highest of three grades of Conspiracy l86 occurs when the target crime of the conspiracy is a "forcible felony."
(4). Felony Murder Rule. The new "forcible felony" classification has
affected the application of the felony murder rule in several ways. All murder is Murder In the First Degree (a class A felony) when the killing occurs
during participation in a "forcible felony."I9'1 On the other hand, an unintentional killing during participation in a criminal offense, whether a felony or
misdemeanor, other than a "forcible felony" constitutes the much less severe class D felony offense of Involuntary Mansiaughter. llls By implication
this makes an intentional killing during the commission of an offense other
than a "forcible felony" Murder in the Second Degree. l "
Tying the felony murder rule doctrine to a general classification of offenses constituting "forcible felonies" as the includible requisite underlying.
felonies has broadened the scope of the first-degree felony murder rule in
some ways and narrowed it in others. A smaller number of crimes, Arson,
Burglary, Mayhem, Rape, and Robbery, were included under the pre-revised
first-degree felony murder rule. IOO All of these crimes are included in the
"forcible felony" classification, although two, Arson and Burglary, are no
longer all-inclusive, since only the first-degree grades of these offenses are
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

[d. § 906.5. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1698.
IOWA CODE § 711.3 (1979).
[d. § 708.6(2).
[d. § 706.3.
[d. § 707.2(2).
[d. § 707.5(1).
[d. § 707.3 (1979).
See IOWA CODE § 690.2 (1977) (repealed 1978).
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"forcible felonies."201 Additionally, the term "forcible felony" includes the
three kidnapping offenses and the "felonious assault" crime of Terrorism. loa
Moreover, the revised offense of Sexual Abuse is considerably broader than
the pre-revised offense of Rape l08 (including a killing during non-consensual
sodomy).
f. "Property." The broadest possible definition of "property"ICH is included in the new Criminal Code, namely "anything of value,IOII whether
publicly or privately owned." The scope of the Theft1Ge provisions is particularly broader than under the pre-revised forerunner provisions in light of
the express inclusion of labor and services as "property."
g. "Serious Injury. ''107 Whether or not a defendant caused or attempted to infiict208 a "serious injury" upon another person is one of the
pervasive concepts in. definingl09 and gradingllO a majority of the personal
violence crimes in the new Criminal Code. That is, this Code focuses major
attention upon criminal activity involving violence or potential violence.I I I
(1) General Definition. A "serious injury" is defined as either (1) "disabling mental illness," (2) bodily injury which creates "a substantial risk of
death," (3) bodily injury which causes "serious permanent disfigurement" or
(4) bodily injury which causes "protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily memeber or organ."1lI So restrictively defined, a "serious
201. IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 38.
202. See id. §§ nO.1-A, 708.6, respectively.
203. [d.
204. IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No.
1441; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 41.
205. A broad definition of the phrase "thing of value" appears in State v. Knutson, 220
N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 1974) ("we hold a jury could reasonably find as a matter of fact that
satisfaction of sexual demands constitutes a thing of value").
206. IOWA CODE §§ 714.1-.6 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 41.
207. [d. § 702.18. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 45.
208. Strangely, a whole array of terminology is used in the various statutes which refer to
"serious injury" being either "inflicted," "suffered," or "caused," either as an element of the
crime itself or as a factor in grading the offense for punishment purposes.
209. A "serious injury" is a necessary element of the crime of Willful Injury. IOWA CODE §
708.4 (1979). An intended "serious injury" merely is required for the crime of Assault With
Intent to Inflict a Serious Injury. [d. § 708.2(1).
210. Although not an element of the crimes, a "serious injury" inflicted, suffered or
caused during three other crimes constitutes an aggravating circumstance that raises these to
the highest grades of the respective crimes. These include Assault While Participating in a
Felony, Kidnapping in the First Degree, and Sexual Abuse in the First Degree. IOWA CODE §§
708.3,710.2,709.2, respectively. Similarly, either purposeful infliction or attempted infliction of
"serious injury" during the commission of the crimes of Interference With Official Acts and
Robbery raises these crimes to their highest degrees. [d. § 719.1, 711.2, respectively.
211. Strangely, "serious injury" only needs to be attempted for a robbery to be considered
in the first degree, whereas it must be "caused" or "suffered" for Sexual Abuse and Kidnapping
to be considered in the first degree. [d. §§ 711.2, 709.2, 710.2, respectively. The latter two offenses are class A felonies, whereas first-degree robbery is only a class B felony.
212. [d. § 702.18 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 219; J.
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injury" clearly amounts to "a great deal more than mere physical injury,"lI18
thus not including a black eye or a bloody nose. This broad definition does
encompass mental injury, being limited, however, to a "disabling mental illness" which would seem to rule out mere anxiety reactions.lI14
(2) Bodily Injury Creating "a Substantial Risk of Death." This type
of "serious injury" is defined restrictively in the Uniform Jury Instructions
as. "an injury which causes or is likely to cause a real hazard or danger of
death."2u Thus limited, the mere use of a "dangerous weapon"218 does not
automatically create "a substantial risk of death." Instead, it would depend
upon the exact use made of the weapon.lIl7 A "firearem"218 used as a club
probably would not meet this standard, unless the victim is pistol whipped
on the head in a particularly vital spot. Even shooting a victim would not
always meet this standard, if, for example, the victim is shot in the foot or
leg.
Texas is one state with a "serious injury" statutell19 similar to Iowa's. A
review of the Texas caselaw interpreting the crime of aggravated assault
based upon creating a substantial risk of death reveals that stab wounds
have been the basis for several successful prosecutions. These have included
stab wounds that "penetrated to the cartilage of the rib cage,"1I110 that "cut
from the front of her neck around to the back of her head" and "severed the
superficial jugular vein,,,m and that cut the victim's stomach requiring
twenty stitches. m On the other hand, another aggravated assault conviction
was reversed where the victim merely "sustained two stab wounds in the
back and a cut on the thigh. "IllS
Interestingly, the appellate courts in each of these cases also noted collateral facts such as the degree and duration of medical attention as well as
the subsequent return of the victim to his normal routine. For example, in
cases affirming the convictions, the courts noted that the victim "was hysterical and was placed, for a time, in the 'trauma' room;"1I114 that the victim
"stayed overnight in the hospital" and that "the laceration was too large for
surgery in the emergency room and surgery had to be performed in the opYEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 45.
213. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 45.
214. See text accompanying notes 277-95 infra.
215. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 219.
216. IOWA CODE § 702.7 (1979). See text accompanying notes 161-70 supra.
217. See generally Hopper v. Dowling, 191 Iowa 57, 181 N.W. 759 (1921); State v. Roan,
122 Iowa 113, 97 N.W. 997 (1904); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 218.
218. See text accompanying notes 346-50 infra.
219. TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02 (Vernon 1974).
220. McElroy v. State, 528 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
221. Boney v. State, 572 S.W.2d 529, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
222. Hart v. State, 581 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
223. Gonzales v. State, 146 Tex. Crim. 108, 172 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1943).
224. 581 S.W.2d at 677.
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erating room" (with twenty-three stitches required).22G Contrastingly, in another case228 in which the conviction was reversed for lack of evidence of a
"serious injury" it was noted that the victim's two and one-half day stay in
the hospital was not prompted solely by the seriousness of his injuries but
rather for observation for complications or infection, neither of which materialized. 228. 1 An injured party in another casell27 was noted to have gone
downtown the following morning after being released from the hospital following only an hour of treatment.
(3) Bodily Injury Causing "Serious Permanent Disfigurement."
Under section 702.18 of the Iowa Code, "serious injury" can consist of a
bodily injury which causes "serious permanent disfigurement."118 None of
these three words is defined in the Iowa Code, thus leaving the matter of
their meaning to "the usual meaning ascribed by the COurts."1II11 None of
these three words has necessarily taken on a technical meaning in the law,
and thus each generally has been defined judicially in its ordinary sense as
discussed below. 1I30 This phrase is defined overly restrictively in the Uniform
Jury Instructions as "a deforming or mutilated condition of a person."1Sl
The logical starting point in determining if a "serious permanent disfigurement" has been caused or produced is to determine if the injured party
has been "disfigured." If so, then the second requirement of "permancy"
must be met, thus disregarding temporary scars. Finally, even a "disfigurement" which is "permanent" must additionally be "serious" in nature, thus
disregarding minor scar tissue anywhere as well as more pronounced scars in
normally non-visible parts of the body.
(A) "Disfigurement." In the absence of either a statutory definition or
relevant caselaw interpretation of the term "disfigurement" in Iowa law,1811 it
225. 572 S.W.2d at 530-31.
226. Gonzales v. State, 146 Tex. Crim. 108, 172 S.W.2d 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 1943).
226.1. [d. at _, 172 S.W.2d at 99.
227. Garrett v. State, 164 Tex. Crim. 275, 298 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957).
228. The term "disfigurement" appears in only two other provisions of the IOWA CODE
(1979). In section 717.1 of the Criminal Code, the offense of Injury to Animals can be committed, inter alia, by "disfiguring" any animal of another. But see note 232 infra. More relevant to
injury to persons, the workmen's compensation statute was amended to include a schedule of
recoverj for "permanent disfigurement of the face or head . . . . " IOWA CODE § 85.34(2)(t)
(1979). This term has not yet been interpreted by the Iowa Supreme Court.
229. State v. Wilson, 287 N.W.2d 587 (Iowa 1980).
230. See also In re Requests of Governor and Senate, 389 Mich. 411, _, 208 N.W.2d 469,
482 (1973), in which the court held that the phrase "permanent serious disfigurement" is comprised "of no less commonly used or understood words of the English language, nor is the
language . . . less precise than that which has been adopted to express other standards for
determining tort liability. The phrases are within the province of the trier of facts and are
sufficient for legal interpretation."
231. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 219.
232. In the context of the crime of Injury to Animals through an act causing maiming or
disfiguring, an early Iowa Supreme Court case took a broad view of "disfiguring" by suggesting
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is nef!essary to look to other jurisdictions for acceptable definitions. Several
courts 233 have stated that this word has "no technical meaning and should
be considered in the ordinary sense."284 A common general dictionary definition of "disfigurement" adopted in workmen's compensation cases in several
jurisdictions 285 has been "[t]hat which impairs or injures the beauty, symmetry or appearance of a person or thing, that which renders unsightly, misshapen or imperfect or deforms in some manner."286 Other less common ordinary definitions of "disfigurement" followed in criminal or workmen's
compensation cases have been "a change of external form to the worse;" "a
deformity [that] render[s] one grotesque, unsightly, obnoxious, even repulsive to others;"287 and "mar[ring] the figure and ... render[ing] [one] less
perfect or beautiful in appearance."Z88
(B) "Permanent." A "serious disfigurement" must also be "permanent"289 in order to constitute "serious injury" under Iowa law. This term
apparently has no technical meaning, and thus should be interpreted in its
ordinary dictionary sense essentially as follows: "[f]ixed, continuing, lasting,
stable, enduring, abiding, not subject to change."z4o It is generally the opposite of "temporarY,"241 although not necessarily to be equated with "perpetually."242 Indeed, evidence of permanency need only appear with reasonable
that a "very slight" injury was sufficient so long as the injury "tend[ed] to destroy the beauty
or symmetry of the animal." State v. Harris, 11 Iowa 414, 415 (1861). The precedential value of
this case is diluted somewhat in light of the applicable statute referring both to the maiming
and disfiguring animals, and the court's observation that
[t]o maim as applied to domestic animals, implies some permanent injury; but to
disfigure is a lower grade of the same offense, and the disfiguring need not be of a
permanent character to make the offense complete. Thus to shave a horse's mane or
tail is a disfiguring of the horse, but the injury is not of a permanent character.
Id. at 415.
233. E.g., State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 312, 422 P.2d 353 (1966); State v. Nieuhaus, 217 Mo.
332,117 S.W. 73 (1909).
234. For "general" definitions 'of the word "disfigurement," see BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 355 (3d ed. 1969); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 554 (4th ed. 1968).
235. E.g., Dombrowski v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 148 Conn. 87, _, 167 A.2d 458, 462 (1961);
Superior Mining Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 309 Ill. 339, _, 141 N.E. 165, 166 (1923); Duncan
v. Beck, 553 S.W. 2d 476, 478 (Ky. 1977); Vukelich v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Utah 486, _, 220
P. 1073, 1075 (1923). See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 355 (3d ed. 1969); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 420 (5th ed. 1979).
236. Mitchum v. Inman Mills, 209 S.C. 307, _, 40 S.E.2d 38, 39 (1946) (workmen's compensation). See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 355 (3d ed. 1969).
237. Mitchum v. Inman Mills, 209 S.C. 307, _, 40 S.E.2d 38, 39 (1946) (workmen's
compensation).
238. State v. Nieuhaus, 217 Mo. 332, _, 117 S.W. 73, 78 (1909) (criminal).
239. The singular term "disfigure" in Virginia mayhem statute has been interpreted to
mean "a permanent and not merely a temporary and inconsequential disfigurement." Lee v.
Commonwealth, 135 Va. 572, _, 115 S.E. 671, 673 (1923).
240. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1025 (5th ed. 1979).
241. Id.
242. Id.
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medical probability. For example, medical testimony was used in an Iowa
tort case in determining that plaintiff's injuries were "permanent" through
the physician's expert testimony was that the injuries involved were permanent "unless there is some unexpected radical change."243 Or, as stated in an
Ohio workmen's compensation case,2•• a "permanent" disability is an injury
which, with reasonable probability, will continue for an indefinite period of
time without any present indication of recovery.
(C)· "Serious." Under the express statutory terms, a "permanent disfigurement" must also be of a "serious" nature 2 • D in order to constitute "serious injury." However, this limiting factor of "seriousness" is not included
in the only other two provisions on "disfigurement" in the Iowa Code. I.e
Accordingly, the term "serious" in this section should be interpreted liberally to exclude marginally "serious" disfigurements.
One court has made the observation, in a criminal case, that the word
"serious" has "no technical meaning and shall be considered in the ordinary
sense."an Accordingly, a "serious" injury in its general context must be
"grave" or "momentous" in nature, as opposed to "trivial" or
"superficial. "2.8
More specifically, the term "serious" commonly has been defined in
workmen's compensation cases as requiring that the disfigurement be "of
such a character that it substantially detracts from the appearance of the
person disfigured."2.e Under such a standard, the location of the injured
party's scars is of great importance, although it is not necessarily decisive.
At first blush, any permanent blemish or scar on an injured person's
face would appear to constitute "disfigurement" in light of the generally accepted definition of "disfigurement," which is to render one less perfect in
appearance. liDO However, the limiting factor of "seriousness," with its gener243. Knudsen v. Merle Hay Plaza, 160 N.W.2d 279, 286 (Iowa 1968).
244. Logsdon v. Industrial Comm'n, 143 Ohio St. 508, _, 57 N.E.2d 75, 78 (1944).
245. Judicial gloss has resulted in reading a requirement of "seriousness" into a Kentucky
tort recovery statute relating on its face only to "permanent disfigurement." See Duncan v.
Beck, 553 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1977). In this automobile accident case, the injured party had "some
small scars upon his right knee" which could "only be seen upon close examination of the
knee." Id. at 478. The court determined that such minor marks did not constitute "disfigurement" within the general dictionary definition of that term. See note 234 supra. In actuality, it
appears that the court was saying that a scar or other mutilation, although permanent in nature, has to be "serious" in order to be legally compensable as "permanent disfigurement."
246. See note 228 supra.
247. State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 312, _, 422 P.2d 353, 355 (1966).
248. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 168 Tex. Crim. 51, 323 S.W.2d 422, (Tex. Crim. App.
1959); McKee v. State, 93 Tex. Crim. 217, 246 S.W. 1035 (Tex. Crim. App. 1923); Ward v.
State, 70 Tex. Crim. 393, 159 S.W. 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913). See generally BALLENTINE'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1163 (3d ed. 1969); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1226 (5th ed. 1979).
249. E.g., Mitchum v. Inman Mills, 209 S.C. 307, _, 40 S.E.2d 38, 39 (1946); Dombrowski v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 148 Conn. 87, _, 167 A.2d 458, 462 (1960) (emphasis added).
250. See note 234 supra.
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ally-accepted definition of substantially detracting from the appearance of
the so-called "disfigured" person,lOI has been interpreted in several workmen's compensation cases to exclude "minor" blemishes or scars. Stating
that "[a]ll facial injuries which result in scars are not ipso facto compensable,,,m a New York court determined that "a one and one-half inch scar on
[the] left anterior scalp at the hair line" was not "serious."2Os Similarly,
other courts have determined that relatively short, narrow scars on more
prominent parts of the face do not qualify as "serious." In one case,lM the
court observed that the scars were not distinguishable at a distance beyond
eight feet. In another,2OO the court adroitly observed: "[w]e can think of no
form of activity, social, political, or economic, in which plaintiff might indulge, and be subject to any embarrassment by the presence of this small
scar."I66
Of course, "disfigurement" is not limited to bodily areas normally visible to others.II07 Perhaps the preferable approach in these situations would
be to require a stricter standard of substantiality. This is because a scar on
the face obviously detracts more from the injured person's appearance than
exactly the same scar on the buttocks, chest, legs, arms, or hands.
A Missouri casEi208 involving aggravated assault is an example where the
"disfigurement" occurred on an area of the body generally not visible to
others. These included the chest, abdomen, shoulders, back, thighs, stomach
and legs. The multiple whip wounds and burns (inflicted by a hot stove-lid
lifter) had penetrated "entirely through the skin upon [the] body and to
[the victim's] flesh,"II09leaving numerous sizeable permanent scars. The only
analysis of "disfigurement" in the opinion was the condusory statement that
these injuries constituted "disfigurement" as that non-technical term is considered; to wit, "to mar the figure and to render less perfect or beautiful in
appearance. "1180
251. For "general" definitions of the word "seriousness," see note 234 supra.
252. Hildreth v. Ford Motor Co., 14 App. Div. 2d 953, _, 221 N.Y.S.2d 16, 18 (3d Dep't
1961).
253. [d. at _,221 N.Y.S.2d at 17.
254. Mitchum v. Inman Mills, 209 S.C. 307, 40 S.E.2d 38 (1946).
255. Chisholm v. Jahncke Dry Docks, Inc., 10 La. App. 323, 121 So. 684 (1929).
256. [d. at _, 121 So. at 684.
257. The Iowa "disfigurement" provision in IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979) is not limited to
any bodily areas. This compares to the Delaware workmen's compensation statute which requires the "serious and permanent disfigurement" to be "visible and offensive when the body is
clothed normally . . . ." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2326(0 (1975). Judicial gloss on this restrictive language has resulted in the "clothed normally" provision to include "clothing normally
worn by the employee-claimant when involved in any of his or her regular activities, including
recreational, vocational, and avocational activities," rather than being limited to being clothed
"in his daily routine of life." Beam v. Chrysler Corp., 332 A.2d 143, 145 (Del. 1975).
258. State v. Nieuhaus, 217 Mo. 332, 117 S.W. 73 (1909).
259. [d. at _, 117 S.W. at 78.
260. [d.
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Similarly, a criminal conviction for aggravated battery in New Mexico
has been upheld 281 under a statute defining "great bodily injury" as causing
"serious disfigurement." The prosecution was based upon the forcible tattooing of the victim with a needle and India ink. The tattoo apparently was
partially visible even when the victim was fully clothed, extending from the
back of his neck to his waist. A doctor testified that "it would take 'strenuous and extensive' skin grafting to remove the tattoo."28lI Refusing to reverse
the conviction for insufficient evidence, the court said that these circumstances presented a question of fact "as to whether or not the injuries sustained were sufficiently substantial to come within the definition of the statute."283 The court observed that the word "serious" and "disfigurement"
have "no technical meaning and should be considered in the ordinary
sense. "284
On the other hand, an injury resulting in permanent scars on the injured party's hands has been interpreted in a Connecticut workmen's compensation case28G to not satisfy the statutory requirement that the disfigurement be "serious." These fine-line scars were visible only when the hand was
opened and the palm exposed.
(4) Bodily Injury Causing "Protracted" Loss of Bodily Function or
Organ. Another type of physical injury can constitute "serious injury" although it neither involves "a substantial risk of death" nor results in "serious permanent disfigurement." This is bodily injury resulting in "protracted" loss of any bodily function or organ. Unfortunately, the term
"protracted" is not defined in the Criminal Code, and it does not appear to
be a term with particular legal significance. l88 Thus, the word should be
given its usual meaning in common parlance. The general dictionary meaning is: "To draw out or lengthen in time; prolong."287 The words "prolong",
"protract," and "extend" are synonyms. They mean "to lengthen in time or
space. Prolong implies an increase in duration (time) beyond normal limits.
Protract adds to prolong the idea of lengthening indefinitely or unnecessarily. Extend can refer to mere lengthening in time or space, or to increase in
range or scope of activities or influence. "288 Slightly more elucidation can be
garnered from the Uniform Jury Instructions, which state that "[aJ bodily
injury which causes a protracted loss or impairment is such injury as would
prolong or extend the loss or use of a member or organ, or which would
261. State v. Ortega, 77 N.M. 312, 422 P.2d 353 (1966).
262. [d. at _,422 P.2d at 355.
263. [d. (citing State v. Edwards, 28 N.J. 292, 146 A.2d 209 (1958».
264. 217 Mo. at _, 117 S.W. at 78.
265. Dombrowski v. Fafnir Bearing Co., 148 Conn. 87, 167 A.2d 458 (1961).
266. Indeed, this term is not even included in the standard legal dictionaries TINE'S LAW DICTIONARY (3rd ed. 1969) and BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
267. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1052 (4th ed. 1976).
268. [d. at 1046.
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weaken, damage or reduce the use of a member or organ of a person."S8e
Whether or not a broken limb can be considered "protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member ... " and thus constitute
"serious injury" remains for judicial interpretation, with the question for
decision being the meaning of "protracted." Because of the restrictive language in the Uniform Jury Instructions, a reasonable interpretation would
be that the ordinary six weeks or so in a cast for a broken leg would not be a
"protracted" period. On the other hand, complications could arise causing
the broken limb to not mend entirely for a prolonged or extended period of
six months or so. Arguably, this would fall within the definition of "protracted," even though the initial injury itself was more or less routine in
nature. Of course, it is possible (although not desirable) that the Iowa courts
would interpret "protracted" as being merely a more prolonged, rather than
a mere temporary, disuse of a bodily function. Mter all, an assault victim
can suffer a wide range of injuries - from (1) merely momentary pain to (2)
a bruise which will disappear in a few days to (3) incapitation of a leg for a
few days while the victim is on crutches to (4) an ordinary broken leg necessitating a cast for approximately six weeks or so to (5) an extended period of
incapitation due to unusual complications surrounding a broken leg to (6)
indefinite (if not permanent) loss of a bodily function or organ (e.g., a leg
that needs to be amputated or a collapsed lung). The question becomes at
which point in this wide spectrum does an injury become "protracted" in
nature. Obviously, the final point of indefiniteness or permanency is unnecessary, in light of reading, in pari materia, this phrase of protracted loss
with the accompanying phrase of serious permanent disfigurement in another clause of this same sentence in the Code. On the other hand, "protracted" should be read restrictively to not include an ordinary broken leg in
light of the three other types of "serious injury" in section 702.18 requiring
injuries of a grave nature. These include disabling mental illness, as well as
physical injuries either creating a substantial risk of death or causing serious
permanent disfigurement.
Temporary amnesia has been held insufficient by itself under a similar
Texas statute to show "protracted loss or impairment of any bodily member
or organ."no Moreover, this same victim's "multiple superficial abrasions
and contusions of head and body"nl were not considered to be "serious injuries," presumably because of their temporary nature.
Protracted impairment of a victim's eye has been considered a "serious
physical injury" under a similar New York law.1n The victim had been
kicked in the face ten or twelve times by the defendant, who was wearing
heavy leather boots. Even after surgery, his "eye level had not returned to
269. UNIPORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 219.
270. Sanchez v. State, 543 S.W.2d 132 (TeL Crim. App. 1976).
271. [d. at 134.
272. See People v. Rumaner, 45 App. Div. 2d 290, 357 N.Y.S.2d 735 (3d Dep't 1974).

HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 268 1979-1980

1979-80]

Iowa Criminal Code

269

normal and [his] left eyelid was lower than the right."178 Similarly, another
New York case27• essentially has held that a "serious injury" was not inflicted when the victim was struck in the back of the head with a stone
which was roughly 2- Y2" in diameter. The injury merely had caused him to
feel dizzy and to be unable to walk, and he was taken to the hospital where
three sutures were taken in the head wound.lI711 In contrast, there was no
doubt that a "serious injury" was suffered in another New York caseJ78 in
which the victim's left ear was bitten off.
(5) "Disabling" Mental Illness. A fourth alternative category of "serious injury" under section 702.18 of the Code - a "disabling" mental illness
- does not focus upon physical injury at all. Once again the General Assembly failed to define these terms. This means that judicial interpretations
must be based upon existing legal interpretations for technical definitions,
or, if none, then to common parlance.
A "disabling mental illness" is defined in the Uniform Jury Instructions
as "an illness or condition which cripples, incapitates, weakens or destroys a
person's normal and usual mental functions."lI77 This essentially follows the
general definition of "disability" used by the Iowa Supreme COurtll7S and in
common parlance. 278
The use of the unqualified singular term "disabling" raises many major
questions. Must the disability be total or is a partial disability sufficient?
Must the disability be permanent or is a temporary disability sufficient?
What effect must this disability have on the injured party's ordinary way of
life? Or, more fundamentally, what exactly is a disability?
That a "disabling mental illness" was intended to include both permanent and temporary disabilities is evident from its non-qualified language in
comparison with the expressly limited language of "serious permanent disfigurement" in the same statute. Similarly, Iowa's workers' compensation
statute280 contains separate provisions for temporary and permanent
disabilities.
273. [d. at 293, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 736-37.
274. In re Taylor, 62 Misc.2d 529, 309 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1970).
275. [d. at _,309 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
276. People v. Dingley, 50 App. Div.2d 361, 378 N.Y.S.2d 90 (3d Dep't 1976) rev'd, 42
N.Y.2d 888, 366 N.E.2d 877, 397 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1977).
277. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCl'IONS, supra note 136, at No. 219.
278. See Hill v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 146 Iowa 168, 124 N.W.898 (1910), in which the court
used the following general dictionary meaning of "disability": "a want of competent power,
strength, or physical ability; we$ess; incapacity; impotence." Accord State v. Chatterson, 259
N.W.2d 766, 770 (Iowa 1977) ("disabled" means "incapacitated by ... injury, or wounds:
crippled").
279. See generally BALLENTINE'S LAW DICl'IONARY 351 (3rd ed. 1969); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 415 (5th ed. 1979) (ordinarily, to take away the ability of, to render incapable of proper
and effective action).
280. IOWA CODE § 85.34 (1979).
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It appears also that the legislative intent was to include both total and
partial mental disabilities in section 702.18 in the absence of any qualifying

language. Contrastingly, Iowa's workers' compensation statuteS81 contains
separate sections on permanent partial disabilities and permanent total
disabilities.
The phrase "mental illness" suggests a defect more serious in nature
than a mental condition (although the two terms are equated in the Uniform Jury Instructions).181 That is, one could have a mental condition
which, unlike a mental illness, nevertheless would not render the person incapacitated. Examples of a mental condition would be temporary amnesialsa
or an anxiety reaction/'a. as opposed to mental illnesses such as psychosis or
severe psychoneurosis.s811 Mental illness seemingly involves a lowering of intellectual capacity, although obviously not to the extent of insanity. Indeed,
a mentally-ill person normally is thought of as being unable to pursue an
ordinary life pattern (e.g., to care for oneself or to carry on regular employment). Indeed, for purposes of the Federal Social Security Actl88 the "disability" must cause inability to work (because of a medically determinable
physical or mental impairment).187
Judicial interpretations of the "disability" provision in the Social Security Act also give some guidance as to the meaning of a mental disability.
The parameters generally have been set as follows: on the one hand, the
term "disability" has been interpreted as not meaning completely helpless
or bedridden,l88 and, on the other hand the term has been interpreted as
being required to be of long-continued and indefinite duration. o •
In terms of the type of mental condition that qualifies as a "disability"

281. Id.
282. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 219. This type of "serious injury" is defined therein as "an illness or a person's normal and usual mental functions." Rejecting defendant's claim that the terms "normal" and "usual" are vague, the supreme court
has said: "[R]elative to words which are of ordinary usage and generally understood, further
instructional definition is not required." State v. Holmes, N.W.2d (Iowa 1979).
283. See generally Sanchez v. State, 543 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (temporary
amnesia not a serious injury involving protracted loss of bodily function).
284. See Alvarado v. Weinberger, 511 F.2d 1046, 1049 (1st Cir. 1975) (interpretation of
"disability" under Social Security Act).
285. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (1979); Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 1034, 1047 (1969). See also
Rosay v. Gardner, 247 F. Supp. 603 (S.D. Cal. 1965) (psychoneurosis is a mental disorder compensable under Social Security Act).
.
286. 42 U.S.C. § 423 (1976).
287. See Teeter v. Fleming, 270 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1959). See generally Annot., 77
A.L.R.2d 641 (1961). See also Annot., 23 A.L.R.3d 1034 (1969) (pain as "disability" under S0cial Security Act); Ozark Mut. Life Assoc. v. Winchester, 116 Okla. 116,243 P. 735 (1926) (term
"disability" in accident insurance policy means disability from performing occupation insured
was following at time of accident and not some vocation which he might be able to follow after
the accident).
288. Celebrezze v. Warren, 339 F.2d 833, 837 (10th Cir. 1964).
289. Mims v. Celebrezze, 217 F. Supp. 581, 585 (D.Colo. 1963).
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under the Social Security Act, the courts similarly have been restrictive. For
example, the First Circuit Court of Appeals1llo has summarily held that
"[t]he mere existence of a psychoneurosis or an anxiety reaction does not
constitute a disability."11I1 Without noting the cause of the claimant's mental
condition, the opinion stated that the claimant complained of "numbness in
her head, insomnia, inability to work in the home, lack of appetite, waking
up screaming and walking back and forth, a frightened feeling in her heart,
crying spells, and an impulse to scream."lIIl1 Her condition was diagnosed
variously as "involutional psychotic depressive reaction" and as "a chronic
depressive neurosis in almost total remission of symptoms."1118
In conclusion, either an anxiety reaction or a slight neurosis should not
qualify as "mental illness." For example, a rape victim would not have suffered "serious injury" merely by being afraid to go out alone at night or by
being "cool" to all men or by being depressed. It would also seem that a
"disabling mental illness" does not arise merely because a rape victim requires psychiatric or psychological care of an incidental nature. Indeed,
emotional trauma would be an incidental fallout of most forcible sexual
abuse attacks. The crux of the matter is that there are three degrees of Sexual Abuse,III' with a forcible rape without more constituting only third-degree Sexual Abuse whereas a "serious injury" is necessary to upgrade the
"ordinary" forcible rape into Sexual Abuse in the First Degree.
By again referring to the Social Security Act, the conclusion is fortified
that incidental counselling for a mentally-disturbed crime victim is not sufficient for purposes of the "serious injury" provision. Under the Code of Federal RegulationslillD an example is given of a compensable mental "disability" as a psychosis or severe psychoneurosis requiring continued
institutionalization or continued supervision of the affected individual. And
the Social Security Act is interpreted liberally. By contrast, a criminal statute should be interpreted narrowly to not include anything beyond that
clearly within legislative intent. The bottom line should be that a forcible
rape victim should not be considered to have suffered a "serious injury" if
she or he is able to carry out ordinary pursuits of life. A person who maintains ordinary gainful employment and other everyday activities clearly has
not suffered a "disabling mental illness" merely because of anxieties over
being outside after dark or being in the company of strangers of the opposite sex.
h. "Sex Act." An extremely broad general statutory definition of "sex
act" is included in Iowa Code section 702.17 as the necessary actus reus for
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Alvarado v. Weinberger, 511 F.2d 1046 (1st Cir. 1975).
[d. at 1049.
[d. at 1048 n.1.
[d. at 1048.
See IOWA CODE §§ 709.1-.4 (1979).
20 C.F.R. § 404.1502(a) (1979).
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the crimes of Sexual Abuse 2s8 and Prostitution,2S? as well as one alternative
actus reus for the crimes of Indecent Exposure 298 and Lascivious Acts With
a Child. 2sS Moreover, the five obscenity offensessoo contain broader, more
specific definitions of "sex act" which use the general term as their starting
points.
A "sex act" is defined in section 702.17 as "any sexual contact between
two or more persons" in any of the four alternative ways:
[1] by penetration of the penis into the vagina or anus, [or] [2] by contact between the mouth and genitalia or [3] by contact between the genitalia of one person and the genitalia or anus of another person or [4] by
use of artificial sexual organs or substitutes therefor in contact with the
genitalia or anus. SOl

Sexual contact is therefore necessary, whereas penetration is not. This, of
course, represents a major expansion of the pre-revised unauthorized sexrelated crimes (Rape,S02 Statutory Rape,sos Carnal Knowledge of an Imbecile,s04 Sodomy,SO~ and Prostitution,S08) all of which required penetration by
a sexual organ. This leaves Incest80? as the only crime requiring sexual intercourse (i.e., penetration) as an element.
The broad definition of "sexual contact" thus includes a wide range of
consummated and attempted heterosexual and homosexual activity, "both
conventional and deviant, between members of the same or opposite sex,"808
including the following: intercourse, buggery, cunnilingus, and fellatio. Nevertheless, these activities are punishable only when committed (or attempted) either: by force, with a "child," with a mentally-defective person,
or with fourteen and fifteen-year olds in certain circumstances. Thus, homosexual "sex acts" and acts of sodomy are not criminalized per se.
The judicial gloss put on this term has seemingly broadened the concept of a "sex act" even further. In State v. Howard,809 the Iowa Supreme
Court held that intertwining or rubbing together of the pubic hair of the
defendant and the intended victim constituted contact of their genital parts
IOWA CODE §§ 709.1·.4 (1979).
297. [d. § 725.1.
298. [d. § 709.9 (committing a "sex act" in view of a third person).
299. [d. § 709.8(3) (soliciting a "child" to engage in a "sex act").
300. [d. §§ 728.1-.12.
301. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 902; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 44, 201.
296.

302.

IOWA CODE § 698.1 (1977) (repealed 1978).

303.
304.
305.
306.

[d.
[d. § 698.3.
[d. § 705.1.
[d. § 724.1.

307.
308.
309.

IOWA CODE § 726.2 (1979).
J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 202 at 58.
284 N.W.2d 201 (Iowa 1979).
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and thus a "sex act" sufficient to uphold a conviction for Sexual Abuse. It
was also held in Howard that the trial court correctly took judicial notice of
the exterior anatomy of genitalia as well as of the location of pubic hair.
On the other hand, the court demonstrated in State v. Baidwin 810 that
it was unwilling to expand by judicial interpretation the scope of a "sex act"
in situations where the offensive conduct did not involve parts of the body
enumerated within the statutory definition. In a prosecution for Lascivious
Acts With a Child slo. l allegedly committed by solicitation to engage in a "sex
act," the evidence showed only that the defendant kissed an unwilling young
girl "on the forehead" and "put his hand down the front of her shirt."810.lI
Reversing the conviction, the court pointed out that the human breast is not
one of the specifically-enumerated bodily parts within the statutory definition of "sex act" and held that the term "genitalia" (being limited only to
"the reproductive organs")810.8 within the definition of "sex act" does not
include a human breast. Even though the defendant's conduct constituted
an assault and had some sex-oriented purpose, there was nothing to indicate
an intent to achieve a "sex act." As alluded to by the court, the act of fondling children other than in the genitals or otherwise taking indecent physical liberties with children is a casus omissus in the Iowa law covering the
serious crime of Lascivious Acts With a Child. 81 Q.4
Unauthorized digital manipulation of genitalia does not appear to be
included as a "sex act" - unless a finger is construed as a substitute for a
sexual organ, which is highly unlikely.811 Nor does bestiality or two-party
masturbationsll1 appear to fall within the definition. In interpreting this pro:vision, one should keep in mind that this provision basically replaces the
pre-revised crime of Rape, the gravamen of which was non-consensual sexual intercourse. Whether the new concept of "sexual contact" encompasses
certain acts such as digital manipulation and masturbation must be clear
and unmistakeable in the statutory language itself, in light of Emery v.
Fenton. 8lB
i. Undefined Terms. The list of general definitional clauses in chapter
702 is by no means complete. In light of only a limited number of general
definition clauses in the Criminal Code, the supreme court has had to apply
general rules or canons of statutory construction to define words or phrases
left undefined by the General Assembly. One such principle the court has
applied is the rule that "in enacting a statute, a legislative body is presumed
310. 291 N.W.2d 337 (Iowa 1980).
310.1. IOWA CODE § 709.8(3) (1979).
310.2. 291 N.W.2d at 339.
310.3. Id. at 340.
310.4. Id.
311. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 44, 201-2.
312. See State ex reI. Clemens v. ToNeCa, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 909 (Iowa 1978).
313. 266 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1978). See text accompanying notes 112-119 supra.
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to know the usual meaning ascribed by the courts to show language and to
intend that meaning unless the context shows otherwise."s14
Fortunately, many of the undefined terms do have a well-defined common law meaning (e.g., the homicide-related terms of "malice aforethought," "premeditation," and "provocation"). More obscure undefined
terms (e.g., abandon,slII disfigure,8l8 protracted,Sl7 and torture S18 ) enjoy less
well-defined common law meanings.
Two other terms - "explosive device"s18 and "minor"sao - appear in
several provisions without benefit of a general definitional clause in the
Criminal Code. Nevertheless, both terms are defined in other titles of the
Iowa Code. au Looking to these statutory definitions, in pari materia, for
guidance in interpreting these undefined terms in the Criminal Code certainly seems appropriate, especially in light of State v. Wilson. SIll In Wilson,
the court took into consideration the statutory definition of the word "abandon" in two provisions outside the Criminal Code in interpreting the word
"abandon" as it appears, undefined, in the newly-constituted crime of Wanton Neglect of a Minor. su
(1) "Abandonment." The statutorily-undefined term of "abandonment" as used in the newly constituted offense of Wanton Neglect of a Minorm has been defined by the supreme courtsu as requiring permanency,
therefore, temporary neglect or temporary absence is insufficient.
(2) "Felonious Assault." One new key term in the Criminal Code,
which went statutorily undefined is "felonious assault." This term appears
only once in the Criminal Code - in the definition of a "forcible felony,"S'8
yet it nevertheless is important even though it does not define a crime itself.
That is, any crime constituting a "felonious assaulf' is subject to the special
provisions relating to all "forcible felonies," as discussed above.m
The Iowa Supreme CourtSJ8 has filled the lexiconical gap by interpreting the term "felonious assault" to mean "any assault the commission of
314.
315.
ing notes
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.

State v. Wilson, 287 N.W.2d 587, 590 (Iowa 1980).
See IOWA CODE § 726.6(2) (1979) (Wanton Neglect of a Minor) and text accompany324·25 infra.
See id. § 702.18 ("serious injury") and text accompanying notes 233·38 supra.
See id. § 702.18 ("serious injury") and text accompanying notes 268·71 supra.
See id. § 710.2.
See id. §§ 712.1·.8 (Arson offenses).
See text accompanying notes 153·55 supra.
See text accompanying notes 153·55 supra.
287 N.W.2d 587 (Iowa 1980).
IOWA QODE § 726.6(2) (1979).
1d.
State v. Wilson, 287 N.W.2d 587 (Iowa 1980).
IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979). See text accompanying notes 180·83 supra.
See text accompanying notes 184·203 supra.
State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979).
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which constitutes a felony."8111 Thus, any felony in either the "Assault"
chapter or elsewhere (e.g., Attempted Murder)880 "which necessarily include[s] an assault"881 is a "felonious assault."
The determination of a felony classification is clear on the face of the
various statutory provisions. Thus, Assault with Intent to Inflict Serious Injurym (an aggravated misdemeanor) is not a "felonious assault." However,
whether or not an assault88S is "necessarily included" in some of the offenses
contained in this chapter is far from clear. The determining factor seems to
be that an assault is It required element of the greater offense charged, as
determined by the elements on the face of the statute itself, rather than that
the facts surrounding the commission of the greater offense indicate an assault. SS4 The mere fact that an offense is included in a chapter entitled "Assault" is of no significance at all in determining whether that offense is a
"felonious assault."886 After all, a chapter entitled "Murder" also includes
Voluntary Manslaughter, Involuntary Manslaughter, and several feticide-related offenses. S8e
To date, that court has had occasion only to specifically determine that
Attempted Murder8s7 is a "felonious assault."888 Other clearly assaultive offenses carrying a felo.ny penalty are Assault While Participating in a Felony,8SI1 Terrorism,840 and Willful Injury.841 Two other felony offenses included in the chapter entitled "Assault" - Administering Harmful
Substancess41 and Going Armed With Intent848 - do not expressly include
an assault in their elements and thus must await judicial interpretation to
determine if they are "felonious assaults." The same circumstances apply
to Voluntary Manslaughter844 and unlawful act-type Involuntary Man329. [d. at 28.
330. IOWA CODE § 707.11 (1979). See State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979).
331. State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa 1979).
332. IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979).
333. [d. § 708.1.
334. The language in the definition of "felonious assault" as "a felony which necessarily
include[s] an assault" in State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa 1979) (emphasis added)
suggests that an Assault must be a lesser included offense of the particular greater crime in
order for the latter to be a "felonious assault." For a detailed discussion of the test for lesser
included offenses, see text accompanying notes part II D 11-18 infra.
335. See generally 2A Sutherland on Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47.14 (4th
ed. 1973).
336. See IOWA CODE ch. 707 (1979).
337. [d. § 707.11.
338. State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979).
339. IOWA CODE § 708.3 (1979).
340. [d. § 708.6.
341. [d. § 708.4.
342. [d. § 708.5.
343. [d. § 708.8.
344. [d. § 707.4.
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slaughter. 84 &
(3) "Firearm." Next to "forcible felonY,"848 probably the most important single term in the Criminal Code is "firearm," in light of a five-year
minimum sentence being mandatory for use of firearms during the commission of any "forcible felony" offense. 847 In addition, involvement of a "firearm" is a necessary part of four crimes.848 Yet, this important term is not
defined anywhere in the Iowa Code. Nevertheless, "firearm" has been interpreted under the pre-revised law to mean "a small arms weapon from which
a projectile is fired by gunpowder."s48 The court noted additionally that "a
firearm must meet two requirements. It must be able to propel a projectile
and it must do so by explosive force."8I1o
(4) "Physical Injury." In contrast to the related term of "serious injury,"Slll the term "physical injury" is not defined anywhere in the Criminal
Code, nor is there any clue as to the extent of the injury required. As Professor Yeager ponders: "Does this mean any physical injury, no matter how
slight?"SIlI This would appear to be the case, especially in light of the very
restrictive definition of "serious injury." About the only definite point is
that some injury, however slight, is necessary - thus requiring more than
mere offensive contact or touching (indeed even shoving). Thus, a bruise, a
cut, indeed even a scratch may be enough, albeit such injuries are minor in
nature.
"physical injury" is a component of two crimes. Burglary is raised to the
first degree SII8 whenever a "physical injury" alone is intentionally or recklessly inflicted. (On the other hand, a "serious injury" is necessary for several other major crimes to be of the first (highest) degree, including Kidnapping, Robbery, and Sexual Abuse.) One of the eight forms of Extortion81i4
occurs when the underlying threat is to inflict "physical injury."

345.

[d. § 707.5(1).

346.

See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 180-204 supra.

347. [d. § 902.7. See State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26 (Iowa 1979); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 220-22; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 1628; and text
accompanying notes 93-96 pupra.
348. These offenses which expressly include presence of a "firearm" as an alternative
mode of commission include: Assault, Interference With Official Acts, Carrying Weapons, and
Possession of Firearms by Felons. See IOWA CODE §§ 708.1(3), 719.1, 724.4, and 724.26 (1979),
respectively.
349.

State v. Lawr, 263 N.W.2d 747, 749 (Iowa 1978).

350.

[d. at 750.

351.

See IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979) and text accompanying notes 207-295 supra.

352.

J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 295.

353.

IOWA CODE § 713.2 (1979).

354.

IOWA CODE § 711.4(1) (1979).
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Transitional or Savings Provision

A savings provision in section 801.5 of the Codem permits prosecution
of criminal conduct committed before the effective date of the new Criminal
Code, January 1, 1978, notwithstanding the general repeal of the prior law
as part and parcel of the code revision process. Moreover, any such carryover prosecutions "are governed by the prior law, which is continued in effect for that purpose. . . ."8118
Certain provisions of the new Criminal Code can apply to carryover
prosecutions, however, but only at the election of the defendant. These
clearly include defenses and factors of mitigation. Additionally, there appeared to be a retroactive decriminalization provision, whereby a defendant
would not be prosecutable now for pre-1978 conduct which was decriminalized in the new Criminal Code,8117 but its impact has been sharply curtailed
by several restrictive judicial interpretations. 8118
Although there should be few, if any, carryover prosecutions in mid1980, nevertheless these transitional principles remain important in light of
retrials following successful appeals or postconviction relief actions.
1. Substantive Provisions

With one limited exception, the new Code provisions defining criminal
conduct are not applicable to carryover prosecutions. In other words, the
definition of a crime at the time of its commission controls, notwithstanding
a subsequent change in the statutory language which is favorable to an offender (provided, of course, that an "applicable offense" is included in the
revised Code). This provision was applied in State v. Bousman8118 to uphold
the trial court's refusal in a "carryover" prosecution for Assault With Intent
to Inflict Great Bodily InjuryBso to instruct the jury on the apparently more
restrictive successor offense of Assault With Intent to Inflict Serious Injury.SSI Noting that this situation was not included in any of the enumerated
exceptions for applying the new Code, the court held that all that was required was that the instruction accurately define the applicable law at the
time of the offense.
The one exception relating to the definition of a crime is that the new
Code shall apply when "based upon [its] failure ... to define an applicable
355.
356.
Code, see
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

IOWA CODE § 801.5 (1979).
Id. § 801.5(1). For a discussion of several aspects of construction of the new Criminal
text accompanying notes 29-35 and 112-127 supra.
IOWA CODE § 801.5(2)(a) (1979).
See text accompanying notes 361-63 infra.
276 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1979).
See IOWA CODE § 694.6 (1977) (repealed 1978).
IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979).
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offense."362 No judicial discretion is accorded, as application of this apparently decriminalization provision is at the defendant's request (with the
court's approval not required, unlike several other of the sections in the
transitional provision).863
On the face of this statute, it appears that a person would not be prosecuted for conduct which although criminal at the time of its commission was
no longer criminal (in the revised Code) at the time of trial. Because the
new Code failed to define as criminal this particular conduct, the philosophy
is that a person who has not yet been prosecuted should get the advantage
of the ameliorative provision. After all, the legislative judgment in the revision process was to the effect that this type of conduct is no longer serious
enough to be treated as criminal and thus a person should not be prosecuted
for an antiquated crime.
This provision was sharply restricted in the case of State v. Buck8"
. which presented a showcase example for such an ameliorative provision.
Buck was convicted under the pre-revised law of five counts of Lascivious
Acts With a Child.86& Three of his victims were either fourteen or fifteen
years of age, and the other two were under fourteen. These respective ages
were crucial in light of the definition of a "child" being lowered from a
cutoff age of under-16 under the pre-revised law to an under-fourteen cutoff
under the new law. 866
Thus, all five victims were included as children under the pre-revised
law, but only two were included under the revised law.
Buck was prosecuted and convicted in late 1977, but was not sentenced
until 1978 (i.e., after the new Code took effect). At his request, he was sentenced under the new Code. Nevertheless, he was sentenced - even under
the new Code - on all five counts, and the supreme court affirmed.
The supreme court relied solely on the general savings provision867 (to
the effect that the new Code does not apply to any offenses committed
before its effective date) without even mentioning the enumerated exception
of failure of the new Act to define an applicable offense. There is an implication in the opinion that the latter exception was not argued on behalf of the
defendant, in light of the court's observation that defendant "seeks to avoid
the effect of the savings clause by reason of the court's application to be
sentenced under the [new Code)."868 The court then noted that permission
for a "carryover" offender to be sentenced under the new Code is granted,
by express terms of the statute, where it is "applicable to the offense and
362. [d. § 801.5(2)(a).
363. [d. §§ 801.5(2)(b)(1), (2).
364. 275 N.W.2d 194 (Iowa 1979). See also IOWA CODE § 702.5 (1979).
365. See IOWA CODE § 725.10 (1975) (repealed 1978).
366. IOWA CODE § 709.8 (1979).
367. [d. § 801.5(1).
368. 275 N.W.2d at 196.
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the offender."s8s Thus, sentencing under the new Code for prior offenses can
occur only after the sentencing court has found an applicable provision in
the new Code. Then, and apparently only then, the court can apply the new
sentence. Thus, this section does not "substitute for old offenses the revision's definition of the crime."s7o Here, then, the sentencing court correctly
applied the new Code's lower sentences to all five counts of the pre-revised
offenses he was convicted of, the supreme court intimated.
The import of this decision is unclear in light of defendant having already been prosecuted in 1977, with his only apparent argument being that
he should be sentenced under the new Code. Perhaps the Buck holding
means only that the apparent mitigation (i.e., failure of new statute "to define an applicable offense") applies only to the initial prosecution and not to
the ultimate sentencing process. Because the defendant apparently limited
his argument to the sentencing provision, it remains to be seen whether a
frontal decriminalization attack on a conviction in circumstances similar to
those in Buck will be successful. Such an argument should prevail, provided
that the defendant had preserved his record by a timely raising of the issue
in the trial court.
In State v. Massey,S71 the supreme court reversed a conviction for keeping a House of III FameS711 under the pre-revised law and remanded it for
retrial. The court, relying upon section 801.5 of the new Code, summarily
noted that "[t]he statutes involved in this case were repealed as part of the
criminal law revision effective January 1, 1978, but this prosecution was unaffected by that event."S7S Massey had committed his crime in 1977 and had
been convicted and sentenced also in 1977.
A related section of the transitional provisionS?4 gives a "carryover" defendant (upon his request and without necessity of court approval) the benefit of any "defense or mitigation" under the new Code. Nevertheless, the
supreme court essentially has taken this right away. In State v. Hanna,171
the court rejected defendant's contention that the trial court erred in refusing his request to be tried under the new Code for an offense committed
under the old Code where the new penalty schedule was particularly ameliorative. Specifically, defendant committed an Assault With Intent to In1lict
Great Bodily Injury (a felony under the pre-revised law) in 1977 and was
convicted of that offense in 1978. It must be noted that the "comparable"
crime (if not even more serious in nature) under the new Code is a mere
aggravated misdemeanor. As the supreme court pointed out, had defen369. 275 N.W.2d at 194, 196. See IOWA CODE § B01.5(2)(b)(2) (1979) (emphasis added).
370. 275 N.W.2d at 196.
371. 275 N.W.2d 436 (Iowa 1979).
372. See IOWA CODE § 724.3 (1977) (repealed 1978).
373. 275 N.W.2d at 437.
374. IOWA CODE § 801.5(2)(a) (1979).
375. 277 N.W.2d 605 (Iowa 1979).
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dant's request been granted, he would not have been subject to being further sentenced under the habitual criminal statute which relates only to underlying felony convictions. Regarding whether the statutory change of the
status of this offense from a felony to a misdemeanor constituted a "mitigation" under the statute, the opinion observed:
The matter is troublesome because the statute does not define "mitigation." As pointed out in State v. Smith, 324 A.2d 203, 206-07 (Del.
1974), the term is susceptible of the meaning for which defendant argues.
Be that as it may, we are controlled here by our Buck and Massey decisions. We therefore hold defendant was properly convicted under § 694.6,
The Code, 1977. 378

2. Procedural Law
It appears that a "carryover" defendant has his choice of whether to
proceed under either the old or the new Code, as far as procedural law is
concerned. However, the court's approval is required. Moreover, a test for
the court's approval is set out: "insofar as they [procedural provisions] are
justly applicable."s77
A question undoubtedly will arise as to whether the defendant can elect
application of only some of the new procedural provisions. I submit that it is
an all-or-nothing proposition. Were it otherwise, the test of applicability of
the new procedural provisions - "insofar as they are justly applicable" would not be met, as far as the State is concerned. There would also be the
argument that a piecemeal approach would develop, encouraging conflicting
results.
•
That the transitional provisions on procedure and sentencing are not
intertwined was decided in State v. Kantaris. 878 Defendant by implication
had elected to be tried under the new Code's procedural provisions by having filed several motions pursuant to the new Code. The judge subsequently
erred in sua sponte electing to also sentence the defendant under the new
Code. Defendant quite understandably had not requested to be sentenced
under the new Code, in light of its harsher penalty. Because the Code clearly
conditions the application of the new Code's sentencing provisions in carryover cases on the defendant's request, the trial court was without authority
to sentence on its own motion. The State's contention that defendant had
waived his right of election as to the sentencing provision by his filing of
new Code procedural motions was rejected. Thus, the transitional provisions
on procedure and sentencing "are independent of each other" and are not to
be "yoked in their application. "879
376.
377.
37S.
379.

277 N.W.2d at 60S.
IOWA CODE § S01.5(2)(b)(1) (1979).
2S0 N.W.2d 3S9 (Iowa 1979).
ld. at 393.
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Sentencing

The transitional provision also relates to sentencing in two respects.
One aspect concerned "carryover" sentencing in instances where the defendant was already convicted under the pre-revised law but was not sentenced
until January 1, 1978 or after the effective date of the new Code. The other
relates to inmates serving sentences under the pre-revised law which are less
severe for the same offense under the new Code, with the pertinent question
being whether the new Code mandated resentencing.
a. "Carryover" Sentencing. Under section 801.5(2)(b)(2) of the new
Code, before a "carryover" defendant may be sentenced under a comparable
new Code provision for an old Code offense, the following three conditions
must exist: (1) defendant must request such sentencing, (2) the trial court,
in its discretion, must so approve, and (3) there must be a provision in the
new Code which is both "applicable to the offense and the offender."a8o
The matter of approving or disapproving a defendant's request has
been interpreted as a matter left "entirely to trial court discretion,"S8I and
thus a "carryover" defendant has no right to the advantage of any ameliorative sentencing changes. This principle prevails in spite of the general savings provision in section 4.13 of the Code which requires imposition of an
applicable reduced penalty in a "carryover" prosecution, because section
801.5 of the Criminal Code is a specific savings provision. 882
b. Resentencing Inmates. In Cartee v. Brewer,888 the supreme court
held that the transitional provision in the new Criminal Code did not require resentencing of inmates serving sentences under the pre-revised Code
although the comparable sentences under the new Code were less severe. In
pertinent part, section 801.5(3) provides: "[p]rovisions of this [new Act] governing the release . . . of prisoners . . . shall apply to persons under sentence for offenses committed before [the effective date of this Act,] except
that the minimum or maximum period of their detention . . . shall in no
case be increased . ... "884
The key factor controlling release is the maximum length of the imprisonment. This subsection must have a purpose, and the purpose of applying
new law to old law would be to effect either an increase or a decrease. The
statutory language expressly prohibits an increase, thus leaving only a decrease as a purpose. An accepted rule of statutory construction is that the
courts will not assume the legislature intended to pass a meaningless provision, and this subsection would be meaningless if it were not interpreted to
380. The importance of the third factor is underscored in State v. Buck, 275 N.W.2d 194
(Iowa 1979), as discussed in text accompanying notes 364-370 supra.
381. State v. Bousman, 278 N.W.2d 15, 17 (Iowa 1979).
382. [d.
383. 265 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1978).
384. IOWA CODE § 801.5(3) (1979) (emphasis added).
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require decreasing of sentences where the applicable criminal conduct carries a lesser penalty under the new Criminal Code.
Nevertheless, the supreme court determined that this provision merely
makes the new Code's procedures for release or discharge applicable to a
person under a valid sentence. The opinion seemingly was based upon the
express declaration therein that nothing in the new Code shall "affect the
substantive or procedural validity of any judgment of conviction [previously] entered . . . . " This reasoning begs the question, however, as validity
was not the issue. Rather, an ameliorative sentencing equalization scheme
was intended to lower valid (but excessively harsh) sentences. The most extreme example of reduction in penalty schedules is in the area of Burglary.
Burglary with Aggravation was punishable under the pre-revised law by confinement for any term of years through life, and merely having an aider and
abettor present was sufficient to constitute Aggravated Burglary. Contrastingly, a two-person burglary without more constitutes mere Burglary in the
Second Degree, punishable under the new Code by an indeterminate term of
ten years. Two inmates should not be serving potentially maximum terms of
life or ten years for the same criminal conduct, especially after the legislative judgment that the harsh penalty schedule under the pre-revised law
should be ameliorated.
c. Combining Procedural and Sentencing Elections. That a defendant
may still elect sentencing under the old Code, even though he has elected to
be tried (procedurally) under the new Code in a carryover prosecution, has
been determined in State v. Kantaris,886 as discussed above. 888

E.

Uniform Jury Instructions

A comprehensive set of revised "Uniform" Jury Instructions on the major crimes887 in the new Criminal Code 888 has been prepared by the Special
Committee on Uniform Jury Instructions of the Iowa State Bar Associa385. 280 N.W.2d 389 (Iowa 1979).
386. See text accompanying notes 377 -378 supra.
387. No instructions have been prepared for any of the following classifications of offenses: IOWA CODE §§ 717.1-.3 (injury to animals); 718.1-.6 (offenses against government); 721.1.9 (official misconduct); 722.1-.9 (bribery and corruption offenses); 727.1-.11 (health, safety, and
welfare offenses); 728.1-.11 (obscenity offenses) (1979). However, chapters have been reserved
for future Uniform Jury Instructions. Additionally, there is no indication that Uniform Jury
Instructions will ever be prepared for the following offenses: IOWA CODE §§ 725.5-.16 (gambling); 729.1-.3 (infringement of civil rights); 730.1-.3 (blacklisting employees); 731.1-.8 (labor
union membership); 732.1-.6 (labor boycotts and strikes) (1979). Moreover, some minor crimes
are not included in the Uniform Jury Instructions relating to these classes of offenses: assault,
sexual abuse, obstructing justice, interference with judicial process, and public disorder.
388. Minimally, the applicable Uniform Jury Instructions, if any, are cited in this Article
in the discussion of the individual crimes. Additionally, many of the Uniform Jury Instructions
are discussed extensively in the text.
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tion. 389 As explained in the foreward to this volume, the use of these instructions by Iowa courts and attorneys is entirely discretionary,8110 and the Iowa
Supreme Court has not placed its imprimatur on these instructions. Thus,
their correctness will continue to be determined in appellate review of actual
cases.
Nevertheless, the supreme court has repeatedly indicated that it "disagree[s] with these [uniform] instructions reluctantly"8l1l (and sometimes
even "very reluctant[ly]"}.392 Indeed, in one of these cases the court noted
that before it would express disagreement with any instruction proved by "a
distinguished committee of the Iowa State Bar Association"8118 it would
make every effort to square the instruction with Iowa caselaw. In that case,
however, the court was faced "with the alternative of disapproving several
Iowa decisions . . . or of expressing disagreement with [a] substitute uniform instruction ... ,"894 it chose to go along with its own caselaw.
Although a few sections of the above committee's earlier edition of uniform instructions on the pre-revised criminal code were declared unconstitutional by the Iowa Supreme Court,8911 the overall track record for the predecessor uniform instructions has been excellent. Trial judges and counsel
would be well advised to use them, except in limited instances in which they
appear defective. Some of these potential defects will be discussed later in
this Article. 398
The general pattern of the uniform instructions is to merely put the
statutory language into the format of jury instructions, without changing or
modifying the Criminal Code. Nevertheless, substantial amplification of general statutory language appears in the uniform instructions,S11'7 presumably
389. See generally. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, note 136 supra.
390. IOWA STATE BAR ASS'N, I IOWA UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS ANNOTATED (CIVIL)
(1978). See generally State v. McGranahan, 206 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Iowa 1973), in which the court
stated: "[w)e do not wish to be understood as holding or intimating trial courts are bound by
any model or form in formulating instructions. We especially do not wish to be understood as
intimating brief and succinct instructions are in any way discouraged."
391. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Iowa 1978); see also Ness v. H. M. litis
Lumber Co., 256 Iowa 588, 593-94, 128 N.W.2d 237, 240 (1964).
392. McMaster v. Hutchins, 255 Iowa 39, 45, 120 N.W.2d 509, 512 (1963).
393. [d.
394. [d. at 513.
395. See, e.g., State v. Hansen, 203 N.W.2d 216 (Iowa 1972) ("conclusive" statutory presumption of intoxication in OMVUI prosecutions). See also State v. McGranahan, 206 N.W.2d
88 (Iowa 1973). In McGranahan, the court noted that the uniform instruction given on reasonable doubt was defective due to its failure" [to) limit its reference to the lack or failure of evidence produced by the state." [d. at 92.
396. See, e.g., text accompanying note 510 infra.
397. See, e.g., Uniform Jury Instruction No. 1403 which amplifies upon the "intent to
deprive" element of Theft. See text accompanying notes 1124-29 infra. See also State v. Fluhr,
287 N.W.2d 857, 867 (Iowa 1980) ("Although there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of
'intent to deprive' under the new statute, ... [Uniform Instruction) No. 1403 provides some
guidance which could be shared with defendants offering guilty pleas."),
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incorporating existing case law definitions and other general principles. Although these expansive definitions are useful, they generally lack any meaningful annotations explaining the derivation of these amplifications.
II.

GENERAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

A. Parties to Crime
1.

Vicarious Liability Through Joint Criminal Conduct of Individuals

a. Section 703.1 (Aiding and Abetting). Under section 703.1 of the
Code,898 all persons concerned in the commission of a public offense are
punishable as principals whether they directly commit the requisite criminal
act or whether they merely aid and abet its commission. There should be no
significance attached to omission from the new Criminal Code of the lead-in
phrase in the pre-revised statute,8811 which stated that no distinction was to
be made between an accessory before the fact400 and a principal. Thus, a
common law accessory before the fact is considered to be aiding and abetting under the new Criminal Code. This is in line with the broad definition
of aiding and abetting given in State v. Buttolph,4Ol where it is described as
"lend[ing] countenance or approval, either by active participation in [the
act] or by some manner encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission."40I A similar position is taken in Uniform Jury Instruction No. 205,
which states that aiding and abetting includes "by some manner knowingly
398. IOWA CODE § 703.1 (1979); See al80 J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3 §§ 61·66.
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW §§ 63,66 (1972); R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON
CRIMINAL LAW 643-85 (2d ed. 1969).
399. IOWA CODE § 688.1 (1977) (repealed 1978).
400. Some indices for what constitutes an accessory before the fact were noted in State v.
Young, 211 N.W.2d 352 (Iowa 1973). In Young, the court stated that "[k]nowledge or intent is
usually inferred from the circumstances. Participation in a crime may be inferred from the
presence, companionship and conduct before and after the crime is committed." [d. at 354.
Accord, State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1977). The court in Lott stated that "[t]he underlying precept of aiding and abetting is a requirement that the accessory in some way 'associate
himself with the venture, that he participate in it as something that he wishes to bring about,
that he seek by his action to make it succeed.''' [d. at 108 (quoting United States v. Peoni, 100
F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938». One authority has stated that the modern approach in determining parties to a crime is to hold a person legally accountable for the conduct of another when
that person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of the crime. W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, supra note 398, at 501.
401. 204 N.W.2d 824 (Iowa 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857.
402. [d. at 825 (emphasis added). See also State v. Fonza, 254 Iowa 630,118 N.W.2d 548
(1962). The court declared:
However for conviction there must be evidence that the accused committed the act
constituting the offense or did 'aid and abet its commission.' Mere presence is not
enough. To make the defendant guilty, he must have aided or abetted, or the act
must have been the result of a confederacy.
[d. at 635, 118 N.W.2d at 551 (emphasis added).
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advising or encouraging the act prior to ... its commission."408
A nexus (connection in their joint course of conduct) must be shown
between the defendant charged with aiding and abetting and the other criminal offender charged with commission of the crime,404 in order to prosecute
under section 703.1 of the Code. Moreover, it is reversible error for a trial
court to give an aiding and abetting instruction when the defendant is prosecuted as the sole perpetrator of the crime, with no evidence of more than
one person's participation. 4oa On the other hand, it has been held 408 that no
fatal variance in the charge exists when the defendant is charged as a principal in a robbery but the prosecution's proof at trial shows only that he aided
and abetted his armed confederate who actually carried out the robbery.
The reason given by the Iowa Supreme Court is that Code section 703.1
expressly provides that an aider and abettor shall be "charged, tried and
punished" as a principal.407
To be punishable, the aiding and abetting must have been done knowingly. The Iowa Supreme Court has stated that "[k]nowledge is essential;
however, neither knowledge nor presence at the scene of the crime is sufficient to prove aiding and abetting."408 Instead, an aider and abettor may be
convicted only if he participates either with requisite intent, or with knowledge that his principal has the requisite intent"OIl This knowledge or intent
"is usually inferred from the circumstances. Participation in a crime may be
inferred from the presence, companionship and conduct before and after the
403. Uniform Jury Instructions, supra note 136, at No. 205 (emphasis added). While defendant's participation as an accomplice can be proved by circumstantial evidence, "subsequent
conduct is relevant only insofar as it tends to prove defendant's prior encouragement or participation. A defendant may not be convicted as a principal on a theory of aiding and abetting for
conduct which would only make him an accessory after the fact." State v. Barnes, 204 N.W.2d
827, 828-29 (Iowa 1972). In Barnes, with defendant's stated purpose for his presence imd location at the theft scene being lawful and there being no direct evidence that defendant saw or
had knowledge of the theft, the court reversed the conviction and held the circumstantial evidence insufficient for the jury to find he was acting as a lookout (as a lookout, he would be a
principal in the second degree). The court held:
One cannot be convicted of crime upon a theory of aiding and abetting unless there is
sufficient evidence to show he assented to or lent countenance and approval to the
criminal act either by active participation in it or by some manner encouraging it
prior to or at the time of its commission.
1d. at 828.
404. See generally State v. Gladstone, 78 Wash.2d 306, 474 P.2d 274 (1970).
405. State v. Mays, 204 N.W.2d 862, 864-65 (Iowa 1973).
406. State v. Black, 282 N.W.2d 733 (Iowa 1979).
407. IOWA CODE § 703.1 (1979).
408. State v. Barnes, 204 N.W.2d 827, 828 (Iowa 1972).
409. State v. Lott, 255 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa 1977). But see J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra
note 3, which states that "(aliding and abetting is usually done by one who intentionally associates himself with the commission of an offense. However, one may aid and abet another's criminally negligent conduct, and thus be guilty of a resulting crime which he did not anticipate
being committed." 1d. § 62, at 18.
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crime is committed."4lo
The practical import of the second clause of section 703.1 is as yet unclear. Incorporating language contained in State v. Kittelson,411 this section
states: "[t]he guilt of a person who aids and abets the commission of a crime
must be determined upon the facts which show the part he or she had in it,
and does not depend upon the degree of another person's guilt."4111 One interpretation is that this section means that it is irrelevant to the guilt of one
person that his accomplice is not convicted. 413 Professor Yeager illustrates
this interpretation as follows: "[o]ne who hires an insane person to kill another is guilty of murder, even though the one who actually did the killing
cannot be held responsible because of his or her insanity."414
This provision should not be construed to mean that the law of vicarious liability has been changed. This provision, read in conjunction with the
next section on joint criminal conduct, means that an unarmed getaway
driver who aids and abets a Robbery in the First Degree, committed directly
by his armed accomplice, will also be punishable for Robbery in the First
Degree, even though the driver was not armed. m Similarly, an aider and
abettor' to a forcible "sex act" will be guilty of Sexual Abuse in the First
Degree if either the perpetrator of the "sex act" or another accomplice
causes "serious injury" to the victim of the sexual abuse, or to another. This
guilt is incurred even though the aider and abettor did not himself cause the
"serious injury," and even though he did not himself commit a "sex act."
Absent the "serious injury" which the aider and abettor did not himself
cause, however, the crime would only be Sexual Abuse in the Second Degree,
except for section 703.1.
These principles were reaffirmed in State v. Sanders,418 where the supreme court held that the new provision for a mandatory five-year term of
imprisonment for use or possession of a firearm 4l7 during a "forcible felony"4l8 applies also to a mere aider and abettor (here, in a Robbery) who
did not personally have the firearm. Focusing on the language in section
410. State v. Young, 211 N.W.2d 352, 354 (Iowa 1973). See State v. Cuevas, 281 N.W.2d
627 (Iowa 1979) (evidence that defendant drove the car with prior knowledge of burglary plans
is sufficient to convict defendant of felony murder on aiding and abetting theory).
411. 164 N.W.2d 157, 162 (Iowa 1969).
412. IOWA CODE § 703.1 (1979).
413. Acquittal of a common law accessory before the fact does not bar a prosecution of his
principal. State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63 (Iowa 1972).
414. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43, at 28.
415. The conduct of one accomplice is attributable to all. Thus, all parties participating
in a robbery need not be armed. If one is armed, then all are armed, and all can be convicted of
Robbery With Aggravation. See IOWA CODE § 711.2 (1977) (repealed 1978); State v. Johnson,
162 N.W.2d 453 (Iowa 1968).
416. 280 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1979).
417. See IOWA CODE § 902.7 (1979).
418. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 86-943 supra.
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703.1 that all persons involved in a criminal act shall be "punished as principals," the supreme court noted that this section "deals with both guilt and
punishment." The court concluded:
[sJection 711.1 defining robbery speaks in terms of a person who assaults
or threatens with intent to commit a theft, yet defendant, who did not
personally do so, is guilty of that crime because of section 703.1. Similarly defendant, who did not hold the gun, is liable for the enhanced
punishment of section 902.7 because of section 703.1. U8

This approach seemingly ignores the entire last sentence of section
703.1, which provides: "[t]he guilt of a person who aids and abets the com- .
mission of a crime must be determined upon the facts which show the part
he or she had in it, and does not depend upon the degree of another person's
guilt. "410 A fair alternative reading of section 703.1 in its entirety would be
that the first sentence abolishes the common law distinction between principals in the first degree, principals in the second degree, and accessories
before the fact, thus rendering them all equally punishable for the generic
offense of, for example, Robbery. This criminal responsibility for Robbery
thus applies equally to the actual taker, the lookout or getaway driver, and
the accessory before the fact who planned the robbery but did not actually
participate at the scene of the robbery. The second sentence then could be
read as differentiating among the various classifications of parties to a crime
which, like Robbery, consists of more than one degree. Thus, the unarmed
getaway driver as a mere aider and abettor would be guilty only of the lowest degree of Robbery indicated, as stated in section 703.1, by "the facts
which show the part he or she had in it, and. . . not. . . upon the degree of
another person's guilt."411 Such facts would make the unarmed aider and
abettor (as well as the accessory before the fact who is not even at the scene
of the robbery) guilty of the elementary offense of Robbery in the Second
Degree. Only their armed confederate would then be guilty of Robbery in
the First Degree (for being armed).
b. Section 703.2 (Joint Criminal Conduct). The aiding and abetting
provision in section 703.1 thus relates to crimes which the defendant himself
participated in to some degree, and which were jointly planned. 411 A companion provision in section 703.2 of the Code relates to additional or other
crimes committed by defendant's accomplices without defendant's personal
participation, and without joint planning of the crimes.42S
419. 280 N.W.2d at 378.
420. IOWA CODE § 703.1 (1979) (emphasis added).
421. IOWA CODE § 703.1 (1979).
422. For an analysis of how the justification concept of police activity under Code §
704.11 may create a new complicity concept as applied to law enforcement officers and their
agents during "active" undercover investigative activity, see text accompanying notes 814-29,

infra.
423.

TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43, at 28.
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This general concept of joint criminal conduct424 appears in section
703.242G as a codification of well-recognized case law. m The concept is that a
person, acting in concert with others in knowingly committing a public offense, is
responsible for the acts of the other done in furtherance of the commission of the offense or escape therefrom, and his or her guilt will be the
same as that of the person so acting, unless the act was one which the
person could not reasonably expect to be done in the furtherance of the
commission of the offense.'"

The crux of this provision is foreseeability of other crimes being committed by accomplices or co-conspirators. u8 This foreseeability is implied
under the felony murder doctrine to make punishable for murder all coconspirators acting in concert in the commission of the underlying felony,
upon the theory that a killing is a foreseeable consequence of inherently
dangerous activity, such as robbery or sexual abuse. us This same principle
should apply, as discussed above, to an aider and abettor to a forcible "sex
act" who did not cause a "serious injury" himself or directly commit a "sex
act," hut who is punishable for Sexual Abuse in the First Degree because his
co-conspirator caused a "serious injury." If death is a foreseeable consequence of sexual abuse, then obviously a "serious injury" is also foreseeable.
On the other hand, an unplanned sexual abuse during a house burglary
would be considered as an "independent frolic,"4so not imputable to a coconspirator in the burglary who did not aid and abet in the sexual abuse
itself.

Vicarious Liability 0/ Employers and Business Entities
Sections 703.4 and 703.5 of the Code4s1 represent the first codification
in Iowa of the general common law principle that employers and business
entities can, in limited circumstances, be held criminally responsible for
criminal acts of their employees. This theory of vicarious liability renders
both the employer and the employee equally punishable for a crime. However, the import of these sections does not extend the concept of respondeat
superior4s2 to the criminal law in general,488 without distinguishing between
2.

424. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 63. See also UNIFORM JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 204.
425. IOWA CODE § 703.2 (1979).
426. See State v. Kneedy, 232 Iowa 21, 3 N.W.2d 611 (1942).
427. IOWA CODE § 703.2 (1979).
428. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 63.
429. See generally W. LAFAVE & R. SCOTT, supra note 398, at 515-17.
430. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43, at 28.
431. IOWA CODE §§ 703.4, .5 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
Nos. 223-29; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 65-66.
432. One commentator has noted that U[a]n employer may be civilly liable for harm

HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 288 1979-1980

1979-80]

Iowa Criminal Code

289

true crimes as opposed to civil offenses. 484 Rather, supervisory persons and
the business entity itself are being made criminally responsible "for their
own misfeasance or nonfeasance, the criminal act of the employee being significant only in that, being the consequence of such misfeasance or nonfeacaused by an employee within the scope of employment, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, even if the former had forbidden the latter to do what was done, but this has no application to criminal law." R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 637.
433. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 65.
434. Violations of public welfare measures, which in aid of the state's police power are
designed to protect the public, are punishable "whether the offender was cognizant of the violation of the law." State v. Barry, 255 Iowa 1329, 1332, 125 N.W.2d, 833, 834 (1964). That is,
vicarious liability is cognizable for a strict liability offense based upon certain regulatory measures. The statute in question in Barry imposed a duty upon car dealers to see that pasteboard
registration-applied-for cards were not used on cars sold by them unless timely application for
registration and certificate of title had been made by the buyer. Defendant Barry's conviction
for violation of the statute was upheld, even though he had specifically instructed his employees not to sell the particular car in question and he was out of the country when that car was
sold by one of his employees (and the registration requirements were not met by defendant's
salesman).
Noting that this statute amounted to "an absolute prohibition," the court pointed out that
failure to put the ultimate duty upon the licensed dealer could render the statute "a dead
letter." Id. at _, 125 N.W.2d at 835. Moreover, the court considered it within the legislature's
perogative to adopt "such a method as the best way of preventing deleterious results to the
public." Id.
The Iowa Supreme Court stated in Barry:
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that, in prohibitive statutes covering misdemeanors, as this one is, where no provision is made as to the intention, and the word
"knowingly" or other apt words are not employed, to indicate that knowledge is the
essential element of the crime, intention is not an element of the crime. This is especially so where the act is forbidden by a statute in aid of the police power of the state.
Id. at 834.
Vicarious liability pyramided on top of strict liability was upheld in City of Iowa City v.
Nolan, 232 N.W.2d 102 (Iowa 1976). Nolan's conviction for illegal parking was affirmed even
though he was merely the owner of the vehicle and not its operator at the time of the incident.
One of the applicable municipal ordinances imposed strict liability by making illegal parking an
offense "without regard to the state of mind of the vehicle operator." Id. at 107 (McCormick, J.,
dissenting). The other ordinance "makes the vehicle owner culpable for conduct for which the
vehicle owner is strictly liable." Id. The supreme court held it was constitutionally permissible
under the "public welfare doctrine" for this municipal ordinance to impose prima facie strict
criminal responsibility upon the registered owner of an illegally parked vehicle ... [b)y proving (1) the existence of an illegally parked vehicle, (2) registered in the name of the defendant,
and (3) inability to determine the actual operator. . . . " Id. at 105. The court held further that
a conviction could rest upon this prima facie inference, but, of course, the defendant could
"come forward with evidence" to rebut that he should be held responsible as the registered
owner of the vehicle. Id. "In the area of public welfare offenses, such burden shifting is not
constitutionally infirm," the court determined. See id. See also, Commonwealth v. Koczwara,
397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 848 (1960) (respondeat superior held
applicable to civil offenses involving violations of detailed regulatory provisions in fields which
were essentially non-criminal); R. PERKINS, supra note 398, which states: "Generally accepted,
however, is the view holding the employer vicariously liable for a civil offense committed by his
employee in the course of his employment." Id. at 814.
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sance, it determines the nature and degree of the employer's or supervisor's
guilt. "4SI1
An administrative or supervisory person can have vicarious liability im·
puted to him under section 703.4 for criminal acts committed by an em·
ployee "acting under the employer's control, supervision, or direction"4S8 in
any of these three all·inclusive ways: (1) affirmative action by the employer
in directing the employee to commit the offense;4S7 (2) failure to act to stop
an employee from knowingly committing a public offense with the intent
that the employer will benefit thereby;4S8 or (3) affirmative action in as·
signing a task to an employee with reasonable foreseeability that the task
cannot be accomplished except for the employee committing a public of·
fense.4S9 Criminal culpability on the same level as the employee committing
the crime is imputed to business entities under section 703.5 in these limited
circumstances: (1) acts of misfeasance or malfeasance on behalf of the busi·
ness entity itself by nonperformance of duties imposed upon it by law, with·
out regard for any showing of intent or lack of interest, and (2) criminal acts
authorized, requested, or tolerated by a person in authority440 while acting
within his authority and for the benefit of the business entity, with the
criminal intent or negligence of this person in authority considered that of
the business entity.441

3.

Accessory After the Fact

The new Criminal Code has expressly invoked criminal responsibility
for conduct amounting to the offender being an accessory after the fact.4"
This represents a change in Iowa law, since the prior law4 48 had been inter·
preted as not criminalizing this type of conduct. 444 An accessory after the
fact, of course, is not made equally responsible for the criminal acts of the
person he assists, and thus vicarious liability is inapplicable to this crime.
Rather, the only connection between the degree of severity of the offender's
punishment and that of the person he assists depends upon whether thepublic offense committed was a felony or a misdemeanor. An accessory after
the fact to a felony commits an aggravated misdemeanor, while an accessory
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.

J. YEAGER
IOWA CODE

& R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 65, at 19.
§ 703.4 (1979).

See generally UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 223.
[d. at No. 224.
[d. at No. 225.
[d. at No. 227. See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 398, at 228-37.
See generally UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 226.
IOWA CODE § 703.3 (1979). UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 30106; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 64.
443. IOWA CODE § 688.2 (1977) (repealed 1978).
444. In State u. Kittelson, 164 N.W.2d 157, 165 (Iowa 1969), the pre-revised accessory
after the fact statute was interpreted as not defining a crime because it did not provide for any
punishment.
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after the fact to a misdemeanor commits only a simple misdemeanor.
An accessory after the fact is a person, other than the accused's spouse,
who (1) harbors, aids, or conceals; (2) a person accused of committing a public offense; (3) with intent to prevent his apprehension; and (4) with knowledge that a public offense has been committed. 4411 This is a specific intent
crime. The mere act of harboring, aiding, or concealing44e a fugitive is not
sufficient to invoke criminal culpability. Rather, as explained in Uniform
Jury Instruction No. 305, it must also be proved that "in so doing there was
an intent to prevent his apprehension for the commission of the offense for
which he was accused."447 Thus, a benevolent motive will not suffice to incur
criminal culpability.448
This crime also involves a second particularlized state of mind, requiring the prosecution to prove that the ac~essory knew that a prior public
offense had been committed. 449 This, under Uniform Jury Instruction No.
303, requires more than merely suspicion, speculation, or conjecture of a
prior offense. Rather, the accessory must be shown "to be aware of, informed, perceived, or had information of the commission [of a public
offense]. "4110
The implication in the language of the Criminal Code, as well as the
language in Uniform Jury Instruction No. 301, is that a public offense must
actually have been committed. However, in Uniform Jury Instruction No.
304 it is stated that it is not necessary in convicting the accessory that the
accused person he assisted was
[i]n fact guilty of the offense for which he was being sought. Rather, it is
only necessary that he was being sought for the commission of a [public
offense] and thereafter the [accessory] knowing that a [public offense]
had been committed and [X] was accused of so doing, harbored, aided or

445. See generally UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 301.
446. To "harbor, aid or conceal" is defined as meaning "to shelter, hide or provide a place
of refuge or safety; or to lend assistance or help." UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136,
at No. 302.
447. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 305. For an extensive discussion
of the principle that the words "harbor" and "conceal" under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1071 (1978) muSt
be narrowly construed so as not to include all forms of assistance, see United States v. Foy, 416
F.2d 940 (7th Cir. 1969).
448. See W. LAFAVE & A. SC01T, supra note 398, at 523, citing State v. Jett, 69 Kan. 788,
77 P. 546 (1904).
449. See R. PERKINS, supra note 398, which states that provided a party did not aid and
abet the principal felony in any way:
One who is an accessory before the fact may also become an accessory to the same
offense after the fact, but this is not true of one who is guilty as a principal felon. On
the other hand, absence at the time of perpetration is not essential in the case of an
accessory after the fact.
[d. at 669.
450. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS supra note 136, at No. 303.
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concealed him with the intent to prevent his apprehension. m

It also appears that it is unnecessary that the principal already be charged
with the underlying crime.
The requirement that another offense has been committed apparently
means that the underlying public offense must have been completed prior to
the alleged act of accessoryship after the fact. Thus, it has been held that
the act of knowingly giving assistance to the perpetrator of a homicidal act
before the death of the victim does not constitute being an accessory after
the fact to murder. 4t1z Also, mere passive failure to report a known crime
does not render one an accessory after the fact.4t18 Nor is this punishable at
all as criminal conduct, since the common law crime of Misprision of Felony4t14 is not recognized in Iowa criminal law. However, if one's failure to
report another's known crime is grounded upon an agreement with the perpetrator of the crime to not do so, then the separate crime of Compounding
a Felony4t1t1 may have been committed, but this still does not render the
"compounder" punishable for the principal's original crime.
a. Lesser Included Offense. The difference between charging Accessory After the Fact as a crime outright and submitting it as a lesser included
offense4tl6 has been pointed out recently by the Iowa Supreme Court. In
State v. Sanders,4t17 the court affirmed a conviction for Robbery in the First
Degree although the trial court had refused to submit defendant's pro jury
instruction that would have permitted the jury to find defendant guilty instead of being only an Accessory After the Fact. Defendant's theory of the
case was that the evidence merely showed that he had driven the getaway
car and that he had played no part in the robbery itself. The supreme court
pointed out the difference between a defendant's right in closing argument
to argue to the fact finder "as a matter of defense to the robbery charge
that the evidence only shows defendant helped the robbers get away"4tl8 and
the prosecution's right "to try to convict defendant of the aggravated misdemeanor of accessory after the fact."4t19 Rejecting the theory of Accessory After the Fact as being a lesser included offense of Robbery, the supreme court
determined that the legal test of a lesser included offense·" was not met
[d. at No. 304.
452. State v. Williams, 229 N.C. 348, 49 S.E.2d 617 (1948).
453. W. LAFAVE & A. SCO'M', supra note 398, which states: "But under such circumstances, ... the aider may be found to be an acceBBOry after the fact to the felonious assault."
[d. at 522-23 n.8.
454. State v. Bosworth, 170 Iowa 329, 345, 152 N.W. 581, 588 (1915). See W. LAFAVE & A.
SCO'M', supra note 398, at 526.
455. See IOWA CODE § 720.1 (1979).
456. See part II(D), infra.
457. 280 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1979).
458. [d. at 376.
451.

459.

[d.

460. That is, "the elements of the lesser offense are an elementary part of the greater
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since these two offenses require different states of mind (specifically, to prevent another's apprehension under Accessory After the Factm and to commit a theft under Robbery).4ell
b. Grading. There are two grades of Accessory After the Fact, with the
distinction· based upon whether a felony or misdemeanor was the underlying
crime by the other person being unlawfully assisted. An accessory is responsible for an aggravated misdemeanor4ea when he unlawfully aids a known
felon, but merely for a simple misdemeanor4414 when a known misdemeanant
is involved.
B. States of Mind 4ea

Unlike many revised codes in other jurisdictions, the new Iowa Criminal
Code does not contain a separate chapter on states of mind. 4ee Rather, the
only specific reference to mens rea consists of including the term "reckless"
in the chapter on definitional clauses. 4e7
Seven other particularized states of mind are used in the new Criminal
Code without statutory definitional clauses. 4ee This necessitates referral to
definitions made in "pre-revision court decisions."4ell These seven states of
mind are maliciously, intentionally, willfully, voluntarily, knowingly, with
the purpose of, and specific intent. no In addition, several dozen crimes appear merely to be general intent crimes. Of these states of mind, only maliciously, recklessly, knowingly, and intentionally are included in the Uniform
Jury Instructions, as discussed below.
.
offense." Id. at 377, quoting State v. Millspaugh, 257 N.W.2d 513, 516 (Iowa 1977). See part
II(D) infra.

461. See IOWA COOE § 703.3 (1979).
462. See id., at § 711.1.
463. An aggravated misdemeanor is punishable by either a determinate term of confinement not to exceed two years or a maximum fine of $5000 or both. Other sentencing alternatives include a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation,
in lieu of the above-mentioned confinement or fine. See text accompanying notes 103-11 supra.
464. A simple misdemeanor is punishable by either a determinate jail term not exceeding
thirty days or a maximum fine of $100, but not both. Other sentencing alternatives include a
deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation, in lieu of the
above-mentioned confinement or fine. See text accompanying notes 103-11 supra.
465. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI', supra note 398, at §§ 27-31 and R. PERKINS,
supra note 398, at ch. 7.
466. See Schantz, supra note 2, at 436-39.
467. IOWA COOE § 702.16 (1979).
468. This compares with a total of "at least 14 different terms apparently used to designate a state of mind" under the pre-revised criminal code. Schantz, supra note 2, at 437.
469. Id. at 439.
470. In addition, two specialized states of mind - malice aforethought and premeditation
- relate only to the crime of Murder. See IOWA COOE § 707.1-.2 (1979).
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Intent

a. General Intent. A general criminal intent refers to whether the. defendant intended deliberate or knowing action, as opposed to causing the
prohibited result through accident, mistake, carelessness, or absent-mindedness.471 "When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a
particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a
future consequence,"47l1 the question is whether the defendant had the general criminal intent to do the proscribed act. Intent is understood as an element and therefore is not specifically enumerated in the individual statutes
dealing with true crimes (as opposed to strict liability478 for regulatory
offenses).
A corollary to the proposition that every man is presumed to know the
law is that criminal intent can be imputed even to persons who have no
realization of the wrongfulness of their act, much less an actual intent to
commit a crime. Indeed, "[W]hen a person capable of entertaining criminal
intent, acting without justification or excuse, commits an act, prohibited as a
crime, his intention to commit the act constitutes criminal intent. . . .
[I]ntent is presumed from commission of the act, on the ground that a person is presumed to intend his voluntary acts and their natural and probable
consequences."474 This so-called "presumption" is stated in Uniform Jury
Instruction No. 215 as follows: "In determining the intent of any person you
471. State v. Peery, 224 Minn. 346, 28 N.W.2d 851 (1947).
472. People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 456-57, 462 P.2d 370, 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 626
(1969). See also TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43, at 25 ("A person may intend to act as he or
she does, but may not intend the results which make the act criminal.").
473. Some minor criminal offenses, known as strict liability offenses, have no mens rea
component and thus punish the offender without regard to his state of mind. These offenses
"require only the proof of an act, without specific or general intent" to commit the crime or of
knowledge that a crime is being committed. TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43, at 25.
Legislatures have "wide latitude . . . to declare an offense and to exclude elements of
knowledge and diligence from its definition," especially in light of no general constitutional
doctrine of mens rea ever having been articulated. City of Iowa City v. Nolan, 239 N.W.2d 102,
104 (Iowa 1976). Legislation creating public welfare offenses, which have no ancestors in the
common law, commonly dispense with "any awareness of wrongdoing." [d. The underlying rationale for invoking strict liability as to these offenses is that U[i]n the interest of the larger
good it puts the burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in
responsible relation to a public danger." [d.
The Iowa Supreme Court has determined that violations of traffic regulations squarely fit
into the classification of minor crimes known as public welfare offenses. The classic examples of
strict liability traffic offenses are overtime parking and illegal parking. See id.
Minor moving traffic offenses also are examples of strict liability offenses. In City of Des
Moines v. Davis, 214 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1974), it was held that speeding does not require intent
or knowledge on the part of the· driver. This means that a speeding driver is guilty merely
because of his act of driving over the speed limit, and thus neither intended to speed nor knew
he was speeding. Nevertheless, legal excuse is cognizable, even as to strict liability offenses. An
example of legal excuse is the common law criminal defense of sudden emergency. See id.
474. J. MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 57-58 (1934) [hereinafter cited as J. MILLER].
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may, but are not required to, infer that he intended the natural and probable consequences which ordinarily follow his voluntary acts."47B
This inference, without more, is sufficient to generate a jury question on
the element of general mens rea. If, however, defendant offers offsetting evidence, then the prosecution should - but need not as a matter of law offer rebuttal evidence in order to shore-up the inference (which may have
been eroded by defendant's theory of the case). This inference does not,
however, shift the burden of proof to the defendant when relying upon absence of general intent. In other words, the prosecution still must prove general intent,m although the inference by itself may be sufficient. As explained by the Supreme Courts of the United States477 and Iowa: m
[T]he entirely permissive inference or presumption ... allows - but
does not require - the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof
by the prosecutor of the basic one and that places no burden of any kind
on the defendant . . . Because this permissive presumption leaves the
trier of fact free to credit or reject the inference and does not shift the
. burden of proof, it affects the application of the "beyond the reasonable
doubt" standard only if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational
way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference.m

b. Specific Intent. A specific intent crime is "so defined as to require
not merely that an act be committed voluntarily, but that its commission be
accompanied by a specific intent,"480 a second and separate state of mind
(beyond general mens rea with respect to the actus reus of the crime). That
is, "[W]hen the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act
or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of
specific intent."481
The Iowa Supreme Court has had only a few occasions to differentiate
between general and specific intent. In State v. Redmon,488 the court characterized Assault and Battery488 as a general intent crime and Assault with
Intent to Inflict Bodily Injury484 as a specific intent crime under the prerevised law. Its only discussion consisted of quoting from a treatise ex475.

UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 215.

476. But see State v. Jamison, 110 Ariz. 245, 517 P.2d 1241 (1974).
477. County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, _ U.S. _, _, 99 S. Ct. 2213,
2224 (1979) (emphasis added).
478. State v. Rinehart, 283 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Iowa 1979), quoting County Court of Ulster
County, New York v. Allen, _ U.S. _, _, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 2224 (1979)(emphasis added).
479. [d. Regarding the constitutionality of a jury instruction on an inference of intent
(both general and specific), see text accompanying notes 515-27 infra.
480. J. MILLER, supra note 474, at 60.
481. P. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL LAW 331 (1975).
482. 244 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1976).
483. See IOWA CODE § 694.1 (1975) (repealed 1978).
484. See id. § 694.6.
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cerpt,.S5 which stated:
Specific intent is present when from the circumstances the offender must
have subjectively desired the prohibited result. General intent exists
when from the circumstances the prohibited result may reasonably be
expected to follow from the offender's voluntary act, irrespective of any
subjective desire to have accomplished such result. 486

Similarly, in State v. Barney,487 a prosecution for Assault With Intent
to Commit Murder,.ss the court said that "[p]roof of a mere general felonious intent will not suffice; the crime charged requires a specific intent."4s9
Indeed, the latter (in this instance the specific intent to kill) was deemed
"the very 'gist' of the crime."4eo
A better comparison has been made by a commentator, as follows:
When the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or achieve a
future consequence, we ask whether the defendant intended to do the
proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be a general criminal intent.
When the definition refers to defendant's intent to do some further act
or achieve some additional consequence; the crime is deemed to be one of
specific intent. 491

He goes on to state that specific intent most commonly designates "a
special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental
state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime." An example of
common law larceny was given. 492 That specific intent crime "requires the
taking and carrying away of the property of another, and the defendant's
mental state as to this act must be established, but in addition it must be
shown that there was an 'intent to steal' the property."493 In other words,
the act or taking and carrying away must have been done willfully and intentionally (i.e., through general criminal intent) as opposed to acting
merely out of carelessness, mistake, or inadvertence (which would not be
criminal at all). Additionally, the intentional act of taking and carrying away
must be accompanied by the specific intent to steal. Theft would not occur
if the property were merely taken for a temporary use, with or without an
intent to return it directly to the rightful possessor. For example, the specific intent to steal is the essential element differentiating the crimes of
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.

1 H. UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 55 (6th ed. 1973).
244 N.W.2d at 797.
244 N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 1976).
See IOWA CODE § 690.6 (1975) (repealed 1978).
244 N.W.2d at 318.
[d.
P. JOHNSON, supra note 481, at 329.
[d. at 331.
[d.
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Theft of a Motor Vehicle 494 and Operating Vehicle Without Owner's Consent.c 911 Relatedly, another commentator has stated that some crimes require
a specified intention in addition to an intended act. 498 Thus, the physical act
in common law larceny may be done intentionally, deliberately, with full
knowledge of all the facts and complete understanding of the wrongfulness
of the act constituting larceny, and yet not constitute larceny unless the
actor had an additional intention in mind - the intent to steal. 497
Kidnapping498 and Escape 499 were two pre-revised crimes which were
interpreted by implication as being merely general intent crimes. In other
words, whereas both crimes had to be committed willfully or intentionally,
nevertheless neither one had to be done with a specific purpose. For example, in State v. Wharf/,lIoo an Escape case, the court held that it was unnecessary for the prosecution to prove that the prisoner left the prescribed work
farm with the intent to escape to avoid further imprisonment. Instead, what
mattered was that he committed the act of voluntarily leaving without permission and contrary to law. His particular motive, purpose, or intent in
doing so was immaterial under the statute, since the crime charged consisted
only of the doing of acts which are prohibited. llol
Similarly, the court held in State v. Wallace llOli that the section of the
pre-revised Kidnapping statute involved therein did not require proof of any
specific intent. The court concluded:
[I]t is evident an offense is committed when an offender willfully, without lawful authority, forcibly or secretly confines or imprisons another
person within the state against his or her will. The act itself is prohibited
and specific intent on the part of the offender is not an essential ingredient of the crime. It is enough if the prohibited act is done willfully and
unlawfully.608

Thus, the offender's intent or purpose was immaterial, and the prosecution
did not need to prove anything beyond the mere unlawful act of confinement. Contrastingly, another clause in the Kidnapping statutel104 did establish a specific intent crime with the act of seizure being for the purpose
either of secret confinement or of removal of the victim from Iowa.
In both of these cases, the supreme court recognized that "the legisla494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.

IOWA CODE § 714.1(1), .2(2) (1979).
[d. § 714.7.
R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 762.
[d.
See IOWA CODE § 706.1 (1962) (repealed 1978).
See IOWA CODE § 745.1 (1962) (repealed 1978).
257 Iowa 871, 134 N.W.2d 922 (1965).
[d. at 875, 134 N.W.2d at 925.
259 Iowa 765, 145 N.W.2d 615 (1966).
[d. at 774, 145 N.W.2d at 621.
See IOWA CODE § 706.1 (1962) (repealed 1978).
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ture may forbid the doing of an act and make its commission a crime without regard to the intent or knowledge of the doer."~o~ It then formulated this
test for determining whether a statute is a general or specific intent crime:
[w]hether a criminal intent or guilty knowledge is an essential element of a
statutory offense is to be determined as a matter of construction from the
language of the act, in connection with its manifest purpose and design.Sexual Abuse~o7 is another example of a general intent crime. The prosecution need only prove the unauthorized act of sexual contact and essentially can rely upon the inference of intent. Although a specific intent (to
gratify the defendant's sexual passions) is not an element of the crime,~08
nevertheless the defendant must have acted intentionally as opposed to acting through a mistake,~o9 accident, carelessness, or absent-mindedness.
c. Interrelationship of Specific Intent and General Intent. Considerable confusion over the difference between general intent and specific intent
is quite apparent in the Uniform Jury Instructions. The principal problem
lies in using the meaningless term "intent" instead of the essential terms of
either "general intent" or "specific intent." This problem is exacerbated by
the only applicable Uniform Jury Instruction, which incidentally is entitled
"Intent," covering only specific intent. The omission of a general intent instruction is inexcusable, especially in light of the danger of there being given
no instruction on general intent. ~lO Moreover, the specific intent instruction
is fuzzy, especially on the difference between general and specific intent,
which is not even mentioned.
The following suggested "model" instruction would inter alia clarify the
meaning of general and specific intent as well as their interrelationship (by
the addition of the italicized phrases to Uniform Jury Instruction No. 215):
[a] (General Intent)
You must find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted deliberately or intentionally and not as a result merely of inadvertence, accident, carelessness, mistake, or absent-mindedness.
[b] (Specific Intent)
In addition, specific intent is an essential element of the ofi'enses(s)
charged, and it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a

505. State v. Wharff, 257 Iowa 871, 875, 134 N.W.2d 922, 925 (1965). Accord State v.
Wallace, 259 Iowa 765, 774, 145 N.W.2d 615, 621 (1966).
506. State v. Wharff, 257 Iowa 871, 875, 134 N.W.2d 922, 925 (1965).
507. IOWA CODE § 709.1 (1979).
508. See State v. Pilcher, 158 N.W.2d 631, 637 (Iowa 1968) (interpreting pre-revised
crime of Rape).
509. Strict liability does apply to statutory types of Sexual Abuse, however, as a mistake
(albeit reasonable) as to a child-victim's age is no excuse for criminal responsibility. See State
v. Newton, 44 Iowa 45 (1876).
510. See State v. McCormack, _ N.W.2d _, _ (1980) (Uniform Jury Instruction No.
1446 defining elements of Operating Vehicle Without Owner's Consent erroneous since general
criminal intent not included as element of that offense).
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particularized state of mind above and beyond the general intent requirement set out in part (a) of this Instruction. Specific intent is a
mental state, emotion, or condition of the mind with a design, resolve, or
determination that the doing of an act shall be with a certain purpose. In
this case you must find that the defendant acted with the purpose of
(set out specific intent element).
(c) Inference of Intent.
Intent is seldom, if ever, capable of direct and positive proof. Rather, the
intent, if any, may be arrived at by such reasonable inferences and deductions as may be drawn from the facts proved by the evidence, in accordance with common experience and observation. In determining the
intent of any person you may, but are not required to, infer that he intended the natural and probable consequences which ordinarily follow
his voluntary acts.51o.1

Concomitantly, each of the Uniform Jury Instructions setting out the
elements of a crime should be amended to include the additional element
that the defendant acted intentionally or with criminal intent.
d. Inference on Intent. The Iowa Supreme Court has consistently
taken the position that persons are presumed to intend the natural consequences of their acts. While this presumption generally is thought of in
terms of supplying by implication the basic underlying general criminal intent, lUI nevertheless it. is not limited to general intent crimes. Indeed, as the
supreme court has explained:
It is a general rule, applicable to all criminal cases, including those where
a specific intent is an element of the crime, that, [the] accused, if sane, is
presumed to intend the necessary or the natural and probable consequences of his unlawful voluntary acts, knowingly performed. Accordingly, the law assumes a person to intend all the consequences which one
standing in like circumstances and possessing like knowledge should reasonably expect to result from any act which is knowingly done. au

Similarly, it was noted in State v. RinehartG18 that "this court has always allowed resort to these inferences to prove specific intent. "1114 This reaffirmation is especially significant in the light of Rinehart involving a constitutional attack on the Uniform Jury Instruction which permits an
inference of intent under certain circumstances, as discussed below.
This inference has come under considerable attack recently. First, in
State v. Whiteside llill the court upheld an instruction on intent which closely
510.1 UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 215.
511. See generally State v. Jamison, 110 Ariz. 245, 517 P.2d 1241 (1974) (unlike general
intent, which can be shown by an inference of intent, specific intent must be proved by the
prosecution).
512. State v. True, 190 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Iowa 1971).
513. 283 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa 1979).
514. Id. at 323.
515. 272 N.W.2d 468 (Iowa 1978).
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followed Uniform Jury Instruction No. 215.1U8 The court summarily dismissed without merit defendant's contention that this inference "shifts the
burden of proof on an essential element of the crime to him."D17 The only
"discussion" was to. the effect that the court disagrees with Uniform Jury
Instructions reluctantly.
The matter did not end there, however. Several related appeals contesting the Uniform Jury Instruction followed closely upon the heels of the
decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States in Sandstrom v. Montana,1I18 and County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen. rue In Sandstrom, the Court declared unconstitutional a jury instruction stating that
"the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his
voluntary acts."1120 The Court determined that a reasonable jury could have
interpreted this presumption as being conclusive or mandatory, that is, "as
an irrebuttable direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the
facts triggering the presumption. Alternatively, the jury may have interpreted the instruction as a direction to find intent upon proof of the defendant's voluntary actions (and their 'ordinary' consequences), unless the defendant proved the contrary by some quantum of proof which may well
have been considerably greater than 'some' evidence - thus effectively
shifting the burden of persuasion on the element of intent."1I1l Either interpretation violated the fourteenth amendment's requirement that the state
prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
Contrary to the language in the jury instruction found constitutionally
objectionable in Sandstrom (viz. "the law presumes that a person intends
the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts"),IIU Iowa's applicable Uniform Jury Instruction reads: "In determining the intent of any person you
may, but are not required to, infer that he intended the natural and proba516. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTION No. 215, supra note 136, reads in its entirety, as follows:
[1) Where intent is an essential element of the offense(s) (or degree(s) of offenses(s» charged, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Intent is a mental
state, emotion, or condition of the mind with a design, resolve or determination that
the doing of an act shall be with a certain purpose. As such, intent is seldom, if ever,
capable of direct and positive proof. Rather, the intent, if any, may be arrived at by
such reasonable inferences and deductions as may be drawn from the facts proved by
the evidence, in accordance with common experience and observation.
[2) In determining the intent of any.person you may, but are not required to, infer
that he intended the natural and probable consequences which ordinarily follow his
acts.
[d. (emphasis added).
517. 272 N.W.2d at 471.
518. _ U.S. _, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979).
519. _ U.S. _, 99 S. Ct. 2213 (1979).
520. 99 S. Ct. at 2459-60.
521. [d. at 2456 (emphasis added).
522. [d. at 2454.
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ble consequences which ordinarily follow his voluntary acts."OliS The difference in terminology between "the law presumes" and having a right to infer
was considered crucial in State v. Rinehart,024 in which an instruction similar to Uniform Jury Instruction No. 215 was upheld against a Sandstromtype challenge. The court determined that this instruction, by its language,
fully apprised the jury of its permissive nature and of the jury's implied
option to reject its application. Read together with the other instructions, it
was clearly indicated that the burden of proof remained on the state to
prove all elemental facts of the charge and no where implied that the elemental facts inferred from those proven would stand as established absent
rebuttal by defendant. The court considered it particularly significant that
the instruction was "couched in permissive words: 'you have a right to infer.'''626 Nevertheless, the court observed that trial courts "would be prudent" to include qualifying language in such instructions to expressly state
that the jury would be free to ignore this permissive inference "even without
rebuttal by the defendants."olle Here, however, the absence of such qualifying or explanatory language was not fatal, in light of the concept of permissiveness of the inference being clearly conveyed in the instructions given
when read as a whole. 1I1I7
2.

Related States of Mind

a. Intentionally. Three revised crimes expressly include a mens rea
component of "intentionally."lIlIe The inclusion of an element of intentional
action does not appear to be of much significance, however, in light of the
restrictive meaning of the term "intentional" vis-a-vis the entire concept of
general criminal intent. Indeed, with a very few exceptions, no unintended
conduct is punishable under the Criminal Code, and thus criminally-proscribed results via accident, mistake, carelessness, or absent-mindedness are
not cognizable. 629 This means that the effect of the element requiring the
523. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 215.
524. 283 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa 1979). The instruction in issue in Rinehart stated that jurors
"have a right to infer that he knew the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts
which ordinarily follow such act." [d. at 321. The Rinehart court held that this instruction was
sufficiently permissive. [d. at 322. Uniform Jury Instruction No. 215 states explicitly that the
juror is not required to so infer. See text accompanying note 590 supra.
525. 283 N.W.2d 319, 322 (Iowa 1979).
526. [d. at 323.
527. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 215, is confusing in light of
referring only to "intent" instead of either "general intent" or "specific intent." The logical
assumption is that this is an instruction only on specific intent (in light of the reference therein
to "with a certain purpose").
528. These three crimes are False Imprisonment, Criminal Mischief, and Escape. See
IOWA CODE §§ 710.7, 716.1, 719.4 (1979), respectively.
529. For a discussion of general criminal intent, see text accompanying notes 471-79,

supra.
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requisite proscribed act to have been done intentionally is merely to state
. the obvious, viz. accidental or unintentional acts are not punishable under
the Criminal Code irrespective of their results.
This mens rea is not equivalent to the particularized state of mind of
specific intent. The difference between acting intentionally and acting with
a specific intent was spelled out definitively and accurately in State v. Waterman. 1I30 The applicable state statuteliSl therein made it a crime to deface,
defile, or cast contempt upon the United States flag. The uncontroverted
proof showed that defendant had worn the flag as a poncho. Affirming his
conviction, the supreme court held that such an act defaces, defiles, and
casts contempt upon the flag, notwithstanding defendant's contention that
" 'the Record is replete with uncontroverted testimony demonstrating that
the defendant had no such mens rea.' "1I8S That is, defendant's very commission of the act necessarily had the effect of defacing, defiling, or casting contempt upon the flag irrespective of defendant's intent or motive in intentionally committing the act. Determining that flag desecration was not a
specific intent crime, the court pointed out that the statute merely punishes
"acts intentionally done which have the effect of desecrating our flag."lIaa
Distinguishing specific intent from acting intentionally, the court added:
"The person's reason for doing such an act is of no importance, except in
those instances where the act is in the area of symbolic speech."II" Intimating that an evil intent is unnecessary, the court continued: "[E]ven if we
assume that defendant had an honest political intent ... or that he had no
intent at all, that element is not essential to a conviction of violating a statute which is malum prohibitum. "11811
Under the State v. Waterman interpretation the three crimes explicitly
requiring intentional actions without more should not be considered specific
intent crimes. In this regard, the Uniform Jury Instructionll88 defining Criminal Mischief is erroneous. Criminal Mischief is defined in the Code as
"[a]ny damage, defacing, alteration, or destruction of tangible property is
criminal mischief when done intentionally by one who has no right to so
act. "1137 The mens rea element of intentional actions is delineated in the
Uniform Jury Instructions as "[t]hat when he did so, it was with the intent
to (damage), (deface), (alter), (destroy) the said property."I188 Under this erroneous instruction, the prosecution would, in effect, have to prove not only
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.

190 N.W.2d 809, 813 (Iowa 1971).
IOWA CODE § 32.1 (1971).
190 N.W.2d at 813.
[d. (emphasis added).
[d. (emphasis added).
[d.
UNll'ORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1603.
IOWA CODE § 716.1 (1979) (emphasis added).
[d. (emphasis added).
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that the defendant's mischievous acts were done intentionally (as opposed
to accidentally or carelessly) but also that these intentional acts were done
with the specific intent to damage, deface, alter, or destroy the property affected. However, like the flag desecration statute in State v. Waterman, the
Criminal Mischief statute punishes acts intentionally done which have the
effect of damaging property of another, and the offender's reason for doing
such act is of no importance. 1I8e Indeed, the offender's intent need not be evil
and thus can be motivated by political protest (instead of any subjective
desire to damage or destroy the particular property involved).II4O Contrastingly, the Uniform Jury Instructions defining False Imprisonmentll41 and Escape ll43 correctly require only that the respective act be done intentionally
without also requiring that these intentional acts be done with specific
purposes.
b. Willfully. The defendant is required to have acted willfully in committing the crimes of Willful Disturbancell48 and Harassment of Public Officers and Employees. 1I44 "Willfully," the Iowa Supreme Court has said, "ordinarily means intentionally, deliberately or knowingly, as distinguished
from accidentally, inadvertently or carelessly."11411 This suggests that the offender "must know what he is doing, must intend to act in the way proscribed by the statute, anet he must have knowledge of the facts,"1148 but not
necessarily an evil intent so long as he acted intentionally. Nor is the willful
doing of the requisite proscribed act "the equivalent of, doing the act 'with
the intent' to accomplish certain named results."1147 Accordingly, the offender must be aware that he is disturbing a state or local governmental
agency (for the crime of Willful Disturbance) and that he is preventing or
attempting to prevent personnel of public agencies from performing governmental duties (for the crime of Harassment of Public Officers and Employees). In other words, the offender must know of the governmental character
of the agencies, officers, or employees as well as the disruptive or harassing
nature of the conduct. On the other hand, the offender's specific intent in
doing so is not ipso facto made an element of either crime. Nevertheless,
Willful Disturbance is made a specific intent crime by additional statutory
language (to wit, "with the purpose of disrupting ... "),1148 but there is no
such language concerning the harassment offense.
539. See IOWA CODE § 716.1 et. seq. (1979).
540. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1603 (emphasis added).
541. Id. No. 1011.
542. Id. No. 1907.
543. IOWA CODE § 718.3 (1979).
544. Id. § 718.4.
545. State v. Wallace, 259 Iowa 765, 773, 145 N.W.2d 615, 620 (1966) (emphasis added).
Accord State v. Dunn, 199 N.W.2d 104, 107 (Iowa 1972).
546. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 31(4) at 113 (1961) (footnotes omitted).
547. Id. at 114 (footnotes omitted).
548. IOWA CODE § 718.3 (1979).
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c. . Maliciously. Malice is defined in the Uniform Jury Instructions as
"a state of mind which leads one to intentionally do a wrongful act . . .
which is done out of actual spite, hatred, ill will, or with an evil, wicked or
unlawful purpose, knowing that the act is without just cause or excuse."Me
Malice may be either expressed or implied (inferrable from defendant's
conduct).
This definition appears misplaced to the extent that it refers to an act
being done out of "actual spite, hatred, [or] ill will."550 Malice, at least as it
pertained to the pre-revised offense of Arson,m has been interpreted as not
requiring any ill will, personal hostility, or revengeful motive on the part of
the defendant towards the owner or possessor of the property damaged. m
Rather, the Iowa Supreme Court determined that maliciously "denotes that
malice which characterizes all acts done with an evil disposition, a wrong
and unlawful motive or purpose; that state of mind which 'actuates conduct
injurious to other without lawful reason, cause, or excuse."558 Continuing,
the court said: "the intentional doing of a 'wrongful act,' without justification or lawful excuse, will permit an inference of a wicked state of mind, i.e.,
legal malice, as opposed to actual malice."5M Similarly, malice in the context
of murder, means "that condition of mind which prompts one to commit a
wrongful act intentionally, absent legal justification or excuse."5511
One of the more comprehensive d.efinitions of the ordinary legal concept
of malice consists of two ingredients, in one commentator's analysis: "On the
positive side 'malice' requires an intent to cause the very harm that results
or some harm of the same general nature, or an act done in wanton and
wilful disregard of the plain and strong likelihood that some such harm will
result. And on the negative side it requires the absence of any circumstance
of justification, excuse or recognized mitigation."558 He declares that "the
state of mind required for malice, when less than an actual intent to cause
the actus reus of the crime in question includes a vicious or callous disregard of the likelihood of such harm resulting from what is being done; and it
is this viciousness or callousness which distinguishes malice from criminal
negligence."557 He claims that the customary legal meaning of "malice" in
the crime of malicious mischief as requiring "actual ill-will or resentment
toward [the] owner or possessor" is "quite illogical and resulted from a
faulty analysis of the legal meaning of the word 'malice.' "5118 The confusion,
549.
550.
551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.

UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 216.
[d.
See IOWA CODE § 707.3 (1977) (repealed 1978).
State v. Dunn, 199 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1972).
199 N.W.2d at 107.
[d.
State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Iowa 1972).
R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 334.
[d. at 769.
[d. at 334.
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he concludes has derived from assuming that "malice, as a jural concept,
must involve intent plus some matter of aggravation whereas, in truth, the
requirement is fully satisfied by intent minus any matter of exculpation or
mitigation."GG9 In other words, malice "requires no more than the intentional
doing of the actus reus in the absence of any circumstance of exculpation or
recognized mitigation."1I6o In the final analysis, the jural concept of malice is
clear when these two points are kept in mind: "[f]irst, that in the absence of
justification, excuse or recognized mitigation, it is malicious to intend to do
what constitutes the actus reus of the crime in question; second, that a state
of mind may be malicious even without an actual intent to bring out such a
result. "1161
The foregoing analysis is borne out in terms of the Iowa law of malice,
as already partially discussed. 1I6s In addition, the state of mind of malice
applies only to one or two crimes in the entire Iowa Criminal Code. In one,
Injury to Animals,1I68 it would be illogical to require that the requisite malicious actions toward the owner of an animal be done out of actual ill will or
resentment or for revenge in light of there being no additional requirement
that the offender even know the identity of the owner of the animal. Instead, the offender merely must act intentionally in callous disregard of the
property rights of another person, any person. Malice may also be an element of the new crime of Malicious Prosecution,1I64 although malice is not
enumerated as an element in the statute. 1I611 Even if malice is an element of
this crime, nevertheless malice does not denote a requirement of ill will, resentment, or revenge. Instead, Malicious Prosecution requires intenti9nal
action without justification. An example would be a woman who falsely cries
rape (now sexual abuse) to cover up her indiscretion. If a cover-up was her
only motive, then the crime would still be complete although totally devoid
of any evidence of ill will, resentment, or revenge toward her sex "partner."
d. Purposely. The particularized mental state of purposely appears to
be used in the new Criminal Code synonymously with specific intent.- No
559. [d. at 767.
560. [d.
561. [d. at 766.
562. See text accompanying notes 551-55, supra.
563. See IOWA CODE § 717.1 (1979).
564. See IOWA CODE § 720.6 (1979) and text accompanying notes 1382-83, infra.
565. See text accompanying notes 1382-83, infra.
566. "Purposely" replaces specific intent altogether as the applicable state of mind in
Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a) (T.O.D. 1962). "Purposely" is defined therein as:
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his
conscious object to engage such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
Herbert Wechsler has noted:
The discrimination between acting purposely and knowingly is very narrow. Knowl-
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logical reason for using the cumbersome phrase "for the purpose of' in the
definition of a few crimesll87 is apparent, instead of the usual specific intent
language "with the intent to. "1188
e. Voluntarily. One crime includes the related mens rea component of
voluntariness. The crime of Permitting a Prisoner to Escapell89 is committed
by any jailer or other public officer or employee who "voluntarily permits,
aids or abets in the escape or attempted escape of any person in custody. . . . "1170 So used, "voluntarily" appears synonymous with "intentionally."1i7l However, use of the special term "voluntarily" makes it explicit that
the defendant must have acted volitionally and with a criminal intent,
rather than having been coerced (e.g., captured by a prisoner and forced to
open the cellblock gate). Otherwise, a "captive" guard would act intentionally by meaning to do so, as opposed to accidentally or carelessly, even
though he did so without criminal intent.

3. Knowingly
Several crimes require as an element a particularized mental state relating to specific knowledge ll711 of some fact.1i78 This is separate and apart from
edge that the requisite external, attendant circumstances exist is a common element
in both conceptions. But action is not deemed purposive with respect to the nature or
results of an actor's conduct unless, as the Code puts it, 'it was his conscious object to
engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result'. Though acting knowingly
suffices to establish liability for most offences, there are situations where our law has
deemed it proper to require purpose; for example, treason and crimes of subversive
speech, solicitation, complicity, attempts, conspiracy, and probably obtaining property by false pretenses. The Code formulations on these subjects so provide. Moreover, in determining the gravity of crimes for purposes of sentence, it is often useful
to lay stress on purpose. This is frequently the case under the older law as well as in
the Code.
H. WECHSLER, The Model Penal Code and the Codification of American Law, 419, 436.
567. See IOWA CODE §§ 711.4 (Extortion), 718.1 (Insurrection), 718.3 (Willful Disturbance), and 722.4 (Bribery of Elector) (1979).
568. Analyzing trends in criminal code revision, Herbert Wechsler has noted:
"Many of the codes and drafts employ some form of the term 'intent' in preference to
'purpose', defining it, however, to mean 'conscious object.' The danger of perpetrating
the obscurities and ambiguities of old judicial exploitations of intention, often resulting in a concept indistinguishable from recklessness or negligence, is thus eliminated
by the definition."
H. WECHSLER, The Model Penal Code and the Codification of American Criminal Law, in 419,
436 n. 45.
569. IOWA CODE § 719.5 (1979).
570. [d. (emphasis added).
571. For a discussion of "intentionally" as a type of mens rea, see text accompanying
notes 528-42, supra.
572. Actual, as opposed to imputed, knowledge is required for all but one of these crimes
with a scienter requirement. In contrast, the crime of leasing Premises for Prostitution is complete upon the offender knowing or having reason to know that his premises are being used for
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whether a defendant acted intentionally or deliberately, as well as to
whether a defendant intended any specific result from the commission of his
acts.
The crucial distinction between acting willfully (or intentionally) and
knowingly was made in State v. Perry.m In Perry, the defendant was
charged with unlawfully and willfully resisting an officer in serving process,
although the applicable criminal statute provided that "if any person knowingly and willfully resist or oppose any officer. . . . "11711 Reversing the conviction, the supreme court first said that the word "unlawfully" added nothing
to the elements of proof, and that "[i]t did not supply the omission of
'knowingly.' "1178 The court continued: "An act may be knowingly done, and
yet be unlawful, or it may be unlawful though done in ignorance."1177 Here,
the prosecution had to prove that defendant not only acted willfully but also
that he so acted "with knowledge that the person resisted or opposed was an
officer."1178 Declaring that "knowingly" and "willfully" are not synonymous,
the court said:
To willfully do an act implies that it be done by design or with set purpose. One might purposely do an act which would have the effect of impeding an officer in the performance of his duties, in entire ignorance of
the capacity in which such officer was acting. The obstruction denounced
is that, not only designedly or purposely interposed, but with knowledge
that the person hindered was at the time an officer serving or attempting
to serve . . . process.II"

Nevertheless, this scienter requirement does not go to knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act.1I80 Thus, the defendant merely needed to know that
the person he resisted was an officer and not that resisting an officer was
illegal.
The difference between specific intent and specific knowledge '81 was
prostitution. See IOWA CODE § 725.4 (1979). Concerning a permissible inference of knowledge,
see test accompanying notes 592-93, infra.
573. "Knowing facts that would cause a reasonable man to know the danger is equivalent
to knowing the danger. Ordinarily one is not guilty of a crime unless he is aware of the existence of all those facts which make his conduct criminal. Without guilty knowledge criminal
intent cannot exist." 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 31(3) (1961). See also Comment, Willful Blindness as a Substitute for Criminal Knowledge, 63 IOWA L. REV. 466 (1977).
574. 109 Iowa 353, 80 N.W. 401 (1899).
575. [d. (emphasis added).
576. [d. at 354.
577. [d.
578. [d.
579. [d.

580. See 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 31(3) (1961).
581. The particularized mens rea requirement of one crime, Arson, can be satisfied alternatively by specific intent to damage property or knowledge that property probably will be
damaged. See IOWA CODE § 712.1 (1979).
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pointed out in an Arizona case.1i82 The relevant statute made an assault and
battery aggravated when the person committing the offense knows or has
reason to know that" the victim is a police officer. G8S Rejecting the defendant's contention that this was a specific intent crime, the appellate court
determined that this was a general intent crime. Thus, the prosecution
merely had to prove that the defendant committed an assault, that the person assaulted was a police officer, and that the defendant knew or should
have known that his victim was a police officer. The latter element satisfies
the knowledge requirement. On the other hand, since this is not a specific
intent crime, there is no requirement to prove the defendant's purpose in
assaulting a police officer (e.g., to obstruct him in the performance of his
duties). Recognizing that "[m]ere omission with knowledge of the facts is
not enough, nor is an act willful which is merely careless or negligent or
inadvertent,"084 the court determined that the defendant had acted intentionally and thus had the requisite general criminal intent together with the
requisite specific knowledge.
Concerning the relationship of specific intent and knowledge, the court
said that "lack of knowledge may disprove the existence of specific intent."080 For example, "one cannot intend to steal property which he believes to be his own however careless he may have been in coming to that
belief. "086
Judicial interpretation of the pre-revised statute prohibiting carrying of
concealed weapons is an example of a statute being read as requiring that
the prohibited act be done intentionally and that defendant have knowledge
of the weapon's real character, even though neither of these two requirements is expressly included as an element. In State v. Williams,087 the supreme court held that although "the object of carrying a concealed weapon
is entirely immaterial" as bearing on defendant's guilt, nevertheless "[t]o be
guilty of the offense one must have consciously or intentionally have carried
the weapon."088 Defendant's theory of the case was that he had mistakenly
taken another person's coat and thus was unaware of the presence of the
weapon in the pocket of the coat he was wearing. The trial court erred in
refusing to instruct that the jury must find that defendant knew a weapon
was in his coat pocket. Similarly, the court noted in State v. Krana,089 a
prosecution for going armed in a vehicle, that "while specific intent is not an
element of this crime, the accused must be aware of the presence of the
582.
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.

State v. Jamison, 110 Ariz. 245,517 P.2d 1241 (1974).
Id.
110 Ariz. at _,517 P.2d at 1244.
Id.
Id.
184 Iowa 1070, 169 N.W.371 (1918).
Id. at 1073, 169 N.W. at 372.
246 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 1976).
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gun."1190
Speeding is an example of an offense which has been interpreted lie! to
not require knowledge on the part of the driver of the automobile. This
means that a speeding motorist is guilty irrespective of being unaware of his
vehicle's speed or of the speed limit.
Knowledge ordinarily is determined from the defendant's words and
conduct as well as "reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom in
accordance with common experience and observation."lIel Under Uniform
Jury Instruction No. 230, the requisite knowledge of the defendant (i.e., a
conscious awareness of the prescribed fact) can be inferredlle8 by the jury as
"the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts which ordinarily follow such acts."

4. Recklessly
The statutory definition of recklessness ll" is fairly standard, viz. "a wilful or wanton disregard for the safety of others."lIeli Suprisingly, only two
crimes expressly have a mens rea comprised of recklessness: Reckless Use of
Fire or Explosivesllee .and Abandonment of a Dependent Personlltl? (which
can be committed either knowingly or recklessly). An even higher standard
of criminal culpability seemingly would be required for one type of Involuntary Manslaughterll9s based upon "the commission of an act in a manner
likely to cause death or serious injury." However, the supreme court has
interpreted this statutory definition as being equated with recklessness. II"
590. Id. at 295.
591. City of Des Moines v. Davis, 214 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1974).
592. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 230.
593. Concerning the constitutionality of a similar permissive inference on intent, see text
accompanying notes 511-27, supra.
594. IOWA CODE § 702.16 (1979).
595. See State v. Kernes, 262 N.W.2d 602, 605 (Iowa 1978). ReckleBBneBB as defined in
Uniform Jury Instruction No. 217, as follows, amplifies the statutory definitional clause and the
prevailing case law:
A person is reckless or acts recklessly, when he willfully or wantonly disregards the
safety of persons or property. It is more than a lack of reasonable care which may
cause unintentional injury. Rather, reckleBBness is conduct, which is consciously done
with willfull or wanton disregard of the consequences, when a person knows or should
know a risk of harm to another or property is created.
Though recklessness is willful, that is intentional, it is not intentional in the sense
that harm is intended to result. It is, however, conduct which shows that the person
knew or should have known of a danger and proceeded without any care or concern
for the results of his actions.
596. See IOWA CODE § 712.5 (1979) and text accompanying notes 911-17 infra.
597. See id. § 726.3.
598. See id. § 707.5(2).
599. State v. Conner, 292 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Iowa 1980). In addition, the court held that
recklessness must be read into the other type of Involuntary Manslaughter, defined in IOWA
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The court, noting that "the words 'in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury' implies an awareness of the risk or at least that the accused
should have been aware of the risk," said that "[i]t is this subjective awareness of the risk, although usually determined objectively, that distinguishes
civil negligence, which requires only objective awareness of the risk from
criminal negligence . . . ."800 Mere criminal negligence by itself is not a basis
for criminal liability for true crimes under the new Iowa Criminal Code.801
C.

Venue

Venue no longer is jurisdictional in Iowa, under Code § 803.2 (and its
forerunner 802 since July 1, 1975). Prior to 1975,808 setting of venue (in the
particular county where the crime was committed) was an essential element
in proving (by direct or circumstantial evidence) any crime charged. Venue
had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,80. similar to proof of the substantive elements of the crime (and convictions have been reversed for insufficient evidence of venue).801 Now, however, venue is merely made the
place of trial, with the prosecutor needing to prove only the State's jurisdiction of the matter rather than also proving the particular county in Iowa in
which the criminal activity occurred. Any objection defendant has to the
place of trial must be made prior to trial, or it is waived.8°S Waiver for untimeliness is automatic irrespective of when defendant first discovers venue
error.80? A successful objection, however, does not force a prosecutor to
prove venue as an element of the crime. Rather, it merely forces relocation
of the trial.
Recently the Iowa Supreme Court, in State v. Allen, expressly held that
venue is no longer an element of the crime.80s Several recent cases had implied as much, but in Allen the supreme court decisively settled the issue. In
CODE § 707.5(1), which punishes unintentional killings during the commission of a public offense. The court thus refused to recognize the unlawful act doctrine as the sole mens rea for
involuntary manslaughter, at least in vehicular homicide cases.
600. [d.
601. But see State v. Bahl, 242 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Iowa 1976): "At least to a point, the
legislature could choose to make negligence the basis of a crime."
602. IOWA CODE § 753.2 (1971) (repealed 1975).
603. IOWA CODE § 753.2 (1971) (repealed 1975) provided: "The local jurisdiction of the
district court is of offenses committed within the county in which it is held, and of such other
cases as are or may be provided by law." (emphasis added).
604. State v. Evely, 228 N.W.2d 196 (Iowa 1975). See generally Annot., Necessity of Proving Venue or Territorial Jurisdiction of Criminal Offense Beyond Reasonable Doubt, 67
A.L.R.3d 988 (1975).
605. See State v. Durhant, 196 N.W.2d 428 (Iowa 1972).
606.. State v. Donnelly, 242 N.W.2d 295 (Iowa 1976).
607. [d. In this case, the error in venue was discovered during the State's case-in-chief.
608. State v. Allen, 293 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Iowa 1980).
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State v. Donneliy,809 the supreme court took note of the change in statutory
language and the familiar legislative rule of statutory construction that a
legislative amendment implies legislative intent for a substantive change in
the original statute. Subsequently, the court observed in State v. Hanna 810
that its recent cases "make it clear venue objections may not be raised except by motion prior to trial" and thus that "any objection to venue is
waived unless raised before trial."611
The change in statutory language makes clear that venue no longer is
an element. The pre-1975 venue statute read: "The local jurisdiction of the
district court is of offenses committed within the county. . . . "811 The word
"jurisdiction" was the basis for venue being required to be proved as part of
the prosecution's case. The current provision reads: "Criminal actions shall
be tried in the county in which the crime is committed, except as otherwise
provided by law. All objections to place of trial are waived by a defendant
unless the defendant objects thereto prior to trial."e18 Thus, the trial court's
jurisdiction is no longer a matter of proof at trial. Rather, the place of trial
is to be decided on a pretrial motion/objection, as stated in Allen. 814 Additionally, the state has the burden of proving venue by a preponderance of
the evidence. e1G
Even a successful objection to place of trial does not cause the prosecution to prove venue at trial, thus rendering the county as the situs of the
crime jurisdictional. A trial court's jurisdiction cannot be left to the parties'
agreements or be conditioned upon whether or not one party objects (to the
place of trial) and is successful. 818
The unequivocal statement by the supreme court in Allen should
change the fact that some trial judges are continuing to include venue in
their jury instructions.8l1 Fortunately, the Iowa State Bar Association's up609. [d. Accord State v. Bahl, 242 N.W.2d 298, 303 (Iowa 1976): "Under our holding in
Donnelly it is immaterial whether the crash occurred in the southern part or northern part of
Lee County." See Trimble v. State, 2 Greene 404 (1850) (division of Lee County into two separate judicial areas upheld, with exclusive jurisdiction of the two areas).
610. 277 N.W.2d 605 (Iowa 1979).
611. [d. at 608.
612. See IOWA CODE § 753.2 (1971) (repealed 1975) (emphasis added).
613. IOWA CODE § 803.2 (1979) (emphasis added).
614. "[TJhe defendant must secure a ruling by the trial court before the trial after the
parties have had an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing or he waives the issue of improper
venue. Absent an adverse ruling by the trial court, he may not seek appellate review of the
issue." 293 N.W.2d at 18. The court's newly expressed limit for rulings on venue objections only
applies to cases where the objection is raised after June 18, 1980. [d. at 19.
615. [d. at 20.
616. See State v. Fagan, 190 N.W.2d 800 (Iowa 1971) (parties could not stipulate to bench
trial on indictable offense under pre-revised law).
617. These alternative ways of "proving" venue other than by direct evidence have been
approved. State v. Brooks, 222 Iowa 651,269 N.W. 875 (1936) (venue established by inference);
State v. Anderson, 209 Iowa 510, 228 N.W. 353 (1929) (affirming judicial discretion in permit-
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dated Uniform Jury InstructionsG18 do not include venue as an element.

D. Lesser Included Offenses
Generally, the new Criminal Code does not depart from the pre-revised
law dealing with lesser included offenses,GIB the test in section 701.9 continuing to be whether one offense is "necessarily included in another public offense."G20 The statute bars conviction of a necessarily included offense upon
conviction of a greater offense and permits a trial court to enter judgment of
guilty of the greater offense in those cases where the jury may return a verdict of guilty on both a lesser included offense and the greater offense.
Section 701.9 must be read together with several rules found in the
Rules of Criminal Procedure which deal with lesser included offenses. Rule
6(1) authorizes prosecution by a single charging paper of each of the separate crimes arising "out of the same transaction or occurrence."8lI1 The rule
incorporates the substance of a former Code section making it unnecessary
to charge lesser included offenses, it being sufficient to charge the greater
offense only.GU Rule 6(2) merely restates, in rule form, the essence of section
701.9, barring conviction of both the offense charged and an included
offense.
The Supreme Court has held in State v. Rouse818 that Rule 6(3) does
not change the rule of former Iowa cases which required a request for an
included offense instruction. Absent such request, the prior cases had held
that any error in a failure of a trial court to give a lesser offense instruction
was waived. G24 The new rule, in its entirety provides:
In cases where the public offense charged may include some lesser offense it is the duty of the trial court to instruct the jury, not only as to
the public offense charged but as to all lesser offenses of which the accused might be found guilty under the indictment and upon the evidence
adduced, even though such instructions have not been requested. GS&

The Rule requires a trial court, in every case to determine, as a matter
of law, whether the offense charged carries with it any lesser included ofting prosecution to reopen record to establish proof of venue); State v. Conley, 176 N.W.2d 213
(Iowa 1970) (trial court properly took judicial notice of venue under circumstances of case).
618. See note 136 supra.
619. For an excellent and exhaustive critical analysis of the pre· revised standard, see
Note, The Lesser Included Offense Doctrine in Iowa: The Gordian Knot Untied, 59 IOWA L.
REV. 684 (1974).
620. See generally, J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 14; J. ROEHRICK, THE NEW
IOWA CRIMINAL CODE: A COMPARISON, 513 (1978).
621. IOWA R. CRIM. P. 6(1) (1979).
622. See IOWA CODE § 773.29 (1975) (repealed 1978).
623. State v. Rouse, 290 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1980).
624. See State v. Veverka, 271 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1978).
625. IOWA R. CRIM. P. 6(3) (1979).
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fenses. If the trial court determines that lesser included offenses are present
under the statutory elements and evidence, then such offense must be submitted to the jury notwithstanding a failure of counsel to request such instructions. However, as noted in Rouse, this duty of the court does not relieve counsel "of the responsibility of urging proper objection or
exception. "828
An issue created by Rule 6(3) was whether the failure of a trial court to
give a lesser included offense instruction sua sponte would automatically
result in a reversal of a conviction of a greater offense. Prior caselaw had
indicated that in at least two situations a reversal would not be required. In
those cases in which the trial court instructs on a greater offense as well as a
lesser included offense and the defendant is convicted of the greater offense,
there is no reversible error in a failure to instruct on additional lesser included offenses. 827 The rationale of the cases so holding, being based upon
the lack of prejudice to a defendant under such circumstances, would seemingly apply to cases which raise the issue under Rule 6(3). Moreover, in
those cases in which the defendant objects to the submission of a lesser included offense instruction for strategic or tactical reasons and the trial court
does not submit the instruction, the defendant should not be entitled to a
reversal on appeal on the grounds that Rule 6(3) required jury submission
over defendant's objection. 828 In Rouse, the Supreme Court refused to consider defendant's appellate claim that a lesser included offense instruction
should have been given, in light of defense counsel's specific waiver by stating he had no objections to the proferred instructions and by his failure to
submit an instruction on the lesser included offense, coupled with his failure
to object to the trial court's failure to give such an instruction. 82D
The question is less easily resolved in those cases where the trial court
does not instruct on a lesser included offense sua sponte, either through
inadvertence or based upon a determination that there are no lesser included offenses of the offense for which the defendant is charged. Failure to
so instruct in view of an appellate court's determination that, as a matter of
law, a lesser included offense should have been submitted, seemingly would
constitute reversible error in view of the Rule's apparently mandatory language. However, the Supreme Court in Rouse rejected such a strict application of the Rule, the implication being that the duty under Rule 6(3) is of a
directory, instead of a mandatory, nature. A contrary ruling would be unfortunate in view of the ramifications of such a position. If so applied, the Rule
would permit a defendant an opportunity to simply stand mute and observe
reversible error creep into the record, take a chance on a jury acquittal on
the offense charged, with the knowledge that, if convicted, the conviction
626.
627.
628.
629.

290 N.W.2d at 914.
State v. Pilcher. 171 N. W.2d 251 (Iowa 1969).
State v. Veverka. 271 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1978).
290 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1980).
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will be reversed on appeal. Otherwise, the "plain error" doctrine which has
been rejected outright recently by the Iowa Supreme Court880 would have
this one type of limited application (to the exclusion of all others).
The practical solution on the trial court level would be for the judge to
specifically ask the defense attorney if there are any lesser included offenses
to be instructed upon. Surely, a negative (albeit mistaken) response would
operate as a waiver. Moreover, an astute prosecutor should prompt such a
discussion "to make the record."
In State v. Holmes,881 the supreme court has already applied the prerevised standards for determining what constitutes a lesser included offense
under the new Criminal Code. Thus, the two-test standard for determining
whether one offense is "necessarily included" in the other "remains as
before,"8s2 as formulated in State v. Stewart 688 and State v. Stergion. 884 The
first step "focuses upon the legal or element test,"8811 with the lesser offense
being "an elementary part of the greater offense."888 The second step "requires an ad hoc factual determination,"887 that is, "a factual basis in the
record for submitting the included offense to the jury."688
1.

Same Species Requisite

There is another apparent limiting factor which is not expressly included in the two-step standard but which nevertheless is an integral part of
lesser included offense analysis, if not the starting point.88B It was pointed
out in Stewart 840 that lesser included offenses are thought to be of "the
same nature or same species"641 as the greater offense(s). The court went on
in Stewart to find that because the offenses of reckless driving and vehicular-type manslaughter were not "the same in law or in fact,"641 then reckless
driving was not a lesser included offense of vehicular-type manslaughter via
630. State v. Rinehart, 283 N.W.2d 319 (Iowa 1979).
631. 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979).
632. State v. Sanders, 280 N.W.2d 375, 377 (Iowa 1979).
633. 223 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 902 (1975).
634. 248 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1976).
635. . [d. at 912.
636. State v. Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Iowa 1976).
637. State v. Stergion, 248 N.W.2d 911, 912 (Iowa 1976).
638. State v. Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 796 (Iowa 1976).
639. See State v. Furnald, 263 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1978), in which the court stated:
Certain principles are applied to determine whether one crime is a lesser included offense in another. We examine the two crimes to determine if they are of the
same nature, or some species! (citation omitted). Narrowing the focus to determine
whether one offense is 'necessarily included' within another, we apply two tests ...
[d. at 752 (emphasis added).
640. State v. Stewart, 223 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 902 (1975).
641. [d. at 251.
642. [d. at 253.
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•
reckless driving. 648 Subsequently,
the court was convinced in State u.
644
Furnald that Iowa's criminal trespass crime is not "of the same nature or
same species"64& as the breaking and entering statute, and thus the former
was not a lesser included offense of the latter. The court based its conclusion on what it considered "a logical inference" that the trespassing statute
initially was enacted "at least in part to cope with the destructive fallout of
the demonstrations and protests which commenced in the 1960's. "648 The
fact remains, however, that the gravamen of both offenses is unlawful entry
onto another's property. It is the purpose of the unlawful entry that differentiates burglary from trespass. In order for an unlawful entry into the limited prescribed types of property (i.e., either an occupied structure or an
enclosed space) to constitute Burglary, there must be an accompanying specific intent to commit either a felony, an assault, or a theft. An unlawful
entry onto the same property for the mere purpose of socio-political protest,
on the other hand, would merely constitute the much less severe offense of
Trespass.
2.

Legal Test

Under the legal or elemental test, the lesser offense "must be composed
solely of some but not all elements of the greater crime. "647 That is, the
lesser crime "must not require any additional element which is not needed
to constitute the greater crime. "648 The lesser offense thus is "necessarily
included within the greater."84&
Put differently, to be "necessarily included in the greater offense," the
lesser offense "must be such that it is impossible to commit the greater
without having committed the lesser. "6&0 On the other hand, the court has
noted that "[i]t is quite possible to commit one crime in the act of committing another and yet not have it be an included offense. "6&1 This is because
under Iowa's two-step test for lesser included offenses the less serious crime
is not included if its elements are not entirely included as a part of the
elements of the major offense.6112
In State u. Inger,6&3 the supreme court held that the provision in section
643. [d.
644. 263 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1978).
645. [d. at 754.
646. [d.
647. State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Iowa 1979), quoting State v. Stergion, 248
N.W.2d 911, 912 (Iowa 1976).
648. [d.
649. State v. Stewart, 223 N.W.2d 250, 252 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.s. 902 (1975).
650. State v. Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 801 (Iowa 1976), quoting approvingly State v.
Leeman, 291 A.2d 709, 710-11 (Me. 1972).
651. State v. Furnaid, 263 N.W.2d 751, 753 (Iowa 1978).
652. [d. at 754.
653. 292 N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 1980).
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707.4 of the Code that Voluntary Manslaughter "is an included offense"GM

in a murder prosecution ipso facto satisfies the legal test. "However, for the
court to properly give a voluntary manslaughter instruction over specific objection by a party, there must also exist in the record a factual basis for such
an instruction,"GOO the court added. GOG
a. Pleadings. In analyzing the first or legal test, "the statutes and not
the accusatory pleading or charge must establish the essential elements of
the offense charged."GO'7 That is, the supreme court has held in State v. RedmanGOS that "the statutory or legal element test should be the sole approach
in determining what are the elements of the offense charged and that the
language of the information or indictment charging the crime has no bearing
on that analysis."so9
b. Applications of the Legal Test in Robbery Prosecutions. Two decisions under the new Criminal Code have taken a restrictive view of lesser
included offenses on a charge of Robbery (in either degree). In both cases,
the supreme court reaffirmed the pre-revised two-step legal elements and
factual basis test and held that the legal elements test was not met.
(1) Theft. In State v. Holmes,sso the supreme court held that Theft is
not a lesser included offense of the revised crime of Robbery, even though
the pre-revised crime of Larceny's1 (or Larceny from a Person)881 was a
lesser included offense of the pre-revised crime of Robbery.888 The change
resulted from the revised definition of Robbery not requiring a taking (unlike under the pre-revised law).s" Consequently, under the new Criminal
Code, each of these offenses requires an additional element. That is, Theft
requires a taking while Robbery does not, and Robbery requires either an
assault or certain threats while Theft does not.
This change is unfortunate, since it will or can cause an all-or-nothing
approach in a Robbery prosecution in which the evidence of the requisite
assault is slim but the evidence of a taking is solid.880 Under the pre-revised
654. [d. at 121 (emphasis added).
655. 292 N.W.2d at 122.
656. A similar provision makes Involuntary Manslaughter a lesser included offense of
Murder in either degree and of Voluntary Manslaughter. See IOWA CODE § 707.5 (1979). Compare id. § 714.7 (Operation Vehicle Without Owner's Consent), which states: "A violation of
this section may be proved as a lesser included offense on an indictment or information charging theft." [d. (emphasis added).
657. State v. Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 801 (Iowa 1976).
658. 244 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1976).
659. [d. at 801.
660. 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979).
661. See IOWA CODE § 709.1 (1975) (repealed 1978).
662. [d., § 709.6.
663. See State v. Fonza, 254 Iowa 630, 634, 118 N.W.2d 548, 551 (1962).
664. See text accompanying notes 1302-36, supra.
665. This differential in the quantum of proof as to the various essential elements of the
pre-revised offense of Robbery was discussed in State u. Taylor, 140 Iowa 470, 474, 118 N.W.
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law,666 the lesser included offense of Larceny from a Person was appropriate
for this situation (e.g., in a purse snatching not involving a protracted struggle).867 The public interest is not served by an all-or-nothing verdict which
will result in either an over-conviction for a non-violent act of Theft or an
acquittal of a thief charged with Robbery. Complicating this unfortunate
situation further is the fact that the prosecutor is in complete control. If he
suspects that he has a weak case of a violent taking, he can follow Professor
Yeager's advice668 and charge the defendant in two counts, one for Robbery
and the other for Theft. This dual approach covers the prosecution on both
fronts, while the defense, of course, must sit passively while the prosecution
selects its charging options. 8611 Under such a dual approach, presumably the
jury would be instructed to consider the count on Robbery first and to not
consider Theft at all if a guilty verdict is found on the Robbery count. Otherwise, there could be the spectacle of a defendant being convicted of both
Robbery and Theft for the same taking. Because Theft is not a lesser included offense of Robbery, it is a distinct possibility that double jeopardy
would not preclude both convictions870 however, a sense of justice certainly
would. Moreover, a defendant acquitted of Robbery arguably could face a
second prosecution (for Theft), in light of Theft not being a lesser included
offense. 671 Again, a sense of justice should prevent this, whether the Consti747. 748 (1908):
If there was a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors as to the element of force
and violence. it was their duty to find the deCendant guilty of no greater offense than
larceny from the person. If there was a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors
under the evidence as to whether the watch was taken from the person of the prose·
cuting witness. it was their duty to find the defendant guilty of no greater offense
than larceny. Granting that the evidence of the prosecuting witness was sufficient. if
believed. to warrant the jury in finding the element of force and violence. the jury was
not bound to so find. The jury might properly hesitate to find such fact. because of
the indefinite and unsatisfactory character of the evidence as to that particular question. In other words. the evidence in proof of the element of force and violence was
not so strong as the evidence of the larceny or of larceny from the person. It follows
that the jury could consistently have failed to find the defendant guilty of robbery.
and yet have found him guilty of larceny. or of larceny from the person.
666. IOWA CODE § 711.1-.3 (1975)(repealed 1978).
667. But see State v. Carr. 43 Iowa 418. 423 (1876). which holds that "a sudden snatching
from the hand or person of another constitutes the force and violence sufficient under our statute to constitute robbery."
A better view was taken in People v. Patton, 389 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (Ill. 1979), which
concluded that where an article is taken "'without any sensible or material violence to the
person, as snatching a hat from the head or a cane or umbrella from the hand' the offense is
theft from the person rather than robbery."
668. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON. supra note 3. § 252.
669. See note 1050 infra.
670. See State v. Stewart. 223 N.W.2d 250. 253 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 902
(1975).
671. [d.
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tution does or not.
(2) Accessory After the Fact. In State v. Sanders,672 the supreme
court held that Assessory After the Fact878 is not a lesser included offense of
Robbery. The legal elements test was not met because each offense has a
different state of mind (i.e., to prevent another's apprehension under Accessory After the Fact and to commit a theft under Robbery).
(3) Assault. Another apparent change from the pre-revised law is that
an Assault is no longer a lesser included offense of Robbery.874 This change
should occur in light of the statutory three-alternative definition of the actus reus of Robbery. That is, a person commits the actus reus component of
a robbery when he does "any of the following acts ...
Commits an assault upon another.
2. Threatens another with or purposely puts another in fear of immediate serious injury.
3. Threatens to commit immediately any forcible felony."876
1.

Thus, an assault is only one of three alternative ways of committing the
actus reus component of Robbery. Although serious threats as the other two
ways closely resemble an assault, nevertheless the law is clear that a mere
threat, standing alone, does not constitute an assault.
Application of the existing, lesser included offense standard clearly indicates that Assault is not a lesser included offense of Robbery. In the twostep process under that standard, the first step "requires consideration of
the legal elements,"878 with this legal elements test being as follows: "The
lesser offense must be composed solely of some but not all elements of the
greater crime. The lesser crime must not require any additional element
which is not needed to constitute the greater crime."877
The essential fact is that the lesser crime of Assault is "not needed" to
constitute a Robbery. That is because an assault is only one of three different alternative ways of committing the actus reus for a Robbery. Under the
prevailing test for a lesser included offense, as applied in State v. Stewart 878
(which was cited with approval in the new-Code case of State v. Holmes),878
a lesser crime cannot be a lesser included offense if the greater crime does
not require all of the elements of the lesser crime. It is irrelevant that the
greater crime includes the lesser crime as one of its alternative ways of being
committed. This point was most dramatically illustrated in State v. Stewart,
672.
673.
674.
675.
676.
677.
U.S. 902
678.
679.

280 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1979).
§ 703.3 (1979).
See State v. Duffy, 124 Iowa 705, 100 N.W. 796 (1904).
IOWA CODE § 711.1 (1979).
State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823, 825 (Iowa 1979).
Id., quoting State v. Stewart, 223 N.W.2d 250, 252 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 423
(1975).
223 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 902 (1975).
276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979).
IOWA CODE
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which held that reckless drivingS80 was not a lesser included offense of the
pre-revised crime of Manslaughter. s81 So-called "vehicular" Manslaughter
under the pre~revised law could result by operating a motor vehicle in either
of two-ways: (1) reckless operation or (2) operation while intoxicated. s81
Therefore, this type of Manslaughter consisted of three elements: (1) causing unlawful death of a person; (2) without malice aforethought; (3) by operation of a motor vehicle either (a) recklessly or (b) while intoxicated. Because reckless operation of a motor vehicle was not required for
Manslaughter, the supreme court held that the lesser offense of Reckless
Driving was not a lesser included offense. s8s Similarly, the elements of the
revised crime of Robbery are: (1) with intent to commit theft; (2) doing any
of these acts (a) committing an assault, or (b) threatening immediate serious
injury, or (c) threatening immediate commission of any forcible felony; (3)
to aid in the intended theft or to escape from the scene.
This result is unfortunate, especially in these cases with slim evidence
as to the defendant's intent in committing an assault. A jury could very well
believe that the defendant committed an assault and yet be unsure as to
whether there was an intent to steal something. This leaves the jury with
the dilemma of turning a person loose who they are sure has committed
Assault. Assuming that the jury will follow its instructions, legitimate concern arises over the potential over-conviction for Robbery, in these circumstances of an all-or-nothing approach. The prosecutor, on the other hand, is
protected from the consequences of this all-or-nothing approach, as he can
gamble on a Robbery conviction, content with the knowledge that an acquittal for Robbery would apparently not preclude him from reprosecuting for
an Assault based upon the same transaction. After all, in State v. Stewart,
the supreme court held that the state could prosecute for "vehicular" Manslaughter following an acquittal for Reckless Driving arising out of the same
occurrence, without constituting double jeopardy.
c. Critique. The basic all-or-nothing approach - untempered by examination of the pleadings - is unfortunate. It is hoped that the Iowa Supreme Court will revise its position on this inflexible approach, especially in
light of the applications analyzed above. The problem has been exacerbated
by significant statutory changes in the definitions of many crimes in the new
Criminal Code (especially Robbery).
Consideration of the pleadings would be reasonable in the RobberyTheft and Robbery-Assault situations. If, for example, the defendant is
charged (in the indictment or trial information) with Robbery by taking X,
and the evidence at trial supports an actual taking, then Theft should be
submitted to the fact-finder as a lesser included offense. Theft obviously
680.
681.
682.
683.

See IOWA CODE § 321.283 (1979).
See IOWA CODE § 690.10 (1975) (repealed 1978).
See IOWA CODE § 321.281 (1979).
223 N.W.2d at 253.
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would not be submitted, if either the pleading or the trial evidence did not
show an actual taking. This case-by-case approach would temper the potentially distorted results of the all-or-nothing approach in the Robbery-Theft
situation created in State v. Holmes. ss•
The following procedure is suggested as a better approach. The prosecutor could request a lesser included offense only i( he had given pre-trial notice of such intent. Absent such notice, he would be precluded from making
such a request at trial. Nevertheless, the defense could (in either circumstance) request a theory of the case instruction on the lesser included offense. The court, on the other hand, should not given such an instruction
sua sponte. SS &
The essentially "self-contained" elemental standard is also problematic
whether the elements of the greater nor the lesser crime are being analyzed.
By "self-contained" it is meant that neither the greater or the lesser crime
can be committed in any other way in order for the lesser included offense
standard to be met. For example, as noted above, Trespass was held to not
be a lesser included offense of Breaking and Entering in State v. Furnald688
because " it cannot be said the elements of the 'lesser' offense are entirely
included as a part of the elements of the major offense."SS? The rationale in
Furnald was that only a building was included in the particular Breaking
and Entering statute whereas the Trespass statute referred broadly to
"property." That term obviously includes land, but unauthorized entry onto
land by itself can never constitute Breaking and Entering. In other words,
the situs of the unlawful entry is broader for a Trespass than for a Breaking
or Entering (and now Burglary) - since the broad term "property" obviously includes buildings (and now "occupied structures" and "enclosed
spaces") and more (e.g., land).
This "entirely included" approach appears to focus on the wrong aspect. The broad concept of "property" in the Trespass statute vis-a-vis a
building (or "occupied structure") in the breaking and entering (now Burglary) statute does not involve a different element being required for the
lesser offense. Rather, this means that the element of situs can be met in
alternative ways. The three elements of the most common type688 of Burglary are (1) unlawful entry; (2) onto another's property that consists of either an "occupied structure" or an "enclosed space;" and (3) with specific
276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979). See text accompanying notes 660-71 supra.
This suggested approach is a modified version of the one approved in People v. RiP.2d 431, 433-34 (Colo. 1974) (en banc), which was noted disapprovingly in State v.
244 N.W.2d 792, 800 (Iowa 1976). See also text accompanying notes 622-30, supra.
263 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1978).
687. [d. at 754.
688. Burglary is not limited to unlawful entry, however, as discussed in text accompanying notes 967 -68 infra. This is another reason why Trespassing is not a lesser included offense
of Burglary under the present standard, but would be irrelevant under the revised standard
proposed in this Article.
684.
685.
vera, 525
Redmon,
686.
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intent to commit a felony, an assault, or a theft. The two elements of the
most common type of TresspassG89 are (1) unlawful entry; (2) onto another's
"property" of any kind. The fact that the lesser crime can be committed on
different types of property than the greater crime can should not have legal
significance. The crux of the. matter is that the issue will never come up
unless either an "occupied structure" or an "enclosed space" was unlawfully
entered, since otherwise there would be no Burglary charge. However, in a
Burglary prosecution, a lesser included offense instruction on Trespass
should always be given. Under the evidence of the case, the case consists of
an unlawful entry into another's "occupied structure" or "occupied space"
- with or without a specific intent to commit a felony, as assault, or a theft.
Obviously, defendant could be convicted of Trespassing if only the first two
elements are present. So why shouldn't Trespassing be a lesser included offense of Burglary? Otherwise, there remains the possibility of the all-ornothing and double prosecution spectacles that were discussed above in relation to Robbery and Theft.G80
Approaching it from the opposite direction, the prevailing lesser included offense standard holds in effect that a greater offense which can be
committed in alternative ways does not have a lesser included offense
merely because the lesser offense constitutes one of these alternative ways.
For example, OMVUI891 has been held89S under the pre-revised law not to be
a lesser included offense of vehicular-type ManslaughterGII8 because the latter can be foundationed on either OMVUI or Reckless Driving. It was apparent to the supreme court in State v. StergionG94 that "a key element in
OMVUI - driving while under the influence - is not necessarily included
in the offense of vehicular manslaughter."89t! The upshot in Stergion was
that the defendant's conviction for OMVUI was affirmed even though he
had previously been acquitted of vehicular-type Manslaughter "arising out
of the same incident and collision."898 Similarly, the court in State v. StewartG97 earlier had affirmed a conviction for Manslaughter following an acquittal for Reckless DrivingG98 arising out of the same occurrence.
Another aspect of this "alternative element" approach deserves scrutiny, especially in light of the new Code approach of separating the major
689. Trespassing is not limited, however, to unlawful entry, as discussed in text accompanying notes 1038-43 infra.
690. See text accompanying notes 684-85 supra.
691. See IOWA CODE § 321.281 (1979).
692. State v. Stergion, 248 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1976).
693. See IOWA CODE § 690.10 (1977) (repealed 1978).
694. 248 N.W.2d 911 (Iowa 1974).
695. [d. at 913.
696. [d. at 912.
697. 223 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1974).
698. See IOWA CODE § 321.283 (1979).
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offenses into several degrees. In State v. Redmon699 the supreme court upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct on Assault With Intent to Inflict
Great Bodily Injury and on AssaulFoo in a 1976 prosecution for the prerevised offense of Burglary With Aggravation 701 (which relied upon an assault as the basis for the Burglary being of an /ilggravated nature). The court
noted that "it would have been possible for defendant to have committed
aggravated burglary without having first committed [an assault),"70Il and
pointed to the fact that a burglary is complete upon the requisite breaking
and entering with an intent to commit a public offense. The crucial point
overlooked, however, was that defendant was not merely charged with Burglary. Instead, because the charge was aggravated burglary, the crime was
not complete until the assault was inflicted. This is apparent upon a simple
reading of the statute, which spoke of "actually assault any person being
lawfully therein"70s instead of with the intent to assault any person therein.
Once again, a more practical solution could be achieved if the jury were free
to choose a lesser verdict of Assault, believing that an Assault actually occurred but that the offender had not broken into the victim's dwelling. The
evidence could have been conflicting over whether he was invited or trespassed, but clear as to the physical attack. The jury should not be placed in
the dilemma of the all-or-nothing verdict. 7M

3. Factual Test
As explained by the Court in Stewart:701 "It is only after the elements
of the lesser crime are shown to be necessarily included in the greater crime
that a second inquiry is made. The second inquiry is a factual one, undertaken on a case by case basis."706 The factual test "merely requires there be
enough evidence introduced at trial to justify the submission to the jury of
an instruction on the proposed lesser included offense."707
This second step is never reached when the first test is not met. Conversely, an offense which meets the legal test for a lesser included offense
will nevertheless not be submitted in a particular case in which there is no
evidentiary basis in the trial record for so doing.
A lesser included offense must be determined in light of the evidence in
each case. 708 "Where the facts present a situation in which the major offense
699.
700.
701.
702.
703.
704.
705.
706.
707.
708.

244 N.W.2d 792 (Iowa 1976).
See IOWA CODE § 708.2(2) (1979).
See IOWA CODE § 708.02 (1977) (repealed 1978).
244 N.W.2d at 798.
See IOWA CODE § 708.02 (1977) (repealed 1978) (emphasis added).
See text accompanying notes 684-85 supra.
State v. Stewart, 223 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1974).
Id. at 252.
State v. Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Iowa 1976).
State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973).
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could not have been committed without the commission of a lesser one, the
lesser will be included."709 Put differently, the salient question on this second step is "whether, under the facts of the case, the greater offense could
have been committed without the commission of the lesser."710
This factual determination is not affected by imagining how the major
offense might have been otherwise accomplished. 711 Instead, the actual facts
of the particular case are controlling.
Conversely, the fact that a lesser crime actually was committed during
the commission of a greater crime does not give rise to a lesser included
offense. The supreme court in Everett v. Brewer,712 rejected the notion that
"the elements for an included offense could be conjured from the facts
alone, in the absence of a determination all the elements of the lesser offense were also elements of the greater."718 In other words, the particular
facts in any given case cannot supply "an included offense outside the elements of the major crime."714 For example, the trial court's refusal to instruct on simple possession in a drug sale case was upheld in State v.
Habhab 711l even though there clearly was evidence in the trial record of defendant's actual possession of the drug contemporaneous with the sale.
The principle that the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to
the State has been held 718 to have no application to the determination of
whether or not to submit a lesser included offense. If there is sufficient evidence in the trial record to support a conviction for the lesser offense, it
must be submitted. For example, a trial court's refusal to submit lesser
forms of homicide has been held 717 to be reversible error where the record
contained sufficient evidence of murder without the necessity for the jury to
find the defendant had specific intent to kill.
.
Conversely, an instruction on a lesser included offense need not be submitted where there is no evidence in the trial record to support the lesser
crime718 (that is, the defendant was guilty of the greater crime or nothing).719 Thus, where there was no evidence of criminal negligence, it was not
error to refuse submission of an Involuntary Manslaughter instruction in a
prosecution for Murder.720 Similarly, it is proper to refuse to submit an instruction on second-degree murder where the prosecution's only theory of
709.
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.
718.
719.
720.

State v. Habhab, 209 N.W.2d 73, 75 (Iowa 1973).
Everett v. Brewer, 215 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Iowa 1974).
State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555, 557 (Iowa 1973).
215 N.W.2d 244 (Iowa 1974).
[d. at 246.
State v. Habhab, 209 N.W.2d 73, 75 (Iowa 1973).
[d.
State v. Reese, 259 N.W.2d 771 (Iowa 1977).
[d.
State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973).
State v. Conner, 241 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1976).
State v. Millspaugh, 257 N.W.2d 513 (Iowa 1977).

•
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the case is the felony-murder rule.721 Moreover, it is not reversible error to
fail to give lesser included offense instructions in a prosecution for first-degree murder on the felony-murder doctrine where the defense elected either
to be convicted of felony murder or to be acquitted (that is, all or nothing).722 On the other hand, it has been held error to refuse defense-requested
lesser included offense instructions on second-degree murder and manslaughter is a prosecution for felony murder where it was possible on the
record evidence for the jury to determine that the shooting was not
intentional. 728
III.

INCHOATE OFFENSES

Inchoate crimes724 are independent crimes consisting of incompleted
criminal activity related to other more serious criminal offenses.7I11 These
include Solicitation, Conspiracy and Attempt. 7lI8 Each of these offenses "always presuppose[s] a purpose to commit another crime''7I' that is, a target
substantive crime, such as sexual abuse. If a substantive crime is committed
the defendant(s) will be punished for it. If not, however, the defendant(s)
can be punished for whatever inchoate crime(s)7I8 was committed. Although
the degree of harm, if any, is considerably less for inchoate crimes than if
the substantive crime had been committed, nevertheless persons who have
committed inchoate crimes have shown criminal propensity and thus should
be punished as a deterrence to further criminal activity. Of course, defendant(s) cannot be punished for both the inchoate and substantive crimes.'·
721. State v. Conner, 241 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1976).
722. State v. Veverka, 271 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 1978).
723. State v. Cuevas, 282 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1979).
724. The term "inchoate crimes" is used in G. Dlx & M. SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 684 (1973) [hereinafter cited G. DIX & M. SHARLOT), as compared to the term
"anticipatory offenses" used in W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTJ', supra note 398, §§ 58-66.
725. G. Dlx & M. SHARLOT, supra note 724, at 684.
726. The interrelationship of these inchoate offenses is described as follows: Solicitation
occurs when X requests Y to join him in committing sexual abuse; Conspiracy arises when Y
agrees and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiraceous agreement is committed by one of
them; an attempt occurs when either X or Y performs some perpetrating act sufficient to set
the plan in motion (e.g., "grabbing" the intended sexual abuse victim and "announcing" his
intentions). TRAINING MANUAL, supra note 43.
727. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.01-.03, Comment to art. 5, at 24 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
728. But see note 729 infra.
729. Under common law principles of merger, Solicitation merges into Conspiracy, and
thus a successful solicitor cannot be convicted of both Solicitation and Conspiracy. Begley v.
Commonwealth, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1546,60 S.W. 847 (1901). See R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at
584. In Iowa, a person "may not be convicted and sentenced for both the conspiracy and for the
public offense." IOWA CODE § 706.4 (1979). The term "public offense" appears broad enough to
include both the attempted offense and the consummated substantive offense. However, a person can be convicted for Attempt even when the evidence clearly shows that the target substantive offense was consummated. See State v. Banks, 213 N.W.2d 483 (Iowa 1973)(upholding a

•

•
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A. Attempt780
The new Criminal Code, like the former Code, does not contain a general attempt statute. The attempted offense is incorporated into the consummated substantive offense itself in many statutes in the new Code,781
thus rendering the attempted offense and the consummated substantive offense equally punishable. Attempted murder,m however, is maintained as a
separate offense. Another more limited way to charge attempted offenses is
by way of the crime of Assault While Participating in a Felony under section
708.3 of the Code. 788 However, assault is an essential element of that offense.
The potential overlapping of proscribed attempt-type conduct covered
by a substantive offense (e.g., Robbery) and the inchoate offense of Assault
While Participating in a Felony does not render the substantive offense unconstitutional. In State v. Pierce,784 the supreme court held both that due
process does not preclude the General Assembly, in its legislative perogative,
from eliminating taking as an element of the revised crime of Robbery and
that the Robbery statute "is no less clear merely because the conduct proscribed may overlap conduct which is also proscribed under a separate statute"78Ci (referring to Assault While Participating in a Felony as it relates to
an unsuccessful, or attempted, Robbery). Although not resolved by the ratio
decidendi of State v. Pierce, it appears that standard principles of
prosecutorial discretion 788 will govern on the question of whether an attempted Robbery or attempted Sexual Abuse is charged under the more severe respective substantive offenses or under the less severe inchoate-type
offense of Assault While Participating in a Felony.
A casus omissus occurs concerning an unsuccessful theif since the crime
of Theft787 does not include the attempted offense within its definition. 788
The same situation apparently occurs with the would-be burglar who has
merely attempted to break in at the time of his apprehension, since attempted burglary apparently is not included in the definition of Burglary
jury verdict of guilty for the pre-revised crime of attempted rape even though penetration indisputably occurred and defense theory was consent).
730. See generally, W. LAFAVE & A. SCO'M', supra note 398, §§ 59-60; R. PERKINS, supra
note 398, at 552-90.
731. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 711.1-.3, 712.1-.4 (1979) (Robbery and Arson).
732. See IOWA CODE § 707.11 (1979).
733. This "revised" crime consolidates the following three pre-revised crimes: IOWA CODE
§§ 694.5 (Assault with Intent to Commit a Felony); 694.7 (Assault with Intent to Commit Certain Crimes); 698.4 (Assault with Intent to Commit Rape)(1977) (repealed 1978). See text accompanying notes 684-704 infra.
734. 287 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 1980).
735. [d. at 574.
736. See note 1050 infra.
737. See IOWA CODE §§ 714.1-.2 (1979) and text accompanying notes 1064-1213 infra.
738. But see discussion of Fraudulent Practices as a limited attempted theft provision in
text accompanying notes 1214-49 infra.
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itself.739
Professor Yeager reports that "a general effort was made [in the drafting process] to avoid the problems inherent in formulating specific 'criminal
attempts' legislation by defining the underlying substantive crimes broadly
enough to include all the conduct which should be treated as criminal."74o
Contrastingly, Professor Schantz opines: "Perhaps most surprisingly, the
[then] Proposed Code eschews a general attempt provision."741 This "incorporating" or "equalizing" approach thus focuses upon the defendant-actor's
conduct rather than upon the gravity of the harm done.
1.

Overt Act

In the absence of statutory modification in the Iowa Code, the following
common law principles relating to what constitutes an attempt should prevail. A criminal attempt is "a step towards a criminal offense with specific
intent to commit that particular crime. "741 Thus, there must be an overt act
"amounting to more than mere preparation and performed in furtherance of
the commission of the prohibited act,"748 together with proof of specific intent. The Iowa Supreme Court fashioned the following test for determining
the sufficiency of the conduct constituting the overt acts under the pre-revised law:
The overt act must reach far enough towards the accomplishment, toward the desired result, to amount to the commencement of the consummation, not merely preparatory. It need not be the last proximate act to
the consummation of the offense attempted to be perpetrated, but it
must approach sufficiently near it to stand either as the first or some
subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the
offense after the preparations are made. Whenever the design of a person
to commit crime is clearly shown, slight acts done in furtherance of that
design will constitute an attempt. . . .744

The above articulated test does not apply, however, to the crime of At739. IOWA CODE § 713.1 (1979). See text accompanying notes 997-1007 infra.
740. Yeager Note, supra note 68, at 513.
741. Schantz, supra note 2, at 442.
742. R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 552.
743. Yeager Note, supra note 68, at 513. See also R. PERKINS, supra note 398, which
states:
A distinction is made between measures taken by way of preparation for the commission of a crime and steps taken in the direction of its actual perpetration . . . Between preparation for the attempt and the attempt itself, there is a wide difference.
The preparation consists in devising or arranging the means or measures necessary
for the commission of the offense; the attempt is the direct movement toward the
commission after the preparations are made.
[d. at 557 (cites omitted).
744. State v. Roby, 194 Iowa 1032, lO43, 188 N.W. 709, 714 (1922).
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tempted Murder. 745 The statutory definition of that crime contains its own
specific test, one which applies expressly only to Attempted Murder. 74e This
test embodies "any act by which he or she expects to set in motion a force or
chain of events which will cause or result in the death of such other
person. "747
The failure of the General Assembly to provide a general statutory test
for determining attempt liability, while at the same time providing a specific
test for one crime, should mean that the above-mentioned common law test
previously adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court remains in effect for all
other crimes. Because the legislature "is presumed to know the existing
state of the law at the time of the enactment of a new statute,"748 the failure
to provide a statutory test of general applicability is a strong indication of
legislative intent to leave the common law test intact except as to the one
crime of Attempted Murder. Of course, the supreme court is free to adopt
the section 707.11 definition relating to Attempted Murder as the general
test. However, the Special Committee on Uniform Court Instructions of the
Iowa State Bar Association is not privileged to make such an election to
utilize the Attempted Murder test. Nevertheless, the committee's revised
Uniform Jury Instructions relating to general attempt liability utilize the
specific test set out in the Iowa Code § 707.11.7411

2. Mental State
Attempt liability is grounded solely upon specific intent7110 to commit a
particular crime. As such, attempt liability cannot be based upon negligence,7111 no matter how "great the danger or extreme the negligence."7111
745. See IOWA CODE § 707.11 (1979).
746. See Adams v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 257, 208 S.E.2d 742 (1974), in which a conviction for attempted prostitution was reversed because of the application of the general test for
attempt liability instead of the specific test applicable only to this offense. "Attempted prostitution, unlike attempts to commit crimes generally, is defined solely by CODE § 18.1-194 and, as
so defined, is incorporated within the offense of prostitution itself." [d. at 258, 208 S.E.2d at
743-44.
747. IOWA CODE § 707.11 (1979).
748. State v. Rauhauser, 272 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Iowa 1978).
749. See IOWA CODE § 707.11 (1979).
750. See notes 480-509 supra.
751. "The act must be done with the specific intent to commit the particular crime the
accused is charged with attempting to commit. This intent cannot be supplied by negligence,
nor can there be an attempt at negligence, because a negligent act is necessarily done without
intention." J. MILLER, supra note 474, at 96. But see W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 398,
which states:
Maya defendant be convicted of an attempt to commit a crime which is defined only
in terms of reckless or negligent conduct? In theory at least, it is conceivable that
conviction might be possible if the completed crime consists simply of reckless or
negligent creation of danger and it was shown that the defendant actually intended to
engage in conduct creating that danger.
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Furthermore, the prosecution must prove that the defendant acted "with a
certain purpose,"7G3 as set out in the applicable statute.nf
"To do an act from general malevolence is not an attempt to commit a
crime, because there is no specific intent, though the act according to its
consequences may amount to a substantive crime."7GG This difference between murder and attempted murder in this regard is an anomoly, since "to
commit murder, one need not intend to take life, but to be guilty of an
attempt to murder, he must so intend. It is not sufficient that his act, had it
proved fatal, would have been murder."7G8
B.

Solicitation 7G7

A new crime in the form of a general solicitation statute7G8 was included
in the new Criminal Code. Although there was no solicitation statute of general application under the pre-revised law, there were nevertheless at least
three major specific solicitation statutes of limited application. 7G9 In addition to the general solicitation statute which applies to felonies of all classes
as well as to aggravated misdemeanors, the new Criminal Code contains
some substantive offenses which, by definition, include acts of solicitation
(e.g., Suborning Perjury,780 Bribery,781 and Prostitution).m In these latter
Id. § 59, at 429.
752. R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 574.
753. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 215.
754. "When a statute makes an offense to consist of an act combined with a particular
intent, that intent is just as necessary to be proved as the act itself, and must be found as a
matter of fact before a conviction can be had . . . . " Thacker v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767,
_, 114 S.E. 504, 505 (1922) (conviction for attempted murder reversed because of lack of
evidence of intent to kill). Accord, Aikerson v. State, 295 So.2d 778 (Miss. 1974) (reversal of
conviction for assault with intent to commit rape where the evidence "merely depicted a somewhat aimless attack," and was lacking as to the act of assault being done with the requisite
intent to commit rape).
755. Thacker v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 767, _, 114 S.E. 504, 506 (1922) (citing W.
CLARK, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 111 (2d ed. 1902».
756. Id. at _, 114 S.E. at 506 (citing 1 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 729, at 522 (9th ed.
1923».
757. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 101-03; W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, supra note 348, § 58; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 582-88.
758. IOWA CODE § 705.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos.
501-06. "The thought is that persons who actively promote the commission of crimes by others
are sufficiently dangerous to the general welfare to be considered criminals, even when their
attempts at such promotion are unsuccessful." STUDY COMM. REPORT, supra note 3, Comment
at 31.
759. IOWA CODE §§ 690.8 (Advising or Inciting Murder); 721.3 (Attempt to Suborn Perjury); 724.2 (Solicitation for Prostitution (1977) (repealed 1978).
760. IOWA CODE § 720.3 (1979).
761. Id. § 722.1.
762. Id. § 725.1.
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instances, the prosecution, of course, would be for the substantive offense,7u
as the specific statute controls over the general statute. 784
The elements of Solicitation are: (1) command, entreat, or otherwise attempt to persuade; (2) another person; (3) to commit a particular7811 felony
or aggravated misdemeanor; (4) with "corroborated" intent that the "target"
crime actually be committed. The gist of the offense is in the act of persuading or attempting to persuade. 788 Thus, the crime is complete with the act of
speaking words even though the request is refused,787 provided that there is
sufficient corroborative evidence of defendant's intent. 788 Moreover, the person solicited is never guilty of Solicitation788-even if he agrees to the criminal design, as only the solicitor can be guilty of Solicitation. 770 The criminal
responsibility of the successfully-solicited person must rest upon his participation in other inchoate crimes (i.e., Conspiracy or attempted substantive
offenses) or in the consummated substantive offense itself.771
1.

Corroboration of Intent

The act of soliciting must be done with the specific intent771 that the
solicited act be done "under circumstances which corroborates [sic] that intent by clear and convincing evidence," under Iowa Code section 705.1. 778
763. "[F]or such offenses this section [on Solicitation] should be disregarded as irrelevant,
on the theory that one cannot be guilty of soliciting an act which is itself a solicitation." J.
YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, at 30.
764. Cartee v. Brewer, 265 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1978); State v. Thompson, 253 N.W.2d 608
(Iowa 1977).
765. "Particular" crimes must be solicited because to prohibit general exhortations would
involve free speech problems. G. DIX & M. SHARLOT, supra note 724, at 750.
766. By including commanding, entreating, or otherwise attempting to persuade as alternative modes of the actus reus, the revised crime of Solicitation is much broader than the actus
reus of the pre-revised specific solicitation statutes. See, e.g., State v. Willis, 218 N.W.2d 921
(Iowa 1974) (the term "solicit another" in the pre-revised crime of Solicitation for Prostitution
signifies the "asking or urging of another").
767. A person is guilty of Solicitation even if the person solicited immediately rejects the
proposal, and regardless of whether or not there is any agreement or overt act. Hutchins v.
Municipal Court, 61 Cal. App. 3d 77, 132 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976); accord, State v.
Blechman, 135 N.J.L. 99, 50 A.2d 152 (1946) (one who counsels another to burn solicitor's insured building is guilty of Solicitation even though no step is taken to carry out the solicitor's
request).
768. See IOWA CODE § 705.1 (1979).
769. See State v. Walker, 247 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 1976).
770. "Conspiracy differs from solicitation in that one person alone is criminally liable for
solicitation by reason of suggesting to or commanding or persuading another that he commit a
crime; while in conspiracy two or more persons, with common intent and purpose, agree among
themselves upon the criminal objective." J. MiLLER, supra note 474, at 107.
771. The parameters of the criminal responsibility of the solicitor are discussed in the
text accompanying notes 795-804 infra.
772. See text accompanying notes 480-509 supra.
773. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 503.
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The purpose of corroboration is to protect against the possibility that comments made in jestm may form the basis of a criminal prosecution. 7711 A
corroborative overt act 778 might include producing a detailed "blueprint" of
an intended robbery scene or taking a solicited person to the intended crime
scene to "case" the place.

2. Corroboration of Testimony by the Solicited Person
The evidentiary rules set out in Rule 20(3) of the Iowa Rules of Criminal Procedure prevent a conviction based solely upon the uncorroborated
testimony of a "solicited person."777 By the terms of the rule, this corrobora774. E.g., idle machismo tavern "talk."
775. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, states:
[T]he [drafting] committee was somewhat apprehensive that a solicitation statute
might prove to be excessively restrictive on free speech or be otherwise subject to
abuse, resulting in prosecutions for casual comments which are not intended to be
taken serioUsly; hence the unusual provision for renunciation and the requirement of
corroboration of intent by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. § 101, at 29.
776. "Such corroboration cannot be supplied merely by the fact of the solicitation,
but must be proved independently. The evidence must tend to show, strengthen, con·
firm or point out that the defendant, when he solicited the commission of the offense,
if he did so, intended that the offense be committed. The corroboration may be
proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence."
UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 503.
777. Whether an undercover police officer or agent who successfully can be a "solicited
person" for purposes of the corroboration requirement in Rule 20(3) remains to be determined.
On its face, Rule 20(3) does not exempt peace officers or their agents and there is no sound
public policy reason for the courts to do so by judicial interpretation. This non-exemption approach would be especially meaningful in a situation in which the "solicited" crime is never
attempted or completed (e.g., a contract murder with an undercover police officer allegedly
approached by the defendant to be the supposed "hit man").
A trickier question is whether the officer is a "solicited person" when the evidence shows
that he actually initiated the contact which directly culminated in criminal activity with another. That is, can an undercover officer approach a suspected drug dealer and offer to make a
buy, then be "solicited" by the dealer's offer to sell? Probably so, in light of the evident public
policy protecting a person against a conviction for Solicitation, a new statutory crime unrecognized at common law and which punishes speech, based solely upon the uncorroborated word of
another person claiming to have been solicited. Of course, an officer may be reluctant to establish that he actually initiated or "instigated" this course of conduct in light of the policy activity provision in IOWA CODE § 704.11 (1979), as discussed in text accompanying notes 814-24
infra.
In State v. Iowa District Court, 271 N.W.2d 704 (Iowa 1978), the supreme court refused to
adjudicate on a point of law the question of whether a successful police undercover agent is a
"solicited person" whose trial testimony on a charge of Delivery of a controlled substance would
require corroboration under IOWA R. CRIM. 20(3). Because "a substantial factual controversy"
arose with the defendant claiming that the agent "solicited" the purchase and the officer claiming that the defendant voluntarily offered the drugs to him following contact with the defendant by a third party on behalf of the officer, the supreme court held that "it is inappropriate
to adjudicate the point." 271 N.W.2d at 705.
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tion must be established "by other evidence which shall tend to connect the
defendant with the commission of the offense [and it] is not sufficient if it
merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof."
It should be permissible to prove corroboration by either direct or circumstantial evidence. 778
A jury would be instructed under Uniform Jury Instruction No. 202
that it, .in effect, first must find that a witness is a "solicited person," as
defined therein. If it does, "then the defendant cannot be convicted solely
upon the solicited person's testimony." Instead, the jury must find "other
evidence which tends to connect the defendant, that is, tends to single out
and point to him as one of the persons who committed the offense [of
Solicitation]."778
The issue of corroboration, of course, will only arise when there is no
other prosecution witness. Thus, this provision does not ipso facto require
corroboration of the testimony by a "solicited person," upon pain of its exclusion or its being stricken.

3. Renunciation
A statutory defense of renunciation exists in section 705.2 of the Code.
Renunciation, however, apparently must be successful and not merely attempted, notwithstanding the zealousness of such an attempt. 780 That is, the
defendant-solicitor must either persuade the solicited person not to commit
the target crime or must otherwise prevent the commission of that offense.
If unsuccessful, then the defendant-solicitor is equally guilty, as an accessory before the fact, if the target substantive crime is committed or attempted by his "confederate."781 The terms of the statute itself state:

A renunciation is not voluntary and complete if it is motivated in whole
or in part by (a) the person's belief that circumstances exist which increase the possibility of detection or apprehension of the defendant or
another or which makes more difficult the consummation of the offense
or (b) the person's decision to postpone the offense until another time or,
to substitute another victim or another but similar objective. 78•

Moreover, the renunciation must be timely. It must occur before the com- .
mission of an overt act by any of the co-conspirators. Once the conspiracy is
complete upon the requisite agreement and an overt act, then renunciation
is no longer operative, since renunciation is a defense only for the crime of
778. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 50.
779. Id., at No. 202.
780. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 505, which states that "the
'renunciation' by the defendant must be complete and voluntary, that is, done under such circumstances that clearly indicated he did not want or intend that the offense be committed."
781. See notes 798-800 infra.
782. IOWA CODE § 705.2 (1979) (emphasis added).
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Solicitation and not for Conspiracy.783
The new Criminal Code is silent as to the allocation of the burden of
proof where renunciation is asserted as a defense. However, the burden of
disproving renunciation is placed upon the prosecution in Uniform Jury Instruction No. 504. 784 Pursuant thereto, the prosecution would have to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that "the persuasion and prevention was [sic]
not done under such circumstances as to indicate the defendant's complete
and voluntary abandonment or rejection of his intent that the offense be
committed."
.
811
Such an approach appears to be erroneous/ because of its misunderstanding of the nature of the crime of Solicitation. This crime is complete
(and thus ipso facto punishable) upon the very commission of the act of
persuading or attempting to persuade, accompanied by the requisite intent. 786 The issue of renunciation therefore does not even arise until sometime after the crime of Solicitation is complete. 787 Whereas renunciation, if
proved, would, in effect, vitiate the solicitor's intent, nevertheless the requisite intent is to be determined co-terminous with the commission of the
criminal act.7BB Renunciation is therefore different from the defenses of insanity, diminished responsibility, and entrapment. 789 These three defenses
negate the existence of the mens rea component at the time of the commis783. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 103.
784. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 504.
785. J. ROEHRICK, supra note 620, states:
This [section 705.2] is a codification of the common law defense to solicitation; that
is, there was no intent and the defendant abandoned his plans. It is felt, however,
that the last sentence may place a burden of proof upon the defendant to show that it
falls outside of the exceptions which are listed therein. Obviously for the defense to
prevail, there must be a complete and voluntary renunciation. Therefore, if the defendant introduces the defense of solicitation, he will have the burden of proof. Thus,
this is likely to be held as an affirmative defense.
[d. at 57 (emphasis in original).
786. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 103. Professor Yeager does not
squarely discuss the issue of allocation of the burden of proof, but it appears that the implication from the overall tenor of his discussion is that he feels that renunciation is an affirmative
defense to be proved by the defendant. See State v. Blechman, 135 N.J.L. 99, 50 A.2d 152
(1946).
787. Solicitation, like Burglary, is a consummated offense upon the concurrence of the
requisite actus reus and requisite mens rea, irrespective of the "target" substantive crime ever
being committed or even attempted. See People v. Robles, 207 Cal. App. 2d 891, 24 Cal. Rptr.
708 (1962) (burglary). The Robles court stated that "[p]roof of intent at the time of entry does
not depend upon the subsequent commission of the felony or even an attempt to commit it."
[d. at _, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
788. See note 741, supra.
789. None of these three defenses is defined in the Criminal Code, thus leaving intact the
pre-revised common law definitions set by the Iowa Supreme Court. These defenses are set out
in the UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 206, 209, 213 (respectively). Defenses are not discussed in this Article.
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sion of the criminal act. As such, the substantive crime is never actually
completed when any of these latter three defenses is asserted.7IIO
790. This conclusion is buttressed by the general approach taken in State v. Reese, 272
N.W.2d 863 (Iowa 1978), which is the most recent decision on the question of allocation of the
burden of proof as to defenses in criminal cases. In Reese, the court recognized for the first
time the existence of the defense of necessity in a prosecution for Escape [under IOWA CODE §
745.1 (1977) (repealed 1978)J and then held that the state has the ultimate burden of risk of
non-persuasion to disprove necessity beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant has met
his burden of going forward with the evidence by generating a fact question on the defense.
In reaching its conclusion on the burden of proof, the court analogized to its prior decisions
placing the burden on the state to disprove the defenses of alibi, entrapment, insanity, intoxication, and self defense. Most particularly, the court felt that the analogy with entrapment was
"especially persuasive because that defense, like necessity, is a question which arises after a
showing of defendant's guilt has been made. In spite of such showing, as a matter of public
policy, a conviction cannot be tolerated." 272 N.W.2d at 867. The reference to entrapment
"[arisingJ after a showing of defendant's guilt has been made" indicates that the court presently takes the traditional approach that entrapment merely operates as justification to excuse
what otherwise is crystallized or completed criminal activity, that is, that the entrapped defendant nevertheless formed the requisite criminal intent to commit the crime. An alternative
approach would be that an entrapped defendant lacked the requisite criminal intent because
that intent had not originated in his own mind but instead was implanted there improperly by
law enforcement agents. See State v. Heeron, 208 Iowa 1151, 226 N.W. 30 (1929).
In Reese, the court determined that the defense of necessity "does not negate any element
of a crime." 272 N.W.2d at 866. Rather, "the question of necessity arises only after it has been
determined that a crime has occurred as an entirely independent inquiry." id. This tack is
questionable. Alternatively, the crux of the matter is that a prisoner faced with a situation of
necessity (via "a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in
the immediate future" with no time for complaint to the prison authorities or the courts) commits the actus reus of unauthorized departure because of this necessity and thus lacka any
criminal intent in escaping. [d. The focus should properly be upon the motivational force in
departing.
Similarly, a person acting in self defense essentially has not acted with criminal intent. He
instead had intended to kill but not because of any criminal motivation. The above is the
proper analysis of the defenses of entrapment, self-defense, and necessity-that is, a defendant
acting in any of these circumstances did not act with the requisite criminal intent.
Nevertheless, the reference in Reese to "a question which arises after a showing of defendant's guilt has been made" definitely has implications for the question of burden of proof on
the defense of renunciation. As noted, the crime of Solicitation is already complete before the
attempted renunciation. Indeed, there would be no need for renunciation unless the crime had
already been committed. Thus, under the prevailing approach of the Iowa Supreme Court, renunciation would be akin to entrapment, self-defense, and necessity in being "a question which
arises after a showing of defendant's guilt has been made." Even so, renunciation does not meet
the second part of the prevailing test, namely, U[iJn spite of such showing, as a matter of public
policy, a conviction cannot be tolerated." A defendant who was entrapped should not be convicted because of the intolerableness of such improper law enforcement activity. A defendant
who acts in self-defense should not be convicted because of his inalienable right of self-preservation. A prisoner who escapes out of necessity should not invoke criminal responsibility. And
the burden of disproving these three defenses should be on the state. However, renunciation is
different. There is nothing unfair about requiring a defendant who has already exhibited the
requisite conduct constituting the crime of Solicitation to carry the burden of proof as to his
alleged defense of renunciation. Conclusively, the defendant in a prosecution for Solicitation
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On the other hand, renunciation appears more analogous to the defense
of having a valid prescription, on a charge of possession of a controlled substance. 781 In such a case, the prescription acts as an excuse for the defendant's act of possession, but the defendant bears the burden of proving the
existence of a valid prescription. 791 Likewise, it can be argued that the defense of renunciation acts as an excuse for the actual commission of the
solicitation offense, and that, therefore, the defendant should have the burden of proving the renunciation defense.
Further support is found for the above argument when one considers
the test which the Iowa Supreme Court has followed in determining the allocation of the burden of proof relating to statutory exceptions. That test
may be articulated as follows: If the exception is material in arriving at the
definition of the crime, that is, where the exception is considered an essential element of the crime, then the prosecution has the burden of showing
that the exception does not apply. When an exception merely furnishes an
excuse for what would otherwise be criminal conduct, however, then the
duty devolves upon the defendant to bring himself within the exculpatory
provision. 798 Additionally, if the statutory requirement for the existence of
the exception may be satisfied by objective facts "inaccessible as a practic@l
matter to the prosecution but peculiarly within defendant's knowledge,"
then the exception is normally considered a defense or justification and not
an element of the crime. 7tH
4. Extent of Liability

Solicitation amounts, in effect, to an attempt to form a conspiracY.7911 If
the solicitation is unsuccessful, then the solicitor still can be convicted of
Solicitation. 796 If the solicitation is successful, then both the solicitor and
the solicitee(s) can be convicted of at least ConspiracY, even if the target
substantive crime is never completed or even attempted.797 If the design is
attempted or completed, then the original solicitor will be equally liable as
an accomplice or co-conspirator for all acts committed within the scope of
did have criminal intent at the time of his actus reus, absent any improper influences militating
against a voluntary and informed judgment. The same certainly cannot be said about a defendant whose conduct (the actus reus) was motivated by entrapment, self-defense, or necessity.
791. See IOWA CODE § 204.401(3) (1979).
792. [d. § 204.507, which states that "[i)t is not necesaary for the state to negate any
exemption or exception set forth in this chapter [on controlled substances) ... [T)he proof of
entitlement to any exemption or exception by the person claiming its benefit shall be a valid
defense." See State v. Gibbs, 239 N.W.2d 866 (Iowa 1976); State v. Lynch, 197 N.W.2d 186
(Iowa 1972) (upholding constitutionality of verbatim predecessor statute).
793. State v. Lynch, 197 N.W.2d 186 (Iowa 1972).
794. State v. Gibbs, 239 N.W.2d 866, 868 (Iowa 1976).
795. See generally, W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 398, § 58, at 417.
796. State v. Blechman, 135 N.J.L. 99, 50 A.2d 152 (1946).
797. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 398, § 58, at 414.
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the Conspiracy while he remains a member thereof7l8 (either of attempt?"
or the completed target offenseSOO ).
The crime of soliciting another person to commit a crime (either jointly
with the solicitor or on behalf of the solicitor) is thus distinct from Conspiracy, Attempt Liability, and Aiding and Abetting. Being a distinct offense
itself, Solicitation criminalizes wrongful conduct at a much earlier stage. As
such, it plugs a loophole in the Iowa criminal law, since "[t]he law of attempts and accomplice liability frequently would not reach this culpable
conduct if the solicited crime did not occur."SOl Accordingly, the mere act of
Solicitation in hiring a "hit man" to murder someone does not constitute the
crime of attempted murder where the murder never was attempted.80s In
this circumstance, the act of soliciting is mere preparation whereas attempt
liability requires a perpetrating act.soa Solicitation plus some other conduct
transcending preparation may constitute an attempt, however.804

5. Merger
A successful solicitor presumably cannot be convicted of both Solicitation and Conspiracy. Solicitation, in the nature of an attempted conspiracy,SOG thus merges into Conspiracy.sGe Nor can a solicitor be guilty of both
Solicitation and the substantive offense itself.807 This is because his criminal
responsibility will arise from the commission of the substantive offense itself
(as either a principal or as an accessory before the fact via Solicitation) or
798. G. Dlx & M. SHARLOT, supra note 724, at 749-50; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI', supra note
398, § 58, at 417; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 582-84.
799. "If the one solicited goes far enough to incur guilt of an attempt to commit the
[target substantive] crime, the solicitor is also guilty of attempt." R. PERKINS, supra note 398,
at 584 [citing State v. Jones, 83 N.C. 605 (1880); UbI v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. (Gratt.) 706
(1849)].
800. "One who successfully solicits another to commit a crime is guilty of the offense
committed unless some special defense is available to him." [d. at 582 [citing People v. Harper,
25 Cal.2d 862, 156 P.2d 249 (1945)].
801. Schantz, supra note 2, at 441.
802. Gervin v. State, 371 S.W.2d 449 (Tenn. 1963).
803. [d. at 451.
804. [d. at 452. Whereas a mere solicitation generally is not considered sufficient for attempt liability, "a solicitation accompanied by other overt acts, such as the furnishing of materials, is an attempt." W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI', supra note 398, § 62, at 423.
805. G. Dlx & M. SHARLOT, supra note 724, at 749.
806. Begley v. Commonwealth, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1546,60 S.W. 847 (1901); J. MILLER, supra
note 474, at 107.
807. "The solicitation is so far merged in the resulting offense that the solicitor cannot be
punished for both." R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 584. Perkins continues, however:
"There is no sound reason why there should be any rule of absolute merger. If the
evidence of an indictable solicitation is clear, for example, while there is a condict as
to whether the one solicited did or did not proceed far enough to have committed a
criminal attempt, there should be no bar to a conviction for the solicitation."
[d.
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from the Conspiracy (if the substantive crime is not committed).
6.

Classification of Crime Solicited

Solicitation, under Code section 705.1, applies only to felonies and aggravated misdemeanors. Thus, it is not a crime to solicit another to commit
serious or simple misdemeanors.
This omission is questionable, in light of wrongful conduct being left
unpunishable. The public interest is not served by indirectly "permitting"
persons to solicit others to commit even such a "minor" offense as a simple
Assault. Granted, the potential harm is less if Solicitation of a serious or
simple misdemeanor is successful (than if a more serious offense is solicited)
nevertheless, the criminal law should not leave such gaps in ordering a
peaceful society. This statutory gap is especially questionable in light of the
revised related offense of Conspiracyll°8 applying to all three levels of
misdemeanors.
7.

Grading

There are two grades of Solicitation, with the distinction based upon
whether a felony or an aggravated misdemeanor is the crime which is the
object of the solicitation. Solicitation of a felony of any class809 is itself a
class D felony.8lO As a non-forcible felony, however, Solicitation is not subject to the prohibition on ameliorative sentencing options (i.e., a deferred
judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sentence) applicable to "forcible felonies"811 even though a "forcible felony" is the object of the solicitation. Solicitation of an aggravated misdemeanor is itself punishable as an
aggravated misdemeanor.8ta
808. See IOWA CODE § 706.3 (1979) and text accompanying notes 831-61 supra.
809. The single penalty for Solicitation of any class of felony offenses focuses solely on
defendant's act of soliciting another to commit a felony without taking into account the seriousness of the particular felony solicited. Thus, the same five-year imprisonment for Solicitation
applies to Solicitation of a class A felony offense (which is punishable by a life term); Solicitation of a class B felony offense (25-year term); Solicitation of a class C felony offense (lO-year
term); or Solicitation of a class D felony offense (5-year term).
810. The single grade of this offense is a class D felony. It is punishable by either an
indeterminate term of inprisonment of five years or a maximum fine of $1,000 or both. Because
this offense is a "forcible felony," none of the ameliorative sentencing alternatives (i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sentence of probation) is available, in lieu
of the above-mentioned imprisonment. Moreover, being a "forcible felony," this offense is also
subject to the mandatory minimum five-year sentence if a firearm is used or possessed during
its commission.
811. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (l979).
812. An aggravated misdemeanor is punishable by either a determinate term of confinement not to exceed two years or a maximum fine of $5000 or both. Other sentencing alternatives include a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation,
in lieu of the above-mentioned confinement or fine.
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This grading is unsound, especially when considered in context with the
grading of the related offense of Conspiracy.8lS Providing in the Conspiracy
statute for different grades (and corresponding different penalty levels) depending upon whether a "forcible felony" or a non-forcible felony was the
target crime is preferable to the singular approach in Solicitation. Such a
differentiation would focus upon the gravity of the crime solicited. An even
better approach would have been a sliding scale punishing Solicitation as
two classifications lower than the crime solicited (e.g., Solicitation of a class
A felony would be punishable itself as a class C felony).

8. Police Activity Limitation
A new provision in section 704.11 of the Code establishing legitimate
police undercover activity as justification for otherwise complicity in a crime
has caused excitement in the law enforcement community, because of its
arguable implications for rendering the undercover agent or informant guilty
of the crime of Solicitation, if not also for the substantive offense being investigated, unless the strict requirements of the supposed defense are met.
Because of poor draftsmanship, an innocuous provision intended merely to
codify a well-recognized common law defense 814 has instead the potential of
being a complicity provision extending criminal liability to law enforcement
officers and their agents. Only a common sense approach by prosecutors in
charging and by courts in interpreting this provision can prevent a ridiculous result. Magnifying the problem is the fact that the General Assembly
has supposedly already "repaired" the provision. In its amended form, this
provision reads:
704.11 POLICE ACTIVITY. A peace officer or person acting as an .
agent of or directed by any police agency who participates in the commission of a crime by another person solely for the purpose of gathering
evidence leading to the prosecution of such other person shall not be
guilty of that crime or of the crime of solicitation as set forth in section
seven hundred five point one (705.1) of the Code, provided that all of the
following are true:
1. He or she is not an instigator of the criminal activity.
2. He or she does not intentionally injure a nonparticipant in the
crime.
3. He or she acts with the consent of superiors, or the necessity of
immediate action precludes obtaining such consent.
4. His or her actions are reasonable under the circumstances.
This section is not intended to preclude the use of undercover or
surveillance persons by law enforcement agencies in appropriate circumstances and manner. It is intended to discourage such activity to tempt,
urge or persuade the commission of offenses by persons not already disB13. See IOWA CODE § 706.3 (1979) and part III(C)(5) of this Article.
B14. See generally W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTl', supra note 39B, at 402-07.
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posed to commit offenses of that kind.81&

It is clear that all four of the listed provisos are necessary in order for
this provision to apply. The concern is over the proviso that an officer or his
agent (e.g., an informant) must not have been "an instigator of the criminal
activity." The anxiety was heightened with the silence in the original form
of section 704.11 regarding whether or not the officer or agent could be held
criminally responsible for Solicitation, in light of express conditional exculpation for the substantive crime under investigation without mention of exculpation for Solicitation. An amendment in 1979818 added a phrase also exculpating the officer or informant from the crime of Solicitation. However,
the result is that an officer or agent still must meet the four-part test set out
in section 704.11 itself in order to qualify for exculpation from personal
criminal responsibility for either Solicitation or the substantive crime under
investigation. The legislative response to this problem was wholly inadequate. The one change made in part one of the four-part test was changing
the phraseology from the officer or agent must not be "the instigator of the
criminal activity" to "an instigator of the criminal activity." The distinction
between "the" and "an" is not evident. An undercover narcotics agent who
attempts to make a "buy" certainly could be considered to be "an," if not
"the," instigator.
The term "instigator" is not defined elsewhere in the Criminal Code
and presumably the ordinary dictionary definition will be ascribed to it.817
The word "instigate" is defined in Webster's Dictionary as: "To goad or urge
forward: set on: provoke, incite."8l8 Little solace is found in this broad definition8l9 for the undercover agent or informant who initiates a meeting with
a drug dealer, contract murderer, pimp, fence, or other person suspected of
criminal involvement and offers money or other form of inducement for accomplishment of the criminal act by the other person.
The determinative question thus is: Did the General Assembly intend
that undercover narcotics agents remain passive, without making an initial
815.

IOWA CODE § 704.11 (1979).

816.

[d.

817. State v. Wilson, 287 N.W.2d 587 (Iowa 1980).
818. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1171 (unabridged ed. 1961).
819. Although focusing upon whether the defendant had been entrapped, the Illinois Supreme Court has taken a realistically narrow approach to what constitutes "instigation" or solicitation by peace officers. In Illinois v. Clark, 7 Ill.2d 163, _, 130 N.E.2d 195, 199 (1955),
that court held that "lilt is not an instigation or solicitation to commit a crime for an individual or officer, having reason to believe another is committing a crime, to furnish an opportunity
for the commission of the offense, if the purpose is, in good faith, to secure evidence against a
guilty person and not to induce an innocent person to commit a crime." No entrapment was
found in this case, in which an informant acting under the directions of a police officer contacted defendant by telephone and told defendant that he wanted to get some "stuff." Defendant told him to come over. The informant then went to defendant's apartment and was sold
narcotic drugs. [d.
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contact or overture, but being merely ready to make a "buy" once the drug
dealer instigates the contact? The legislative history of this provision supports the proposition that this was not the intent. This provision first appeared in the bill recommended by the Criminal Code Revision Study Committee in its final report to the General Assembly in January 1973."SO The
language in the Committee's proposed bill was verbatim to that in Code
section 704.11 in its original form until the 1979 amendment. Moreover, the
language remained the same throughout the legislative process, appearing
verbatim in S.F. 1150 and S.F. 85 (both as introduced and as passed).
The following explanatory comment to this section was made in a report by the subcommittee of the special standing committee which reviewed
the study committee's proposed bill during the 1973 legislative session:
The purpose of this section is to authorize the use of informants and
undercover agents in situations where the successful prosecution of persons engaging in a criminal activity should make this COUlse of action
necessary. The limits to which police officers may go in gathering evidence under these circumstances has never been clearly spelled out. The
restrictions contained in the above section are suggested as adequate to
permit the effective use of informants and undercover agents, without
encouraging them "to go to excess in performing these duties.8Il

The emphasis clearly was upon codification of the well-recognized principle
permitting officers and their agents to use "undercover" activities. su Certainly, "effective use" of undercover agents cannot be made when they are
rendered passive, albeit investigatorially impotent, by a provision precluding
them from being "an instigator" of another's criminal activity.
Minimally, what should have been done to repair this section was to
have stricken altogether any reference therein to an officer or his agent being "an instigator," thus leaving only the three other tests. Additionally, the
provision should have been amended to read that an officer or agent "who,
without criminal intent, participates in the commission of a crime by another person solely for the purpose of gathering evidence ..." Nevertheless,
proof of the officer's or agent's criminal intent would seem to be required
even without such express legislative language. A basic tenet of our criminal
law has been that criminal responsibility requires a "criminal" mind,sss and
. 820. Report of Criminal Code Rev. Study Comm., Proposed Revision of Iowa Criminal
Laws § 410 at 35 (1974).
821. Substantive Law Subcomm. of the Crim. Code Review Comm., (Tent. Draft No.4,
1974), expl. comment to § 410.
822. See generally R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 1031·36.
823. See State v. Schultz, 242 Iowa 1328, 50 N.W.2d 9 (1951). This rule, when applied to
a peace officer, is best expressed in the old case of State v. Torphy, 78 Mo. App. 206 (1899),
wherein the court stated:
Another illustration of the doctrine that the intent determines criminality is found in
the rule that a detective who joins with persons in the commission of a crime for the
purpose of securing their arrest and conviction is not punishable, although he 80 far
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thus common law principles on mental state should be read into the statute.
This would exculpate an officer or agent who clearly is "involved" merely as
part of his assigned investigation and not also to make an illegal personal
gain.
Ideally, the entire provision should be repealed in its entirety. This
statutory repeal would reinstate the common law principle recognizing police activity as a defense to prosecution for the crimes participated in by an
officer or agent in attempting solely to gather evidence against a criminal
suspect. The legislative intent, as evidenced in the above mentioned subcommittee report, was laudable in placing some statutory restrictions upon
excesses in undercover activity. But the import of the provision is grossly
misplaced by, in effect, saying that an undercover agent who acts "excessively" (as defined in the very restrictive four-part test in section 704.11)
becomes criminally responsible himself - for the crimes he is investigating.
A better approach to regulating an officer's or agent's "excesses" during
a undercover investigation would be to establish a separate, comparatively
minor, criminal offense of Excessive Investigation or something akin. There
certainly is precedent for such an approach, as evidenced by the serious misdemeanor offense in Code section 808.10 for an officer who either maliciously sues out a search warrant without just cause or who willfully exceeds
his authority during execution of a search warrant. This provision dates
back to 1851.824
The last paragraph of section 704.11, as amended, is an interesting paradox. This paragraph was added by the General Assembly in an amendment
in 1979 in response to the law enforcement community's concern over criminal responsibility of peace officers or their agents arising under the original
provision for the reasons noted above. At first blush, this paragraph evinces
the legislative intent that peace officers or their agents be immunized when
performing their duties, including undercover activity, under ordinary circumstances. However, this explanatory paragraph is rife with qualifying language, to wit: this activity must be carried out "in appropriate circumstances and manner" in order to be immunized. The "appropriateness" of
an officer's or agent's actions would seem to be subject to judging under the
quad-partite statutory test, which, of course, includes the factor of the officer or agent not being "an instigator of the criminal activity."
The second sentence of the "explanatory" paragraph injects even more
confusion. This sentence states that the intent merely is to "discourage" the
use of undercover agents "to tempt, urge or persuade the commission of offenses by persons not already disposed to commit offenses of that kind."
This statutory reference to criminal predisposition of the target of the uncooperates as to be guilty if his intention had been the same as theirs.
[d. at _. See also State v. McKean, 36 Iowa 343 (1873).
824. See IOWA CODE § 3308 (1851).
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dercover activity unfortunately conjures up the subjective test of entrapment. Entrapment, of course, is a defense for the target of the undercover
activity. The problem is that the currently-recognized test of entrapment in
Iowa is the objective test82 !! (which focuses upon the officer's or agent's activity rather than upon the target person's criminal predisposition).
This provision clearly does not authorize entrapment. Indeed, its very
intent may be to negate the police-immunity defense of police activity in
certain circumstances. The upshot of this dual approach is that section
704.11 leaves intact a defendant's right to raise entrapment (in its common
law sense) as a defense to his criminal liability while at the same time immunizing a peace officer or his agent during legitimate undercover activity
to the extent that "entrapment" (in its particularized sense under section
704.77) is not employed. Undercover activity short of "entrapment" is immunized under section 704.11; undercover activity constituting "entrapment" is not.
This interpretation considers "entrapment" in a particularized sense for
purposes of this provision only. The starting point of the analysis is that the
term "entrapment" does not appear in section 704.11. Indeed, the applicable
terminology is contra.ry to the existing entrapment standard. This is evidenced in the last sentence of the amended provision, which states that its
intent is "to discourage such activity to tempt, urge or persuade the commission of offenses by persons not already disposed to commit offenses of
that kind."
The phrase "not already disposed" speaks the language of the subjective standard for the defense of entrapment which focuses upon the criminal
defendant and especially his criminal predisposition or proclivity. Prior to
the final passage of the new Criminal Code, even in its initial form in 1976,
the Iowa Supreme Court had abandoned the subjective test of entrapment
and substituted the objective test. 818 The latter focuses upon the particular
activities of the undercover peace officer or his agent. The pertinent question thus is whether "a law enforcement agent induce[d] the commission of
an offense using persuasion or other means likely to cause normally lawabiding persons to commit the offense."827 Thus, the fact-finder must determine "what the effect of the agent's conduct would be on a normally lawabiding person."828 As stated in State v. Mullen,s28 "the defense is treated
primarily as a curb upon improper law enforcement techniques, to which the
predisposition of the particular defendant is irrelevant."88D
It bears repeating that the word "entrapment" is not used in section
825.
826.
827.
828.
829.
830.

State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974).
[d. at 381.
See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 213.
[d.
216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974).
[d. at 382. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 213.
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704.11, as it has a definite legal meaning (i.e., the objective test). If the legis-

lative intent was to change the standard for entrapment, the easiest way to
accomplish this would have been to use the word "entrapment" in the aforementioned explanatory last sentence in the amended provision. Instead,
however, the statutory language refers to discouraging police activity that
involves persons "not already disposed to commit offenses of that kind."
Because, as noted above, the thrust of this sentence is not to change the
standard for the defense of entrapment, there must have been some other
purpose for this statement. A logical interpretation would be that this explanatory sentence clarifies that the word "instigator" in section one of the
provision refers to entrapment in the subjective sense. This interpretation is
of dual significance. First, as noted above, the word "instigate" should be
read as meaning more than to merely initiate. Otherwise, effective undercover police activity would become almost a nullity. Indeed, "instigate"
means to goad, provoke, or incite, as noted above.
Secondly, this amended provision, so interpreted, would qualifiedly immunize police activity which constitutes entrapment under the objective
test. Under the parameters of the objective test an officer or agent must still
act reasonably and under the guise of authority. Accordingly, all personal
violence crimes would be off limits. Either way, however, the defense of entrapment, as interpreted under the objective test, remains available to the
private individual-criminal defendant who was the object of the undercover
criminal investigation.

C. Conspi racys31
Several changes were made in the revised crime of Conspiracy.s8s These
changes have resulted in a "desirably narrower"S38 crime than under prerevised law. s84 The gist of this crime remains, however, centered upon an
unlawful agreement or combination. s811 The essential elements consist of (1)
831. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 11-16; UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 601-12; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 398, §§ 61-62; .
R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 612-35.
832. IOWA CODE § 706.1 (1979). Additionally, several specific conspiracy statutes relating
to controlled substances offenses appear in IOWA CODE §§ 204.401(1), .401(2), .402(2), .403(2)
. (1979).
833. Schantz, supra note 2, at 441n.99.
834. IOWA CODE §§ 719.1, 782.6 (1977) (repealed 1978).
835. As explained in UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 605, an express
agreement is not necessary. Rather, the members of a conspiracy must "in some way or manner
or through some contrivance, [comel to a mutual understanding to commit a criminal act." [d.
In contrast, under UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 606, mere association
with others to discuss common criminal interests "does not necessarily establish the existence
of an agreement or make one a member of a conspiracy."
A conspiracy agreement can be inferred from presence at the scene of a crime together and
joint participation in criminal activity. If a person understands the unlawful nature of acts
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an agreement or combination of two or more persons (2) to engage in criminal activity (3) with an overt act by at least one conspirator designed to
accomplish the purpose of the Conspiracy.
1.

Mens Rea or Purpose

There must be a criminal purpose of the conspiracy, either in whole or
in part, thus eliminating the alternative purpose of committing a lawful act
in an unlawful manner 888 as existed under the pre-revised statute.1I87 Thus,
Conspiracy remains a specific intent crime. 888

2. Overt Act
Another change is that the revised crime requires the additional element of an overt act (by one or more of the co-conspirators), the nature of
which evidences "a design to accomplish the purpose of the conspiracy by
criminal means. "888 This could consist of some preparatory step being taken
to carry out the design, "or which at least has a tendency to forward the
purpose of the conspiracy."84o Examples of overt acts in a conspiracy to
commit murder would be for one of the co-conspirators to hand a loaded
gun and a photograph of the intended victim to the trigger man, or even for
the trigger man to obtain these on his own.841
taking place and nevertheless assists in any manner in carrying out of the common scheme, he
is a co-conspirator. Bender v. State, 253 A.2d 680 (Del. 1969).
836. See State v. Jennings, 195 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 1972); J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra
note 3, § 112.
837. One authority states:
This definition of Conspiracy changes the law in Iowa. Previously a conspiracy could
involve an agreement to commit civil wrongs. However, with the new definition, it
appears that a conspiracy may only exist for the purpose of committing criminal acts.
Therefore, no longer will a conspiracy exist to injure the property rights of another or
to do injurious acts, unless they are, in and of themselves, criminal acts under other
provisions of the code.
J. ROEHRlCK, supra note 620, at 59.
838. The prosecution must prove, under the UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136,
at No. 602, that the defendant entered into a conspiraceous agreement "with the intent that
the object or purpose of the agreement be performed." See text accompanying notes 480-509

supra.
839. IOWA CODE § 706.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No.
607; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 113.
840. California v. Olson, 232 Cal.App.2d 480, _, 42 Cal. Rptr. 760, 767 (1965).
841. Compare United States v. Armone, 363 F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1966) (yes) with New York
v. Flood, 53 Misc.2d 109, 277 N.Y.S.2d 697 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (no), for contrasting opinions on
whether mere conversations between or among co-conspirators in forming and planning the
conspired design constitute overt acts.
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3. Numerical Considerations
Another apparent change will cause a conspiracy to be treated "as a
single conspiracy whether one or many criminal acts are planned."ulI This is
because of the new statutory language referring to "a course of conduct." As
a result, an agreement to burglarize a dwelling with the intent to pilfer its
contents will not support two separate charges of Conspiracy to Commit
Burglary and Conspiracy to Commit Theft. s43

4.

Merger

The most significant change in the law of Conspiracy effected in the
new Criminal Code is to eliminate multiple convictions for the inchoate offense of Conspiracy and the substantive offense which was the target crime
(or objective of the conspiracy).su Therefore, multiple defendants acting in
concert to commit a burglary cannot be convicted of both Burglary and
Conspiracy to Commit Burglary.84G Because the statutory language says that
a person "may not be convicted and sentenced for both [offenses),"U8 both
offenses may still be prosecuted by including them in multiple counts of the
indictment/trial information.s47 Under Iowa law, a person is not convicted
until entry of judgment by the court.us Accordingly, it appears that the trier
of fact could be given verdict forms as to both offenses, with the prosecution
then being required to elect before entry of judgment which conviction it
wants recorded. If this procedure is permissible, then the prosecution will no
doubt argue for a further extension whereby it would be permitted to seek
deferment of entry of judgment on one of the two offenses until the conviction on the other offense has been upheld (or the time for appealing has
expired).s49 The prosecutor's optionSGO in selecting either Conspiracy or the
target substantive offense conspiraceously achieved is especially potent
842. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 112.
843. See State v. Caine, 105 N.W. 1018 (Iowa, 1906). ct. Lievers v. State, 3 Md.App. 597,
241 A.2d 147 (1968) (conspiracy to utter a forged check was merged into conspiracy to obtain
money by false pretenses, since no false representation independent of the uttering was shown
by the evidence).
844. IOWA CODE § 706.4 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 116.
845. This statutory change in section 706.4 thus overrules State v. Reynolds, 250 N.W.2d
434, 439 (Iowa 1977) (no double jeopardy bar for multiple prosecutions of conspiracy and target
substantive offense).
846. IOWA CODE § 706.4 (1979).
847. But see J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 111: "Finally, although it is still
possible to charge one with both the conspiracy and the substantive offense, he may not be
convicted of both."
848. Iowa Beer & Liquor Dep't v. McBlain, 263 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1977).
\
849. But see IOWA R. CRIM. P. 22(1) which states that "[u)pon a plea of guilty [or a)
verdict of guilty. . . the court must fix a date for pronouncing judgment, which must be within
a reasonable time . ... " [d. (emphasis added).
850.. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 116.
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when a class D "forcible felony" (a five-year offense)8&1 is the object of the
Conspiracy (a ten-year offense). This option is untenable.
One defect in the pre-revised law of Conspiracy which was not cured in
the new Criminal Code is its "multilateral" definition of Conspiracy (an
agreement of two or more persons) which, according to Professor Schantz,
"has created loopholes when for one reason or another one of the alleged
parties to the agreement cannot be prosecuted."8&2 He notes that "[t]he
Model Penal Code attempts to close this loophole by a 'unilateral' definition
of conspiracy: liability is defined in terms of the defendant's act of agreeing
rather than in terms of an agreement between two or more persons."8&8
5.

Grading

There are five grades of Conspiracy, with the penalty classification
ranging from a class C felony down to a simple misdemeanor.8&4 Conspiring
to commit a "forcible felony"81111 is punishable as a class C felony,8118 whereas
a Conspiracy to commit any other (a non-forcible) felony is itself a class D
felony.8&? On the other hand, a Conspiracy to commit a crime included in
any of the three classes of misdemeanors is punishable as a misdemeanor of
the same classification as the target crime. 8118
This five-level grading system contrasts favorably with the one grade of
Conspiracy under the pre-revised law. 8l1D The former uniform penalty was an
indeterminate term of imprisonment of three years, with no authorized fine.
Moreover, Conspiracy was limited under the pre-revised law to felonies as
the target crimes. Thus, a conspirator was equally punishable whether he
had conspired under the pre-revised law to commit a life-imprisonment offense (e.g., Murder in the First Degree) or merely a one-year felony (e.g.,
Assault with Intent to Inflict Great Bodily Injury). Moreover, the pre-revised three-year penalty was inadequate for the most major target crimes
(e.g., a life-imprisonment offense), as well as inequitable for the most minor
felonious target crimes (e.g., the one-year felony of Assault with Intent to
Inflict Great Bodily Injury). The new penalty schedules are considerably
higher for all felonies, with an authorized ten-year term for Conspiracy to
commit a "forcible felony" and a five-year term for Conspiracy involving
any other felonies. These schedules cure most but not all of the problems of
851.
852.
853.
854.
for these
855.
856.
857.
858.
859.

See text accompanying notes 70-102 supra.
Schantz, supra note 2, at 441 n.99.
[d.
For a general discussion of the penalty schedules and various sentencing alternatives
five classifications of crimes, see notes 70-111 supra and accompanying text.
See text accompanying notes 70-96.3 supra.
See id.
See id.
See IOWA CODE § 706.3 (1979).
See IOWA CODE § 719.1 (1977) (repealed 1978).
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inadequacy and inequity under the pre-revised law. Nevertheless, a person
conspiring to commit a life offense (e.g., Murder in the First Degree) or even
a twenty-five year class B felony (e.g., Robbery in the First Degree) is subject to a term of ten years while a person who conspires to commit a forcible
felony in the class C (ten years) or class D (five years) schedule range is also
subject to a ten-year sentence. This schedule, of course, is untenable as to
the class D felony target crimes.
One ameliorative measure in the new Criminal Code permits a fine as
an alternative penalty to either imprisonment or a suspended sentence. Unlike the pre-revised law, both class C (up to $5000) and Class D (up to
$1000) felonies in the new Criminal Code can be punishable, in the sentencing court's judicial discretion, by fine only.860
Another change is that the revised crime of Conspiracy applies to misdemeanors as target crimes. This change seems appropriate, since unlawful
combinations of persons intent upon committing a crime should be punishable irrespective of the classification of target substantive crime(s). The public interest is better served by discouraging group criminal activity even of a
comparatively minor nature. This is especially true with the creation of the
classification of aggravated misdemeanors which includes several rather serious offenses (including some pre-revised downgraded felonies).861
IV.

PROPERTY ABUSE OFFENSES

A. Arson and Related Crimes
1.

Arson862

The revised crime of Arson consolidated into one offense several prerevised crimes,86s including intentional unlawful burnings of both real and
personal property,8M damage by explosives,861i and attempted Arson.- The
elements of Arson are as follows: (1) either causing a fire or explosion or
860. See IOWA CODE § 909.1 (1979) and text accompanying notes 75-102 supra.
861. For example, the pre-revised felony offense of Assault with Intent to Inflict Great
Bodily Injury was downgraded to an aggravated misdemeanor in the related newly-constituted
offense of Assault with Intent to Inflict Serious Injury. Cf. IOWA CODE § 694.6 (1977) (repealed
1978); IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979). A temporizing effect of the new classification is apparent in
the statutory treatment of the so-called "victimless crime" of Prostitution, which is punishable
now as an aggravated misdemeanor instead of as a five-year felony under the pre-revised law.
Compare IOWA CODE § 724.2 (1977) (repealed 1978) with IOWA CODE § 725.1 (1979).
862. IOWA CODE § 712.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos.
1201-11; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 271-76; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 21630.
863. For an extensive discussion of the pre-revised law through the changes proposed in
the 1974 bill, see Note, Arson, 60 IOWA L. REV. 529 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Arson Note].
864. See IOWA CODE §§ 707.1-.4 (1977) (repealed 1978).
865. [d. §§ 697.3, .4.
866. [d. § 707.5.
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placing combustible material or an incendiary or explosive device (2) in or
near real or personal "property"867 (3) either with intent to destroy or damage such property or knowing such property would probably be destroyed or
damaged. Several related offenses comprise the remainder of chapter 712 of
the Iowa Code, as discussed in the remainder of part IV (A) of this Article.
a. Attempted Arson Included. The revised crime of Arson is statutorily defined to include attempted Arson, thus rendering attempted burning
or attempted explosion equally punishable with burning or exploding. The
attempt constitutes the act of placing combustible material or any incendiary or explosive device in or near real or personal property.868 Attempted
Arson requires sucessful placing of these devices, and a mere attempt to
place these devices is not part of Arson, but instead is punishable under the
related but less serious offense of Threats to Place Incendiary or Explosive
Devices. 889 Likewise, a person apprehended in possession of these devices
and intending to use them to commit a public offense, but having not yet
placed or attempted to place them in or near real or personal property, commits the rel~ted but less serious crime of Possession of Explosive or Incendiary Materials or Devices. 87o
b. Specific Result. Arson is no longer a specific result crime. It is
neither necessary that any actual damage occur, nor that fire or explosion
itself occur. This is a change from common law Arson which required at
least some damage,871 with mere charring generally considered to be sufficient for Arson. 872
c. Mens Rea. The new Criminal Code eliminates the requirement of
specific intent which existed under the pre-revised statute. One authority
states that, "[t]he specific intent to damage or destroy, or the general intent
to do the act with knowledge of its probable consequences, is all that is
required"873 under the revised statute. Recklessness,87. however, plays no
part in Arson, with Reckless Use of Fire or Explosives8711 being a separate,
but related and less serious, offense.
Malice878 was also eliminated as an element in the new offense. How867. "Property" is defined broadly as "anything of value," whether real or personal, in
IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979). See text accompanying notes 204-06 supra.
868. [d. § 712.1 (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 272.
869. IOWA CODE § 712.8 (1979). See discussion in text accompanying notes 925-31 infra.
870. [d. § 712.6. See discussion in text accompanying notes 918-24 infra.
871. R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 220-21.
872. "Hence, the discoloration, scorching, or shrivelling of wood by fire may not amount
to a burning, but the charring of wood, even in the absence of an actual blaze, is designated as a
burning." Arson Note, supra note 863, at 533-34 (citing State v. Spiegel, 111 Iowa 701, 705, 83
N.W. 722, 723 (1900».
873. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 272.
874. See text accompanying notes 594-601 supra.
875. IOWA CODE § 712.5 (1979). See text accompanying notes 911-17 infra.
876. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 216:
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ever, this change may not be of major significance in light of the restrictive
interpretation given the term "maliciously" under the pre-revised law. In
State v. Dunn,877 the Iowa Supreme Court pointed out that, while the prerevised Arson statute required willful and malicious burning, willfully means
"purposely, deliberately, intentionally" and "the intentional doing of a
'wrongful act,' without justification or lawful excuse, will permit an inference
of a wicked state of mind, i.e., legal malice, as opposed to actual malice."878
Accordingly, the court held that the prosecution was not required to prove
the defendant's unlawful burning of another's personal property stemmed
from his or her personal hostility or revenge towards the other person. To
the contrary, the proof was that the defendant was hired by the owner of an
automobile to burn the automobile, so that the owner could collect the insurance proceeds. 878
d. Explosions. The newly-constituted offense of Arson, unlike its common law origin, is not limited to burningM° or even to attempted burning.
Rather, it is a more encompassing crime of destruction which includes damage or attempted damage by explosion. The venacular of this revised crime
includes such terms as "combustible material,"881 "incendiarY device,"88l1
and "explosive device."888 In contrast, only incendiary and explosive devices
Where "malice" is an essential element of the offense(s) or the degree(s) of offense(s)
charged, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Malice is a state of mind
which leads one to intentionally do a wrongful act (to the injury of another) (in disregard of the rights of another) which is done out of actual spite, hatred, ill will, or with
an evil, wicked or unlawful purpose, knowing that the act is without just cause or
excuse. Malice may be either express or implied.
Express malice is that which is established by proof of spite, hatred, ill will, or an
evil, wicked or unlawful purpose or by proof of a deliberate or fixed intent to do
injury.
Implied malice is that which may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the
accused, and the means used by him in doing the wrongful and injurious act without
legal justification or excuse.
[d. See also text accompanying notes 549-65 supra.
877. 199 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1972).
878. [d. at 108.
879. [d.
880. See R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 220-23.
881. The term "combustible material" is not defined in the Criminal Code. However,
"[s}ince the ordinary meaning of 'incendiary' is 'designed to cause fires,' it is difficult to comprehend how combustible material can become incendiary material without becoming an indendiary device." J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 278. For the statutory definition of
"incendiary device," see IOWA CODE § 702.21 (1979).
882. IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1977), was amended in 1978 adding the following definitional
clause: "An incendiary device is a device, contrivance, or material causing or designed to cause
destruction of property by fire." 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1183 (67th G.A.). It would appear
that the definition of "incendiary device" in the UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS will need to be
revised in order to conform with the statutory standard. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
supra note 136, at No. 1213.
883. The term "explosive material" is comprehensively defined outside the Criminal Code
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are included in the coverage of the related crimes comprising the remainder
of chapter 712 of the Iowa Code.
e. Felony Murder Rule. The definitional change in the revised crime
of Arson has the additional effect of altering the scope of the application of
Arson as the underlying felony in a first degree felony murder situation. The
basic change was brought about by the elimination of a dwelling house as
the sole subject of the revised crime of Arson. Under the pre-revised law,
every Arson could be the underlying felony in a first degree felony murder
prosecution. 884 The revised crime of Arson, even in the first degree, not only
is not limited to a dwelling house but also does not automatically include a
dwelling house. Moreover, an intentional murder during an Arson in the second or third degree would be Murder in the Second Degree under the second-degree felony murder rule,8811 whereas the crime would only be Involuntary Manslaughter888 if such a killing were unintentional.
f. Arson by Owner Exception. The broad approach taken in the Arson
statute necessitated a specific provision887 authorizing burning or blowing up
of one's own unwanted "property,"888 either directly or through another person. This, of course, may be done provided that no insurer is defrauded and
the life or property of another person is not unreasonably endangered. The
latter proviso thus sets a standard of care for a person who is burning his
own property lawfully, without attempting to defraud his insurer.8811 Both of
these provisos must be present for a defendant to be within the protection
of this limited defense. In order for this defense to be applicable, the prosecution must be unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt anyone (or
more) of the following three factors: (1) that the defendant did not have the
owner's consent to so act, (2) that an insurer "was exposed fradulently to
the risk of loss," or (3) that the defendant's acts were done "in such a way"
that the life or property of another "was unreasonably endangered. "8110
g. Grading. Arson is in the first degree 8111 when the attendant circumstances were such that presence of a person could have been reasonably anticipated on or near the property involved. "[T]he mere possibility of the
presence of a person is insufficient. Rather, the property must have been
itself in IOWA CODE § lOlA. 1 (1979). In light of the absence of anything to the contrary, it is
appropriate to read the § 101A.1 definition into the Arson and related offenses material in
Chapter 712 under the principle of compatible statutory provisions being read in pari materia.
884. See IOWA CODE §§ 690.2 & 707.1 (1977) (repealed 1978).
885. See IOWA CODE § 707.3 (1979).
886. See id. § 707.5(1).
887. [d. § 712.1. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 273.
888. For the statutory definition of property, see IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979) and text
accompanying notes 204-06 supra.
889. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 273.
890. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1209.
891. IOWA CODE § 712.2 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos.
1204, 1208.
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such that a reasonable person would have anticipated or expected a person's
presence in or on the property."892
The actual presence of a person may not be sufficient if such presence
was not "reasonably anticipated," such as a trespasser in a warehouse or in
an apparently abandoned property. Conversely, actual presence of a person
clearly is not required. Rather, only reasonable anticipation of the presence
of a person is required. The anticipation would be great where the target
property is a dwelling house, or other residential or commercial property
normally occupied by persons. 893
Occupied residential property arguably should even carry a presump- .
tion that presence of a person therein was reasonably anticipated. However,
any such presumption should be rebuttable, with the defendant carrying the
burden of proving particular circumstances which would indicate that the
presence of persons was not reasonably anticipated. This situation would
occur, for example, where residential occupants unexpectedly returned home
early from vacation, and the defendant was only aware of their original
plans. Any presumption of presence of persons in an occupied dwelling
house should not be conclusive because of the omission of any specific reference in the Arson statute to a dwelling.
A more meaningful approach would have been to expressly include an
occupied dwelling in the category of Arson in the First Degree. That approach would more closely comport with the adage that a man's home is his
castle, as was statutorily exemplified in the pre-revised statute, as well as
having the advantage of eliminating any technical distinctions between ac. tual presence of persons and reasonable anticipation of persons. Express inclusion of a dwelling was contained in the Criminal Code Revision Study
Committee's report89• and in S.F. 85 as introduced in 1975.8911 The fact that
S.F. 85 was amended to delete specific mention of a dwelling is a strong
indication of legislative intent that actual presence of persons even in a
dwelling is not sufficient when there is no reasonable anticipation of persons
being present.
Arson in the Second Degree898 includes acts of Arson, whether successful or not, directed toward (1) real property of any value in which presence
of persons was not reasonably anticipated, (2) personal property exceeding
$500 in value, or (3) standing crops of any value. 89? This makes Arson in the
supra note 136, at No. 1208.
supra note 43, at 60.
894. See STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, § 1202, at 24 (property covered to include "a dwelling, or a building in which the presence of one or more persons can be reasonably
anticipated").
895. The same language as that quoted in note 894 supra, was included in § 1202 of S.F.
85, as introduced, but subsequently was deleted before final passage of S.F. 85.
896. IOWA CODE § 712.3 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No.
1205.
897. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. '1205.
892.
893.

UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS,

TRAINING MANUAL,
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Third Degree8B8 a residual section, covering only Arson involving personal
property valued at $500 or less. Because Arson no longer is a specific result
crime, these dollar amounts relate to the value of the property involved and
not to the amount of damage caused, if any. Unlike in the Theft statute,8BB
no standard for determining value is set out in the Arson statute, nor is
there an. amplifying Uniform Jury Instruction. Boo
h. Sentencing Options. Arson in the First Degree is a class B felony
whereas Arson in the Second and Third Degrees are class C and D felonies,
respectively.Bol Only first degree Arson is a "forcible felony,"B02 and thus potentially subject to either the five year minimum term (if a firearm was involved)B08 or the first degree felony murder rule. Moreover, the ameliorative
sentencing options of a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence are not available for first degree Arson,BM unlike the two
lower degrees of Arson. Boll Moreover, no fine can be imposed for Arson in the
First Degree unlike for the two lower degrees of Arson, thus leaving the sentencing judge with no discretion, being limited to the one sentencing option
of imposing the twenty-five year prison term.
Another important sentencing .change has occurred in the treatment of
attempted Arson. Under the pre-revised law, attempted Arson, without
more, was punishable by either an indeterminate penitentiary term of two
years or a maximum fine of $1000,908 with all three above-mentioned ameliorative sentencing options available. 907 The revised crime of Arson includes
attempted Arson,908 which means that attempted Arson, if it qualifies as a
class B felony,90B can be punishable by as much as an indeterminate penitentiary term of twenty-five years, without the availability of a fine only as
an alternative sentence. Furthermore, none of the three ameliorative sentencing options is available9lo for the revised crime of attempted Arson.
898. IOWA CODE § 712.4 (1979).
899. [d. § 714.3.
900. Cf, UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1442 (value in theft cases).
901. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70102 supra.
902. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979).
903. See id. § 902.7.
904. See IOWA CODE §§ 702.11, 907.3 (1979).
905. See IOWA CODE § 789A.l (1977) (repealed 1978).
906. See id. § 707.5.
907. See id. § 789A.1.
908. See text accompanying note 868 supra.
909. For a comprehensive discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70-102 supra.
910. In a related matter of strengthening arson investigations, a 1979 legislative act authorizes certain law enforcement agencies to request relevant information held by insurance
companies, which must produce it. A simple misdemeanor penalty attaches to a failure either
to release this information or to fail to keep it confidential. (S.F. 339).

HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 351 1979-1980

352
2.

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 29

Reckless Use of Fire or Explosive

The related revised offense of Reckless Use of Fire or Explosives911 fills
the void in the law of Arson when the defendant did not act intentionally in
using fire or explosives unlawfully. The elements are: (1) recklessly91l (2)
using fire or any incendiary or explosive device and (3) thus endangering
property or safety of another.91B So defined, (as "using"), there is no such
thing as an attempted reckless use. Like the other related offenses below,
this offense has only one degree and thus is not concerned at all with the
values of the real or personal property involved. Unlike under the pre-revised statutes,914 no actual damage is required, nor is it necessary for the
prosecution to show actual loss of control of any fire which was recklessly
started. 9l11 Moreover, Reckless Use of Fire or Explosives was not a criminal
act under the pre-revised law. 918 This crime is merely a serious
misdemeanor.917
3.

Possession of Explosive or Incendiary Devices918

This is a mere possessory offense, where defendant is apprehended in
possession919 of explosive920 or incendiary9ll devices but has not yet placed
or attempted to place such devices in or near real or personal property. Nevertheless, this act of possession must be accompanied by a specific intent911
to use these devices to commit a public offense. 9l1S The intended offense
911. IOWA CODE § 712.5 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos.
1203, 1212-13; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 277; Arson Note, supra note 863, at
540-42.
912. See text accompanying notes 594-601 supra.
913. IOWA CODE § 712.5 (1979).
914. See IOWA CODE §§ 707.7-.8 (1977) (repealed 1978) (setting out fire and allowing fire
to escape, respectively).
915. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 277.
916. See IOWA CODE §§ 697.3-.4 (1977) (repealed 1978) (both of these offenses are specific
intent crimes); J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 277.
917. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 10311 supra.
918. IOWA CODE § 712.6 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos.
1214-17; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 278.
919. "Possession" does not require the devices to be on the defendant's person. It is sufficient if defendant is exercising dominion and control over them. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1217.
920. See text accompanying note 883 supra, for the definition of explosives.
921. See note 882 supra, for the definition of incendiary devices.
922. See text accompanying notes 480-509 supra.
923. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, states:
The major problem of the state in prosecutions under this section will be the proof of
intent. This may limit the use of this section to attempt situations in which the action has not progressed to the point that a violation of§ 712.1 can be proved, or to
conspiracies in which the possession of these devices is the overt act.
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could be any of several offenses other than Arson, such as Burglary, Extortion, or Murder. This possessory offense is a class C felony, but it is not a
"forcible felony. "92.

4.

Threats to Place Incendiary or Explosive Devices9111

The elements of this revised offense9s6 are as follows: (1) either threatening to place or attempting to place (2) any incendiary or explosive device
(3) in any place endangering persons or property.8lI7 So defined, this encompasses an attempted form of attempted Arson.928 The word "attempt" is not
defined in the Code, but is defined in a Uniform Jury Instruction as occurring when a person, "with the intent or purpose to commit an offense, takes
action toward completing the offense."lIslI This offense is a class D felony,
but it is not a "forcible felony."88o
The more serious offense of Arson881 would occur if this threat is carried
out by either (a) causing a fire or explosion or (b) actually placing these
devices in or near property, with the requisite state of mind. For some reason, the lowest degree of Arson is classified as a class D felony, the same as
is the classification for this inchoate-type offense. The offense of Threats to
Place Incendiary or Explosive Devices is not a "forcible felony," however, as
is Arson in the Third Degree.

5. False Reports982
This specific type of false report offense consists of: (1) conveying or
causing to be conveyed (2) to any person (3) any false information (4) about
placement of incendiary or explosive devices (5) in any place where persons
or property would be endangered (6) with knowledge 988 that the information
[d. § 278.

924. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70102 supra.
925. IOWA CODE § 712.8 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos.
1220-21; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 280.
926. See IOWA CODE § 697.7 (1977) (repealed 1978).
927. "Note that there does not appear to be a requirement that the accused knew that the
location would endanger persons or property, only that it could have so endangered a person or
property. This is extremely subjective and vague." J. ROEHRICK, supra note 620, at 136.
928. "This section is one of the few attempt sections of the new code." J. ROEHRICK,
supra note 620, at 136.
929. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1221. But see text accompanying notes 742-49 supra, as to whether this is the proper test for attempt liability.
930. See text accompanying notes 70-102 supra.
931. See IOWA CODE § 712.1-.4 (1979) and accompanying notes 862-909 supra.
932. [d. § 712.7. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 1218-19; J.
YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 279.
933. See text accompanying notes 572-93.
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is false. 934 The crime is not limited to making false reports to official agencies such as fire or police departments, but includes spreading false rumors
to other private individuals. Further, there is no temporal limitation, with
false reports thus relating to either past, present, or future conduct. 93& This
is a class D felony, but is not a "forcible felony."938

B. Criminal Mischief
The revised general offense of Criminal Mischief987 replaces several prerevised specific Malicous Injury statutes9SS dealing with various acts of property damage or destruction. Its elements are: (1) intentionally; (2) without a
right to do so; (3) damaging, defacing, altering, or destroying; (4) tangible
"property,"989 public or private.940 This includes damage to both real and
personal property.sn
1.

Intentional Action

Criminal Mischief is premised upon intentional actions together with
knowledge of having no right to take such actions. Thus, damaging another's
property through recklessness or mere carelessness is not sufficient to incur
criminal culpability. Rather, intentional conduct is required~ and the prosecution must prove under the Uniform Jury Instructions that defendant intended to damage, deface, alter, or destroy the property.941 Elimination of
934. IOWA CODE § 712.7 (1979).
935. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 279.
936. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70102 supra.
937. IOWA CODE §§ 716.1-.6 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
Nos. 1601-06; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 371-77; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at
331-39. Malicious Mischief was the common law predecessor offense.
938. See IOWA CODE § 714 (1977) (repealed 1978).
939. This offense is expressly limited by statute to tangible property [see IOWA CODE §
716.1 (1979»), contrary to the statutory general definition of property as "anything of value"
including both "tangible and intangible property." IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979). "Because the act
is one of physical damage or destruction, the subject matter of criminal mischief must be tangible property, whether real or personal." J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 371. The
statutory general definition appears to be controlling, nevertheless, on the point of tangible
property "of any value" being covered in the provisions or criminal mischief.
940. IOWA CODE § 716.1 (1979). One commentator states that section "717.1 [Injury to
Animals) should be compared with § 716.1, which is concerned with damage to tangible property. Although animals are property, and are certainly not intangible, the inclusion of both §
716.1 and this section indicates a purpose to confine § 716.1 to inanimate property." J. YEAGER
& R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 392.
941. See IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979). "The term [property) includes all that is included in
the terms 'real property' and personal property.''' [d. See also note 939 supra. An example of
damage to real property would be vandals intentionally tearing up sod. This would constitute
criminal mischief even though the sod could be replaced and the lawn fully restored.
942. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1603. Accord, J. YEAGER &
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malice as a particularized state of mind has broadened the scope of this
revised crime by not requiring that the intentional act of mischief be done
"out of spite, hatred, ill will, or with an evil, wicked, or unlawful purpose,
knowing that the act is without just cause or excuse," as that term questionably is defined in the Uniform Jury Instructions. 943

2.

Grading and Sentencing Options

The grading of this offense into four degrees is essentially geared to the
amount of damage caused. The key is the cost of replacing, repairing, or
restoring the property, rather than either the value of the property affected
or the amount of property valuation decrease caused. Moreover, the act of
mischief need not result in a lowering of the value of the property involved. 944 A special verdict form is included in the Uniform Jury Instructions 941 for the jury to determine the cost of repair, replacement, or restoration of the property damaged or destroyed by defendant.
There are three special situations in which the cost of the damage is
immaterial. These involve: (1) substantial interruption or impairment of service rendered by a public utility; (2) damage to a signal or barricade intended to protect the public from a hazardous condition such that it is rendered substantially less effective than before and (3) damage to certain legal
and commercial instruments. Additionally, intentional unlawful disinterment of human remains constitutes Criminal Mischief in the Third Degree,
pursuant to an amendment in 1978.948 The four classifications are simple
misdemeanor947 (for damage of $100 or less); aggravated misdemeanor948 (for
R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 372. But see text accompanying notes 528-42 supra, as to this not
actually being a specific intent crime.
943. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 216 ("malice"). The prerevised offense of Malicious Injury, Iowa Code § 714.1 (1977) (repealed 1978), was interpreted
in Larson v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 258 Iowa 348, 139 N.W.2d 174 (1965), as follows: "The
mere intentional doing of an act prohibited by statute or omitting the performance of a statutory duty, does not alone constitute malicious mischief, though it may damage the property of
another." Id. at 353, 139 N.W.2d at 176. Noting that acting unlawfully and willfully does not
constitute maliciousness, the court in Larson determined that a person acts maliciously if at
the time of the act he "was bent on mischief against some person, ordinarily the owner, and was
prompted by an evil mind to destroy or injure the property." Id. at 352. But see text accompanying notes 549-65 supra, as to "malice not requiring spite, hatred, or ill will."
944. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 372.
945. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136,.at No. 1606.
946. 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1029 (67th G.A.), amending IOWA CODE § 716.5 (Supp.
1978). This provision, however, does not include exposing of or abandoning of dead bodies. See
IOWA CODE § 714.22 (1977) (repealed 1978); State v: Aldrich, 231 N.W.2d 890 (Iowa 1975). A
legislative bill in 1979 to include abandonment in the homicide chapter failed to pass. H.F. 75
(1979).
947. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70102 supra.
948. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70-
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damage from $100-plus to $500); class C felony9<l9 (for damage from $500plus to $5000); and class D felony9110 (for damage in excess of $5,000).
Neither felony is classified as a "forcible felony," and both felonies are punishable, in the sentencing court's discretion, by a fine only or by any of the
ameliorative sentencing options (i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sentence), in lieu of imprisonment.
The legislative judgment in skipping the intermediate misdemeanor
penalty - the serious misdemeanor - is subject to criticism, especially in
light of all of the sentences for misdemeanor offenses being of a non-indeterminate basis. That is, a sentencing judge can, in his discretion, impose a
defini~ or fixed term of any number of days up to the maximum for the
particular classification. Thus, a person convicted of the lowest degree of
Criminal Mischief for causing property damage not exceeding $100 is subject to a possible jail term of any number of days in the comparatively narrow range of one to thirty days, whereas a person convicted of the very next
lowest degree of Criminal Mischief is subject to a possible term of imprisonment of any number of days in the broad range of two years (i.e., one to 730
days) with any term in excess of one year potentially subject to being served
in the penitentiary or adult reformatory.9U At least, the less 'expansive
schedule of imprisonment under a serious misdemeanor (up to one year)
would reduce this unnecessarily broad range of discretion. 9111 Interestingly,
two other "property" offenses - Theft and Fraudulent Practices9118 - have
five grades, including all three levels of misdemeanors. The reason for such
differentiation between stealing another's property altogether or in merely
damaging is unknown. Nevertheless, this very classification scheme appeared unchanged throughout the legislative process, starting with the proposal of the Criminal Code Study Committee. 8114

3. Merger
Section 716.2 of the Criminal Code requires merger of all acts of Criminal Mischief against several items of property attributable to "a single
scheme, plan or conspiracY,"9I1D such that only one offense has been committed. Accordingly, the total damage is to be aggregated with one charge filed,
based upon the highest degree of the total value, rather than filing several
102 supra.

949. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70102 supra.
950. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70102 supra.

951.
952.
953.
-954.
955.

See
See
See
See

IOWA CODE § 903.4 (1979).

id. § 714.2.
id. §§ 714.9-.13.

STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, §§ 1603-06, at 34-35; S.F. 85.
IOWA CODE § 716.2 (1979).
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charges based upon the non-aggregated value of the individual items. This
statutory provision apparently establishes the principle of episodic immunity but only as to the crime of Criminal Mischief, in that the prosecution
must include all of the acts or damage in the initial prosecution, or be
barred from future prosecution of other acts of mischief committed as part
of the same scheme, plan or conspiracy. 11M
C.
1.

Burglary and Related Offenses

Burglary

The revised crime of BurglaryBII7 is different in many respects from both
its statutory forerunners and the common law offense. It includes the prerevised crimes of Burglary,8D8 Burglary by Explosives,"111 Burglary by Electricity or Gas,B60 Breaking and Entering,HI Breaking and Entering Railway
Cars,962 Larceny in the Nighttime,HS and Larceny in the Daytime.H4 It does
not include, in their entirety, the pre-revised crimes of Entering a Bank
With Intent to Rob B611 and Attempting to Break and Enter.a. Act. The actus reus was changed considerably by making Burglary
either an unlawful entry crime or an unlawful remaining over crime. The
breaking requirement has been eliminated altogether, although the revised
crime of Burglary can be committed by a breaking, as compared to the prerevised offense which required both a breaking and an entering. Moreover,
the actus reus can occur by remaining on certain property after expiration of
a limited right or privilege to do so. Professor Yeager reports that "[t]his is
substantial departure from prior law,',"7 and queries:
[Wjill the state have to prove that he had formed the necessary intent at
the time his presence in the place became unlawful, or will it be sufficient
to prove that at some time while he was unlawfully present he formed
the intent, for example, the intent to commit assault? The language sug956. That is, U[t)he merger of these acts into a single offense occurs as a matter of law,
and not at the discretion of the prosecution .... " J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 373.
957. IOWA CODE §§ 713.1-.3 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUcnONS, supra note 136, at
Nos. 1301-14; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 291-96; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTl', supra
note 398, § 96; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 414.
958. See IOWA CODE §§ 708.1-.3 (1977) (repealed 1978).
959. [d. § 708.4.
960. [d. § 708.5.
961. [d. § 708.8.
962. [d. § 708.11.
963. [d. § 709.4.
964. [d. § 709.5.
965. [d. § 708.9. U[W)hile some of the activity which that section prohibited will be burglary under this code, most of it will be treated as robbery under Chapter 711." J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 291.
966. See IOWA CODE § 708.10 (1977) (repealed 1978).
967. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 294.
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gests the latter.9ss

b. Nighttime. The element of nighttime as an aggravating circumstance was eliminated in the new Criminal Code, with the time of day being
totally irrelevant, as it should be. This is in line with the accompanying
elimination of a dwelling house· being burglarized as another aggravating
circumstance.
c. Structure. The type of structure subject to being burglarized under
the new Criminal Code is either an "occupied structure" or certain enclosed
(or secure) areas, with a dwelling house no longer singled out for special
treatment."9 An "occupied structure" is statutorily defined as "any building, structure, land, water or air vehicle, or similar place adopted for overnight accommodation of persons, or occupied by persons for the purpose of
carrying on business or other activity therein, or for the storage or safekeeping of anything of value."970 Nevertheless, by express statutory language, a
person need not actually be present at the time of the burglary.971 An "occupied structure" clearly encompasses an automobile which typically provides
incidental storage. 971
Additionally, the definition of the alternative type of real or personal
property protected under the Burglary statute, an enclosed area,978 is amplified in the Uniform Jury Instructions, which state: "An 'enclosed area' is one
which is so designed, built or enclosed that it is secure for the keeping of
valuable property, and it reasonably appears the area was meant to be secure from theft or criminal mischief. An 'enclosed area' need not be a structure or building."974 An example would be a fenced enclosure containing
nursery plants and gardening equipment adjacent to a shopping center.
Under such broad definitions of an "occupied structure" and an "enclosed area," any secure area can be burglarized. Professor Yeager states,
"[t]he requirement is that it not be open to the public, or, if it is open, that
968.

[d.

969. A similar change was made in the revised crime of Arson.
970. See id. § 702.12.
971. [d.
972. That an automobile is not primarily used for storage or safekeeping of property
should not exclude an ordinary automobile from coverage under the burglary statute, as the
statute does not contain such qualifying language as a vehicle primarily used for the storage or
safekeeping of property. Moreover, exclusion of automobiles from the burglary statute would
mean that there would be no aggravated form of theft involving break-ins of automobiles. This
is because the revised crime of Theft does not contain provisions similar to the pre-revised
crimes of Larceny in the Nighttime and Larceny in the Daytime. See IOWA CODE §§ 709.4-.5
(1977) (repealed 1978) (respectively). See also Emery v. Fenton, 266 N.W.2d 6 (Iowa 1978),
which characterized the new Criminal Code as "primarily a restatement" of the pre-revised law.
[d. at 8.
973. See IOWA CODE § 713.1 (1979).
974. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1313.
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one remain in the building or area after it is closed to the public. "970
d. Burglarious Intent. Burglary has remained a specific intent crime,
of course. However, the scope of the burglarious intent has been narrowed
somewhat from the all encompassing pre-revised burglarious intent to commit "any public offense."976 Now, Burglary occurs only when the requisite
unlawful act is done with the accompanying intent to commit "a felony, assault, or theft."977 Whereas this includes all assaults and thefts of both felony and misdemeanor grades, other misdemeanors are omitted as target
crimes, such as the two lowest degrees of Criminal Mischief. 976 These situations apparently will be left to punishment under the Criminal Trespass
statute979 for the unlawful entry as well as the statute covering the target
crime itself (e.g., Criminal Mischief980 for any damage done by vandalism).
e. Attempted Burglary. The revised crime of Burglary encompasses
only a few of the situations of the pre-revised crime of Attempted Breaking
and Entering. 981 There is no longer a general crime of Attempted Burglary.
It is true that one form of Burglary under the new Criminal Code is by
breaking an occupied structure or enclosed area. However, a "breaking"
under the traditional common law interpretation requires actual removal or
putting aside of an obstruction to entry.981 Thus, a person caught in the act
of attempting to remove such an obstruction, such as jimmying the lock on
or even breaking part of a window without quite permitting entry, would not
be covered.
Professor Yeager disagrees with the above discussion, claiming that the
attempted offense is included, or at least enough of the attempted offense as
should be punishable is included; it is not clear which. 988 He explains that
the intent of the drafters was that "either a breaking or an entering should
be required as the minimal overt act on which criminality should be predicated in these circumstances. Since that minimal overt act, if proved, will
establish the offense of burglary itself, no provision need be made for an
offense of attempted burglary."984
There are several other alternative charges to Attempted Burglary, if
975. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 293.
976. See IOWA CODE § 708.1 (1977) (repealed 1978).
977. IOWA CODE § 713.1 (1979).
978. [d. §§ 716.5-.6.
979. [d. § 716.7.
980. [d. §§ 716.1-.6.
981. See IOWA CODE § 708.10 (1977) (repealed 1978).
982. "Making an opening into a building by trespass" occurs "when an intruder removes
or puts aside some part of the structure relied on as an obstruction to intrusion." State v.
Houglund, 197 N.W.2d 364, 365 (Iowa 1972). Accord, UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note
136, which states that "[t)he term 'breaks' or 'broke' means the removal or putting aside of any
obstruction to entering. No damage need result to the property." [d. at No. 1306.
983. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 291.
984. [d.
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there is no such charge, when entry is not gained. Of course, the offense of
Burglary itself is complete upon a successful breaking. Possession of Burglar's Tools981l is a viable alternative since would-be burglars typically have
some "tools of the trade" to facilitate gaining forceful entry. Also, the Iowa
Supreme Court has been quite liberal in characterizing ordinary tools as
burglar's tools. 98s The utility of this inchoate offense is that it is graded
identically with the consummated offense of Burglary in the Second Degree. 987 One difficulty is that the prosecution needs to prove burglarious intent of the person found in possession of burglar's tools, and the statutory
presumption of burglarious intent under the pre-revised statute was eliminated in the new Criminal Code. A third possibility is Criminal Mischief,988
which would require proof of physical damage to the property. Considerable
damage would be necessary, however, before the offense would be a felony
(over $500),989 except in special circumstances. The last alternative would be
Criminal Trespass,99o which would require unlawful entry onto public or private property to be burglarized. However, Trespass is only a misdemeanor,
even when the aggravated form involving personal injury is involved. 991
f. Felony Murder Rule. Unlike under the pre-revised law,992 not all
burglary under the new Criminal Code is subject to being an underlying felony for application of the felony murder rule to Murder in the First Degree.
This is because Burglary in the Second Degree is excluded from the statutory definition of a "forcible felony," which is the basic qualifying factor for
the felony murder rule. 99s As the revised crime of Arson,9tu however, an intentional murder during the commission of an ordinary burglary (i.e., Burglary in the Second Degree) would constitute Murder in the Second Degree
under the second degree felony murder rule,991l whereas the homicidal crime
would only be Involuntary Manslaughter if such a killing was unintentional. 99S Another change is that the coverage of the revised crime of burglary is much broader, as it is not limited to break-ins of dwelling houses.
g. Grading. Burglary is of the first degree997 when a defendant or an
accomplice either (1) merely has in his possession a "dangerous weapon,"998
985.

IOWA CODE § 713.4 (1979).

986.

See State v. Knudtson, 195 N.W.2d 698 (Iowa 1972).

987.
988.

IOWA CODE § 713.3 (1979).
IOWA CODE § 716.1 (1979).
Id. § 716.4.
Id. § 716.7.
Id. § 716.8(2).
See IOWA CODE § 690.2 (1977) (repealed 1978).
See IOWA CODE § 707.2(2) (1979).
See text accompanying notes 862-910 supra.
See IOWA CODE § 707.3 (1979).
See id. § 707.5(1).
Id. § 713.2. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTION, supra note 136, at No. 1314.
IOWA CODE § 702.7 (1979).

989.
990.
991.
992.
993.
994.
995.
996.
997.
998.
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an "explosive device,"888 or an "incendiary device,"IOoo or (2) "intentionally
or recklessly inflicts physical injury on any person."1001 The first alternative
is satisfied by the mere act of possession, thus rendering unnecessary any
discharging or detonating of the weapon. Under the second alternative, it
appears that any degree of physical injury will suffice. Why the more restrictive general term of "serious injury"100ll was not incorporated herein is not
clear, especially since a "serious injury" is necessary for first degree RobberylOos as well as for first degree Sexual Abuse. 1004 This provision, nevertheless, is more restrictive than its pre-revised counterpart. The latter only encompassed an actual assault as an aggravating circumstance to support a
charge of Burglary With Aggravation,lool1 and an assault, by definition, necessitates no touching at all. looe The presence of a confederate, aiding and
abetting, as an aggravating circumstance under the pre-revised law was
eliminated altogether. All burglary other than that described above is of the
second degree. loo7
h. Sentencing Options. Burglary in the First Degree is a class B felony, 1008 whereas Burglary in the Second Degree is a class C felony,,008 Thus,
one is a twenty-five year maximum offense whereas the other is only a ten
year maximum offense. This amounts to a fifteen-year add-on penalty for
burglary while armed (even though the firearm does not need to be used or
even displayed lOlO or for causing (albeit intentionally or recklessly)1011 a
physical personal injury of any nature during a burglary. Thus, a simple
Burglary (ten years) plus a simple Assault (thirty days) equals twenty-five
years.
One flaw in' the pre-revised law was remedied, however. The former
999. See id. § 101A.1 and note 918 supra.
1000. See 1978 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1183 (67th G.A.), amending IOWA CODE § 702.21
(Supp. 1978), by adding that "[a]n 'incendiary device' is a device, contrivance, or material
causing or designed to cause destruction of property by fire."
1001. IOWA CODE § 713.2 (1979).
1002. [d. § 702.18.
1003. [d. § 711.2.
1004. [d. § 709.2.
1005. See IOWA CODE § 708.2 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1006. IOWA CODE § 708.1 (1979).
1007. [d. § 713.3.
1008. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70102 supra.
1009. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70102 supra.
1010. All that is necessary for the five-year minimum sentence to be imposed under IOWA
CODE § 902.7 (1979), is that the defendant or an accomplice "represented that he or she was in
immediate possession and control of a firearm." [d. (emphasis added).
1011. In contrast, the personal violence crimes of Willful Injury, Assault While Participating in a Felony, Assault With Intent to Inflict Serious Injury, and even simple Assault are
strictly intentional crimes. See IOWA CODE §§ 708.4, 708.3, 708.2(1), 708.2(2) (1979)
(respectively).
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crime of Burglary With Aggravation was punishable, in the judicial discretion of the individual sentencing court, by any term of years to life.lOl l That
ridiculous legislative scheme, coupled with the supreme court's essentially
hands off policy in "reviewing" abuse of judicial discretion in sentencing,I018
led to some disparate sentences with supreme court approval. 1014 Under the
new Criminal Code, the scope of judicial discretion of the sentencing court
has been sharply restricted. Now, an indeterminate term of twenty-five
years and ten years is prescribed for Burglary in the FirstlO'1i and Second
Degrees/o l8 respectively. Moreover, none of the ameliorative sentencing options (i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sentence) is an available sentencing option for Burglary in the First Degree,
because it is a "forcible felony."1017 In contrast, considerable judicial discretion still reposes in the sentencing court in deciding on Burglary in the Second Degree (a non-forcible felony) whether to defer entry of judgment at all
or if so to impose and then suspend the sentence and place the defendant on
probation (i.e., a bench parole).
Unlike the pre-revised law/o,s the new Criminal Code provides for an
alternative sentencing option of a fine-only with a maximum of $5000 for
Burglary in the Second Degree. 101S This ameliorative sentencing option is
welcome in light of the wide ranging activity included within the definition
of Burglary. As a class B felony,IOIO Burglary in the First Degree is not punishable by fine at all, whether in addition to or in lieu of a term of imprisonment or for a suspended sentence.
i. Lesser Included Offenses. In light of the current standard, there do
not appear to be any lesser included offenses of burglary, except, of course,
1012. See IOWA CODE § 708.2 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1013. See, e.g., State v. Peckenschneider, 236 N.W.2d 344, 348 (Iowa 1975). "We have
. demonstrated a growing reluctance to interfere with the trial court's discretion." [d. See also
State v. Smith, 242 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Iowa 1976). "[TJbia col,lrt has consistently held the severity of punishment must be 'carefully considered' but when it does not exceed the statutory
maximum we will interfere only where abuse of discretion is shown," with life term for seconddegree murder upheld. [d. But see IOWA R. CRIM.P. 22(3)(d) ("court shall state on the record its
reason for selecting the particular sentence") State v. Luedtke, 279 N.W.2d 7, 8 (Iowa 1979)
(Rule 22(3)(d) is mandatory).
1014. See, e.g., State v. Kendall, 167 N.W.2d 909, 911-12 (Iowa 1969) (upholding life term
for Burglary with Aggravation).
1015. IOWA CODE § 713.2 (1979).
1016. [d. § 713.3.
1017. See id. §§ 702.11, 907.3 and text accompanying notes 180-203 supra.
1018. See IOWA CODE §§ 708.2-.3 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1019. See IOWA CODE §§ 713.3 (1979) (Burglary in the Second Degree); id. § 902.9(3) (penalty for class C felony); id. § 909.1 (fine without imprisonment); and text accompanying notes
997-1007 supra.
1020. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70102 supra.
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for Burglary in the Second Degree l021 (being strictly a residual provision)
being a lesser included offense that always must be submitted in a prosecution for Burglary in the First Degree.loll! Because of its inchoate nature lOll8 in
not being a specific result crime (as to the objective of the unlawful entry),
the crime of burglary, indeed even in aggravated forms, is complete upon
the unlawful entry with the requisite intent. Thus, any crimes committed or
attempted as part of the burglary (i.e., Assault or Theft) are not lesser included offenses. Neither is Criminal Mischief for any property damage even
though done incidental in gaining entry a lesser included offense, since this
offense requires damage whereas Burglary does not. lOS. Similarly, Trespass
is not a lesser included offense,lOll1l since the two crimes are not of the "same
species" and the elements of Trespass are not entirely included in the offense of Burglary.

2. Possession of Burglar's Tools
No substantive change was made in the elements of the crime of Possession of Burglar'S Tools.lose These elements remain: (1) possessing (2) any
. burglar's tool (3) with the specific intent to use it in perpetration of a
burglary.l027
It is sufficient for possession that the burglar's tools be "within [defendant's] dominion and subject to his control."101l8 Thus, it is not necessary
that the tools be upon defendant's person.
.
It also is not necessary that the particular tools be designed for an unlawful purpose. Conversely, it is immaterial that the particular tools have
legitimate uses. Presence of several tools in combination is to be considered
in determining their burglarious character, rather than each individual tool
being considered separately. 10119
The requisite burglarious intent is only a general intent to commit a
burglary on some occasion. Thus, the prosecution is not required to prove
defendant's intent to commit "a specific burglary at any particular time or
place. "IOSO Nevertheless, burglarious intent must be proved to have existed
IOWA CODE § 713.3 (1979).
Id. § 713.2.
See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOOT, supra note 398, at 715.
See generally text accompanying notes 977-980 supra.
See State v. Furnald, 263 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1978), which is discussed in text accompanying note 1049 supra.
1026. Compare IOWA CODE § 713.4 (1979) with IOWA CODE § 708.7 (1977) (repealed 1978).
See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 1315-19; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON,
supra note 3, § 297.
1027. IOWA CODE § 713.4 (1979).
1028. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1318.
1029. See, e.g., State v. Knudtson, 195 N.W.2d 698 (Iowa 1972); Mahar v. Lainson, 247
Iowa 297, 72 N.W.2d 516 (1955); UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1318.
1030. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1319. See State v. Van
1021.

1022.
1023.
1024.
1025.
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at the time defendant was found in the act of possessing burglar's tools. 10Sl
The only major statutory change concerning this crime occurred with
the elimination of the pre-revised statutory presumption lOSI of burglarious
intent attributed to persons found in possession of burglar's tools. lOSS Professor Yeager explains that "[i]t was felt that presuming intent from possession, when the possession would be innocent without the intent, is a form of
bootstrapping which raises serious due process Questions. The intent can be
proved from the circumstances of the possession."1084
There is an interesting Quirk in the grading of this offense. Both the
consummated offense of Burglary in the Second Degree and the "higly inchoate offense"103& of Possession of Burglar's Tools are class C felonies, lOse
and thus punishable identically. Neither is a "forcible felony."10s7

D.

Criminal Trespass

The substantive content of the types of conduct constituting the crime
of Criminal Trespass l038 essentially was left unchanged in the new Criminal
Voltenburg, 260 Iowa 200, 147 N.W.2d 869 (1967).
1031. See note 70 supra.
1032. See IOWA CODE § 708.7 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1033. This unsurprisingly has been characterized by a defense attorney as "a needed
change." J. ROEHRICK, supra note 620, at 145.
1034. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 297. The impact of this statutory change
is readily apparent in the evolution that the Uniform Jury Instructions have undergone. The
applicable Uniform Jury Instruction (on intent to commit burglary) which was keyed to the
former Code read:
If the State has established beyond a reasonable doubt the first essential of the
offense; namely, that the defendant in fact had burglar's tools or implements in his
possession, such possession is presumptive evidence of intent to commit burglary.
This presumptive evidence creates a permissible inference to be considered along
with any and all other facts and circumstances shown by the evidence which have any
bearing on the issue of the intent of the defendant, and the burden is upon the State
to establish by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time the defendant possessed burglar'S tools, if he did, the defendant then had the intent to commit
the crime of burglary.
The current, revised instruction reads:
One of the elements which the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable
. doubt is the intent of the defendant to commit burglary. Such intent must exist in
the mind of the defendant at the time of possession of the burglar's tools.
It is not necessary for the State to prove an intent to commit a specific burglary
at any particular time or place. The intent of the defendant needs to be only a gen- .
eral intent to commit the crime of burglary on some occasion of his choice.
UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1319.
1035. Schantz, supra note 2, at 454.
1036. For a discussion of the various sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 70102 supra.
1037. See text accompanying notes 180-203 supra.
1038. IOWA CODE § 716.7 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos.
1607-13; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 378-86.
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Code. lo39 This crime has thus retained the following elements: (1) wrongful
entry or wrongful remaining (2) on public or private property (3) without
permission (4) and without justification (5) under anyone of the four following circumstances: lo4o (a) after being notified or requested to not enter or to
leave,lo41 or (b) with the intent to commit a public offense,.042 or (c) with the
intent or effect of unduly interfering with the lawful use of such property by
others,.o43 or (d) with the intent or effect of wrongfully using, removing
therefrom, altering, damaging, harassing or placing thereon anything animate or inanimate. I044
1.

Privileged Entry

The only significant substantive change made in the entire chapter on
Criminal Trespass occurred with the addition of a provision defining privileged entry onto public or private property under limited circumstances for
retrieval of personal property.I040 For the defense to be applicable, all of the
following are necessary: (1) the entry must be made for the sole purpose of
retrieving an item of personal property; (2) the item must have accidentally
or inadvertently ended up on the property of another; (3) the retriever must
take the most direct and accessible route in retrieving; (4) the retriever must
exit as quickly as possible and (5) the retriever must not unduly interfere
with lawful use of the property entered upon. I04e Because of the conjunctive
test, the 'state need only prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the negative of
anyone of the five in order for the privilege to be inapplicable. 1047

2. Relationship With Burglary
Both Burglaryl048 and Criminal Trespass are wrongful entry crimes. Never1039. C{. IOWA CODE § 729.1 (1977) (repealed 1978). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra
note 3, § 378.
1040. IOWA CODE § 716.7 (1979).
1041. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1610; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 382.
1042. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1609; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 381. "[Tlhe intentelement here is stated so broadly that it is unlikely
that anyone can commit a civil trespass without the intent to do at least one of the listed acts .
. . ." Id.
1043. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1611; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 383.
1044. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1612; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 384.
1045. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, ,at No. 1613; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 385. This provision "is merely the civil justification for trespass and is
not a change in the law, except for codification." J. ROEHRlCK, supra note 620, at 230.
1046. IOWA CODE § 716.7 (1979).
1047. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1613.
1048. IOWA CODE § 713.1 (1979).
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theless, Trespass has not been held to be a lesser included offense of Burglary. In State v. Furnald,1049 the Iowa Supreme Court (interpreting the
Burglary and Trespass statutes under the old code which were substantially
similar to the new Criminal Code) reasoned that there were many ways in
which one crime could be committed without the other also being committed, and thus the legal test for lesser included offenses was not met. The
court also noted that Burglary under the former code was a crime solely
against a building, whereas Trespass could occur on land. Because the new
Criminal Code does not extend Burglary to land itself (i.e., open space separate and apart from an enclosed area), the Furnald decision will be controlling. This prospect was enhanced by the supreme court's holdings in State v.
Sanders, 1060 that the lesser included offense standard remains unchanged
under the new Criminal Code 101l1 and in State v. Holmes,lOIlI that Theft is
not a lesser included offense of Robbery under the new Criminal Code since
Theft requires a taking but Robbery does not. Because Robbery can be committed in the alternative - either by an actual taking or by an attempted
taking - and Trespass can be upon many alternative types of property only two of which, an occupied structure and an enclosed space, can be subjects of Burglary, it appears that the Sanders-Holmes rationale will require
extension of Furnald to the new Criminal Code.
3.

Grading

There are two grades of Trespass, with the distinguishing characteristic
being whether either personal injury or property damage in excess of $100
occurred. This aggravated form of Trespass is a serious misdemeanor,
whereas the ordinary form of Trespass is a simple misdemeanor. A similar
scheme of grading was included in the pre-revised law,t°lla except that the
maximum penalty for the aggravated form was imprisonment for six months
instead of the one year maximum, as a serious misdemeanor under new
Code section 716.8(2).
4.

Merger

The above-mentioned grading scheme raises questions on merger of offenses in situations of Trespass in its aggravated form. Is a person who injures another person by assaulting him or her during a trespass subject both
to aggravated Trespass and to Assault? Similarly, is a trespasser who also
concurrently causes property damage in excess of $100 subject both to ag1049.
1050.
1051.
1052.
1053.

263 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1978).
280 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1979).
See IOWA R. CRlM. P. 6, 21.
276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979).
IOWA CODE § 729.1 (1977) (repealed 1978).
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gravated Trespassing and to Criminal Mischiefoll4 in the particular degree
concomitant with the amount of damage caused?
As a matter of fundamental fairness and because of the double jeopardy
mandate, only one charge should lie in either of those two situations. Ion Because the physical injury or property damage would be the only basis for
boot strapping an ordinary Trespass into an aggravated Trespass, neither
circumstance should also be the basis for a separate charge of either Assault
or Criminal Mischief.
On the other hand, a prosecutor clearly should be free to make an election of charges. lOllS Thus, a prosecutor could, in his basically non-reviewable
discretion, decide to charge a "rowdy" trespasser with Willful InjurylOll7 (a
class D felony) or with Assault With Intent to Inflict a Serious Injuryloll8 (an
aggravated misdemeanor POll9 instead of aggravated Trespassing (a mere serious misdemeanor).loso Of course, he cold then throw in the simple Trespass charge as a separate count.
1054. IOWA CODE §§ 716.1-.6 (1979).
1055. See Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975); State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63
(Iowa 1972).
1056. "The fact that there was evidence tending to show more than was required by the
statute and also an attempt to violate another statute did not invalidate the prosecution of the
charge here involved." State v. Stanton, 214 N.W.2d 125, 126 (Iowa 1974). Accord, United
States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973). "[W]here
criminal statutes overlap the government is entitled to choose among them provided it does not
discriminate against any class of defendants" [d.; People v. Fowler, 516 P.2d 428, 429 (Colo.
1973) "[A] single transaction that violates two criminal statutes may generally be prosecuted
under either .... No constitutional proscription has been demonstrated which would prohibit
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in such a situation .... " [d. See United States v. Batchelder, _ U.S. _, 99 S. Ct. 2198 (1979) (defendant sentenced under section with harsher penalty
where defendant's conduct falls within two sections of same criminal statute).
1057. See IOWA CODE § 708.4 (1979).
1058. The single grade of this offense is a class D felony. It is punishable by either an
indeterminate term of imprisonment of five years or a maximum fine of $1,000 or both. Because
this offense is a "forcible felony," none of the ameliorative sentencing alternatives (i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, or a suspended sentence of probation) is available, in lieu
of the above mentioned imprisonment. Moreover, being a "forcible felony," this offense is also
subject to the mandatory minimum five year sentence if a firearm is used or possessed during
its commission.
1059. See IOWA CODE § 708.2(1) (1979).
1060. An aggravated misdemeanor is punishable by either a determinate term of confinement not to exceed two years or a maximum fine of $5000 or both. Other sentencing alternatives include a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a suspended sentence of probation,
in lieu of the above-mentioned confinement or fine.
A serious misdemeanor is punishable by either a determinate term of imprisonment of up
to one year or a fine of up to $1000 or both. The various sentencing alternatives are: imprisonment only, imprisonment and fine, fine only, a suspended sentence of probation, a deferred
sentence, or a deferred judgment.
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5. Lesser Included Offenses
There are, of course, no lesser included offenses lO6l of Trespassing.
Moreover, Trespassing itself is not a lesser included offense of any other
crime, including Burglary.lOGli

V.

THEFT AND RELATED OFFENSES

A.
1.

Theft

Generally

The newly-constituted comprehensive crime of Theftl068 consolidates
the pre-revised offenses of Larceny, Embezzlement, False Pretenses, Receiving and Concealing Stolen Property, False Drawing, and Uttering. However,
several changes were made in these pre-revised offenses that resulted in expanding the scope of these pre-revised offenses,lo64 as discussed below. Nevertheless, like its predecessor offenses, Theft remains a specific result crime,
thus not punishing attempted thefts. 10611
a. "Property" Subject to Theft. The biggest change is in the much
broader scope of "property"1066 that can be the subject of this crime, as opposed to under the pre-revised offenses. This has not only enlarged the
scope of this crime but also has eliminated the need for individual statutes
on particularized subjects. The "property" subject to Theft has been expanded from the basic limitation of tangible personal property under the
pre-revised offensesl067 to include "anything of value,"l068 that is, all real
and personal property. The major areas of expansion include intangible
property, real property, labor, and services.
b. Defense of Claim of Right. A modified version of the common law
defense of claim of right l069 has been codified in Iowa Code section 714.4. 1070
By terms of that provision, wrongful appropriation of another's "property"
does not constitute Theft if the offender "reasonably believes that he or she
1061. See text accompanying notes 619-723 supra.
1062. State v. Furnald, 263 N.W.2d 751 (Iowa 1978).
1063. IOWA CODE §§ 714.1-.7 (1979). See generally UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra
note 136, at Nos. 1401.51; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 311-28.
1064. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 311.
1065. Regarding the theft-related crime of Fraudulent Practices being in the nature of an
attempted theft offense, see text accompanying notes 1217-1225 infra.
1066. IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No.
1441; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 41.
1067. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 312.
1068. IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979) (emphasis added).
1069. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCO'M', supra note 398, § 88. R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at
322.
1070. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1440; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 325.
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has a right, privilege or license to do so, or if [her or she] does in fact have
such right, privilege or license."'071 Contrastingly, the common law defense
was attached to a bona fide claim of title or right to possession. '07• This
change could make the defense less restrictive in light of being tied to only a
"reasonable belief' instead of a "bona fide" claim being required. This puts
the matter in the hands of layman jurors to determine what "reasonable"
persons like themselves would feel under the circumstances. Nevertheless,
an actual belief for so acting is required by this provision, as is a reasonable
factual basis for so believing.
Whenever a "claim of right" is raised by the defense, an additional element is added to the marshaling instruction in the Uniform Jury Instructions,,078 as follows: "That at the time the defendant (acquired, used, etc.)
the property, he did so with no claim of right." This has the effect of requiring the prosecution to disprove the alleged "claim of right." This is because
appropriating another's property under a "claim of right" does not involve
criminal intent. ,074
c. Grading. There are five degrees of Theft,I0711 with the classification
of offenses ranging from a simple misdemeanor to a class C felony. Neither
of the two felonies is.a "forcible felony.",078
The basic point of differentiation is the value l077 of the "property" stolen. Theft in the Fifth Degree/078 a simple misdemeanor,'07' involves fifty
dollars or less. Theft in the Fourth Degree/08o a serious misdemeanor/081
involves fifty dollars plus to $100; Theft in the Third Degree,I081 an aggra1071. The phrase "right, privilege, or license" is defined in the Uniform Jury Instructions,
as follows:
'[RJight' means an interest or title in the property or a legal claim to hold, use or
enjoy it. 'Privilege' means a particular permission or authority given to a particular
person(s) to hold, use, or enjoy the property as opposed to a general permission. 'License' means that the owner gave either express or implied permission or authority to
hold, use or enjoy the property.
UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 3, at No. 1440.
1072. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 325.
1073. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 3, at No. 1440.
1074. See, e.g., Richardson v. United States, 403 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1968); W. LAFAVE &
A. SCOTT, supra note 398, § 88.
1075. IOWA CODE § 714.2 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No.
1451; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 320-23.
1076. IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979). See text accompanying notes 180-203 supra.
1077. See id. § 714.3; UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1442; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 324.
1078. IOWA CODE § 714.2(5) (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 323.
1079. For a discussion of the sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 107-111

supra.
1080.
1081.

IOWA CODE § 714.2(4) (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 323.
For a discussion of the sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 106, 108-

111 supra.
1082. IOWA CODE § 714.2(3) (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 323.
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vated misdemeanor,los8 involves $100-plus to $500; Theft in the Second Degree/os. a Hnon-forcible"losD class D felony,IOS8 involves $5OO-plus to $5000 as
well as thefts of motor vehicles irrespective of their value. Theft in the First
Degree/os7 a Hnon-forcible"loss class C felony/osB involves in excess of $500
in addition to all thefts from a person and all lootings in conjunction with a
disaster or a riot (the latter two circumstances being irrespective of the
amount of property stolen). These five value-dichotomy schedules apply to
all types of Theft (i.e., wrongful takings, misappropriations, deceptions, exercising control over stolen property, false drawing and uttering of checks
and share drafts, and misuse of secured property). Nevertheless, several specific theft statutes have a single penalty schedule irrespective of the value of
the property stolen. 1090
The special attention given to thefts of motor vehicles l091 is anomolous.
Whereas it fills a potential gap at the lower end of the spectrum in effectively protecting used cars with Hspeculative" retail values, it nevertheless
does not realistically take inflation into account at the upper (or even the
middle) end of the spectrum. A logical explanation for this unrealistic placement is that this provision first appeared in the report by the Criminal Code
Revision Study Committee. lOBI That committee's work was done over a fouryear period 1969 to 1973, during which time a $5000 automobile certainly
was not as commonplace as it is now. Unfortunately, no legislative attempt
was made to revise the classification and make all thefts of motor vehicles a
Theft in the First Degree. The General Assembly should take care of this
during its next dession.
1083. For a discussion of the sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 101-105,
108-111 supra.
1084. IOWA CODE § 714.2(2) (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 322.
1085. See text accompanying notes 180-203 supra, regarding "forcible felonies." See also
text accompanying notes 84-92 supra, regarding the probable availability of a fine-only sanction
under IOWA CODE § 909.1 (1979).
1086. For a discussion of the sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 71-83

supra.
1087. IOWA CODE § 714.2(1) (1979). See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 321.
1088. See note 21 supra.
1089. For a discussion of the sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 71-83
supra. Regarding the probable availability of a fine-only sanction under IOWA CODE § 909.1
(1979), see text accompanying notes 84-92 supra.
1090. In addition to the aforementioned thefts of a motor vehicle, from a person, and
during a looting in conjunction with a disaster or a riot (see text accompanying notes 27-33 and
42-46 infra), the other specific theft or theft-related offenses are: Operating a Vehicle Without
the Owner's Consent (an aggravated misdemeanor); Consumer Frauds (apparently a simple
misdemeanor); Unlawful Advertising and Selling of Courses of Instruction (a serious misdemeanor); Sale of More Than One Lifetime Contract Per Person (a serious misdemeanor). IOWA
CODE §§ 714.7, .16, .17, .20 (1979), repectively. See text accompanying notes 128-142 infra.
1091. IOWA CODE § 714.2(2) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
Nos. 1443-44; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 322.
1092. STUDY COMMITTEE REpORT, ·supra note 3, § 1402(2).
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The special new provision on looting in disaster areas lOea was undoubtedly an outgrowth of the turbulent sixties, although the pre-revised Code
included an offense of larceny from a building on fire. loH It seems a little
harsh to bootstrap an otherwise simple misdemeanor petty theft (involving a
trifling fifty dollars or less) into a class C felony merely because of the circumstances of the taking. As a class C felony, lOBI! this offense can be punishable by an indeterminate term of imprisonment of five years. 10M The real
anomoly of this severly high classification is that this non-violent conduct is
equally punishable with Robbery in the Second Degree,lCI8'7 which is also a
class C felony.
The inclusion of all thefts from the person,lOB8 irrespective of the value
of the property stolen, in the first-degree category is justifiable because of
the potential for violence. Nevertheless, the rather curious result is that
Robbery in the Second Degree and Theft from the Person, both of which are
class C felonies, can be punished equally. The incongruity is further highlighted by the fact that Robbery in the Second Degree is a "forcible felony"lOBB (and thus not subject to a deferred judgement or a suspended sentence of probation) whereas Theft from the Person is not. Moreover, as a
"non-forcible" class C felony, Theft from the Person can apparently be
solely punished, in the sentencing court's judicial discretion pursuant to
Code section 909.1, by a fine. lloo This "compares" to the fifteen-year term of
imprisonment which either had to be imposed or suspended without benefit
of an alternative sentencing option of a fine only under the pre-revised
law. llol
The common thief provision lloa was incorporated as a special circumstance in determining even the most petty theft to be Theft in the Second
Degree.
The major interpretational issue is whether everyone started with a
clean slate on January I, 1978, irrespective of pre-1978 convictions of lar1093. IOWA CODE § 714.2(1) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
No. 1434.
1094. See IOWA CODE § 709.6 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1095. See text accompanying notes 71-83 supra.
1096. Of course, this is not a mandatory term of confinement. See text accompanying
notes 84-92 supra.
1097. IOWA CODE § 711.3 (1979). Nevertheless, this penalty equalization is actually an improvement over the pre-revised law. Incredibly, simple Robbery was punishable by an indeterminate term of imprisonment of ten years whereas the lesser included offense of Larceny from
a Person was punishable by a term of fifteen years. Compare IOWA CODE §§ 711.3 with 709.6
(1977) (repealed 1978). See State v. Habhab, 209 N.W.2d 73, 74 (Iowa 1973).
1098. IOWA CODE § 714.2(1) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
No. 1433.
1099. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 180-203 supra.
1100. See text accompanying notes 84-92 supra.
1101. See IOWA CODS § 709.6 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1102. IOWA CODS § 714.2(2) (1979).
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ceny, embezzlement, receiving and concealing stolen property, or false drawing and uttering of checks - offenses which now constitute the newly-consolidated crime of Theft. In other words, has a person with at least two prior
convictions for any of those forerunner offenses of Theft been previously
convicted of "theft," in light of the crime known specifically as Theft not
existing before 1978? The starting point in this analysis is the fact that two
somewhat similar provisions were included in the pre-revised law. llos However, larceny and receiving plus concealing stolen property were the only
pre-revised llo4 offenses which were included. Moreover, these two pre-revised provisions were separate, thus requiring either three convictions for
larceny or two convictions for receiving and concealing stolen property,
without permitting a combination of these offenses in order to constitute the
status of "common thief." In contrast, the new provision can be satisfied by
three convictions of any of the diverse types of offenses known collectively
as Theft. Moreover, changes, albeit minor, were made in the pre-revised offenses which now collectively constitute Theft. Consequently, starting with a
clean slate appears to be constitiutionally mandated by ex post facto
considerations. llol
2.

Theft by Taking l108

The pre-revised law crime of Larcenyl107 essentially has been replaced
by the newly-styled and restructured crime of Theft by Taking. The elements are: (1) "knowingly;"l108 (2) taking possession or control of; (3) "property" belonging to another; (4) with intent to deprive the other thereof.
a. Aggravated Thefts. As discussed in the section on grading, the basic
element classification is the dollar value of the property stolen. These aggravated thefts are punishable by a fixed schedule, regardless of the amount
actually taken. Two of the special takings are carryovers from the pre-revised offense of Larceny-Theft from a Person l108 and Theft of a Motor
1103. See IOWA CODE § 709.19 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1104. See IOWA CODE §§ 709.19, 712.2 (1977) (repealed 1980).
1105. See generally State v. Olson, 200 Iowa 660, 668, 204 N.W. 278, 280-81 (1925).
1106. IOWA CODE § 714.(1) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
Nos. 1401-04; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 313. See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCO'IT,
supra note 398, §§ 85-88 (Larceny); R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 234-79 (Larceny).
1107. See IOWA CODE ch. 709 (1977) (repealed 1978), which contained several separate
particularized larceny provisions. In addition to the basic common law offense of Larceny, these
included Larceny from Building or From the Person; Larceny of Electric Current, Water,
Steam or Gas; Larceny of Domestic Fowls and Animals; Taking Goods from Officer; Larceny of
Logs or Lumber; Taking Property for Boat or Vessel; Shoplifting; and Larceny from a Parking
Meter. See also id. § 321.82 (1977) (repealed 1978) (Larceny of Motor Vehicle).
1108. See text accompanying notes 465-601 supra.
1109. Compare IOWA CODE § 714.2(1) (1979) with IOWA CODE § 709.6 (1977) (repealed
1978) (Larceny From the Person). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No.
1433.
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Vehicle. 1110 Additionally, the pre-revised offense of Operating a Motor Vehicle Without Owner's Consent,llll which appeared in the pre-revised Code
chapter on highways, has been transferred with some minor changes to the
new Code chapter on Theft.1112 One new type of aggravated theft-Theft
from a building in conjunction with a physical disaster, riot, or bombing1ll8
'has been added, apparently in response to the turbulent 1960's. On the
other hand, conduct punishable under the pre-revised offenses of larceny in
the Nighttime 1ll4 and Larceny in the Daytime llu (neither of which was concerned with the value of the property taken) must either fit within the revised crime of Burglary1ll8 or be punishable merely as Theft (according to
the value of the property actually taken).1117 Of course, the myriad number
of particularized larceny statutes under the pre-revised law 1118 was consolidated within the new Theft statute by its broad, general definition of
"property. "1118
b. Taking Possession or Control. The old Code requirement11lO that
the offender "take, steal, take, and carry away" the property was abandoned. The substitute requireIQ.ent,11I1 taking "possession or control" of another's property, can be satisfied by proof of constructive possession or exercise of control without proof of asportation. 11I1 The significance of this
change in the actus reus of the crime will be apparent in those areas of
expanded coverage of the types of "property" subject to Theft. For example,
a thief can wrongfully assume possession of or control over electric current
through meter tampering, but can hardly carry it away.m8
c. Intent to Deprive. Strangely, the mens rea of Theft by taking is an
intent to deprive, as compared to an intent to permanently deprive under
the forerunner offense of Larceny.11I4 This change in statutory language nat1110. Compare IOWA CODE § 714.2(2) (1979) with IOWA CODE § 321.82 (1977) (repealed
1978) (Larceny of Motor Vehicle). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos.
1443·44.
1111. See IOWA CODE § 321.76 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1112. IOWA CODE § 714.7 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos.
1445-46, J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 328.
1113. [d. § 714.2(1). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1434.
1114. See IOWA CODE § 709.4 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1115. [d. § 709.5.
1116. IOWA CODE § 713.1 (1979). See note 957 supra.
1117. [d. § 714.2 See text accompanying notes 1075-1090 supra.
1118. See note 1107 supra.
1119. IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979). See text accompanying notes 204-206 supra.
1120. See IOWA CODE § 709.1 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1121. IOWA CODE § 714.1(1) (1979).
1122. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 313.
1123. See IOWA CODE § 709.7 (1977) (repealed 1978) (Larceny of Electric Current, Water,
Steam or Gas). This particularized pre-revised larceny statute is uncessary under the less restrictive revised theft statute under the new Criminal Code.
1124. Although the pre-revised larceny statute did not contain express language as to an
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urally raises the question of whether a mere temporary deprivation is
sufficient.
The approach to this question taken in the Uniform Jury Instructions l12& is unambiguous and straightforward. "Depriving" the owner is defined therein as
[tlo permanently withhold, or cause it to be so withheld for an extended
period of time, or under such circumstances, that its benefit or value is
lost; or, the property is disposed of in such a manner, or under such circumstances, as to render it unlikely that the owner will recover the
property. lUG

This approach seems correct in light of the usual meaning of the word "deprive" as "something more than a mere temporary dispossessing of another,
although a deprivation is not necessarily a permanent thing."1l~7 The Iowa
Supreme Court has yet to rule lll8 on the parameters of "depriving" under
either the pre-revised or revised law. Nevertheless, the court has strongly
implied in a recent decision that it will support the definition contained in
the Uniform Jury Instructions. lUe
d. Lesser Included Offenses. Because of a change in the definition of
the crime of Robbery,llaO the supreme court has interpreted lla1 the crime of
Theft under the new Criminal Code as no longer being lesser included offense 1182 of Robbery (unlike under the pre-revised law).1188 On the other
hand, the new Criminal Code 118• codified the common law conceptlla & that
the crime of Operating Another's Vehicle Without Owner's Consent may be
intent to deprive, nevertheless it essentially was a codification of the common law crime of
larceny (which essentially required an intent to permanently deprive). See W. LAFAVE & A.
SCO'M', supra note 398, § 55 ("[Flor larceny, one must intend to deprive the owner of the possession of his property either permanently or for an unreasonable length of time, or intend to
use it in such a way that the owner will probably be thus deprived of his property."). See also
State v. Marshall, 206 Iowa 373, 379-80, 220 N.W. 106, 108-09 (1928) (unathorized taking is not
larceny if done so with the intent to preserve and return "stolen" property to its owner).
1125. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1403.
1126. Id. at No. 1403.
1127. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 313.
1128. State v. Fluhr, 287 N.W.2d 857 (Iowa 1980).
1129. The court stated: "Although there is some uncertainty as to the meaning of 'intent
to deprive' under the new statute, § 714.1(1), The Code 1979, see J. Yeager & R. Carlson, 4
Iowa Practice, Criminal Law and Procedure § 313 (1979), II Iowa Uniform Jury Instructions
No. 1403 provides some guidance which could be shared with defendants offering guilty pleas."
Id. at 867.
1130. See IOWA CODE § 711.1 (1979) and text accompanying notes 1302-11 infra.
1131. State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979). See text accompanying notes 1323-24
infra.
1132. See generally text accompanying notes 1323-24 supra.
1133. See State v. Stewart, 223 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1974).
1134. IOWA CODE § 714.7 (1979).
1135. State v. Hawkins, 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973).
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a lesser included offense on a charge of Theft of a vehicle (i.e., Theft in the
Second Degree).1188
This leaves as lesser included offenses in a prosecution for Theft in the
fourth or a higher degree only those degrees of Theft that are lower than the
degree charged and submitted to the fact-finder.u8? Moreover, there may
not be any lesser included offenses in prosecutions for thefts in special circumstances which are not concerned with the value of the property
taken. uss

3.

Theft by Misappropriation 1188

The pre-revised crime of Embezzlement1140 essentially has been replaced by the crime of Theft by Misappropriation. The elements of this revised offense are: (1) misapproprationj (2) of another's "property"1141 which
is either held in trust U41 by defendant or is in defendant's possession or
controlj (3) by using or disposing of the "property" in a manner inconsistent
with the trust or of the owner's rights. 1148 In addition, this comprehensive
offense also includes a particularized type of missappropriation, that is, concealment or appropri~tion of found property whose owner is known.1144
a. Misappropriation. Misappropriation is not specifically defined in
the Code itself, except for notation of the two ways in which it can occur
(viz. "by using or disposing of [the property] in a manner which is inconsistent with or a denial of the trust or of the owner's rights in such property."1141i The definition is amplified in the Uniform Jury Instructions u4' as
1136. See IOWA CODE § 714.2(2) (1979).
1137. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1451.
1138. See text accompanying notes 619-714 supra.
1139. IOWA CODE § 714.1(2) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
Nos. 1405-13; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 314.
1140. See IOWA CODE ch. 710 (1977) (repealed 1978), which contained several separate
particularized embezzlement provisions. These included: Embezzlement by Public Officers; Embezzlement by Bailee; Embezzlement by Agents; Embezzlement by Bank Officers or Employees;
Embezzlement by Carrier or Persons Entrusted; Embezzlement by Executor, Administrator or
Guardian; and Leased and Rented Vehicle Offenses. See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra
note 398, § 89; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 286-95.
1141. See IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979) and text accompanying notes 204-206 supra.
1142. A person is considered under the UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, to
have property in his trust when:
lilt is given to him by the owner or a third person to be held in safekeeping for the
owner or another or for the owner's benefit. When the property is so given, a fiduciary
relationship is then created with respect to the property, and the person who receives
the property is known as a 'trustee,' whether he is called a 'trustee,' 'agent,' 'bailee,'
'broker,' 'factor,' 'attorney,' or otherwise.
[d. at No. 1407.
1143. [d. at Nos. 1405-06.
1144. See text accompanying notes 1150-56 infra.
1145. IOWA CODE § 714.1(2) (1979).
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follows:
To 'misappropriate' means that a person, knowing he had no right or
authority to do so, exercises control over the property and that by exercising control over the property, the benefit or value of the property is
lost to the owner. Misappropriation may also occur when a person knowingly disposes of the property for his own benefit or the benefit of a third
person.'H7

b. Inference from Untimely Return. A new provision 1H8 establishes an
inference of misappropriation of leased personal property or of a bailment
when the property is not returned within seventy-two hours of the time
specified in the written agreement of lease or bailment. In other words, a
jury question can be generated solely on this provision, with the practical
effect being "to compel the defendant to explain why he has not returned
the property."lU9
c. Found Property. Theft by misappropriation" I1O also includes the
pre-revised offense of Appropriating Found Property."1l This type of Theft
can be committed in either of two ways: by concealing found "property" or
by appropriating mS such "property" to his or her own use. In either of these
situations, the owner of this property must be known" I1S to the offender.
The Code thus places no affirmative duty on the finder of lost property to
attempt to discover the owner, 11M which is questionable public policy.

4.

Theft by "Deception"

The pre-revised offenses of obtaining money by false pretenses" l111 and
swindling l1116 were incorporated into a type of Theft by "deception.',m7 Its
1146. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No 1408.
1147. Id. at No. 1408.
1148. IOWA CODE § 714.1(2) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
No. 1439; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 314.
1149. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 314.
1150. IOWA CODE § 714.1(2) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
Nos. 1410-13; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 314.
1151. See IOWA CODE § 709.11 (1977) (repealed 1978). See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,
supra note 398, § 89; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 248-53.
1152. "Appropriates" is defined in the Uniform Jury Instructions to mean "to exercise
control over the property, or to aid a third person to exercise control over it so as to acquire its
value or benefit, or to dispose of the property for one's own benefit or use." UNIFORM JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1412.
1153. For an instruction on proof of knowledge of the owner, see id. at No. 1413.
1154. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 314.
1155. See IOWA CODE ch. 713 (1977) (repealed 1978), which contained several particularized false pretense provisions. These included: False Pretenses, Receiving Goods by False Personation, Suppression or Destruction of Will, Fraudulent Conveyances, Frauds Upon Hotelkeepers, False Use of Credit Cards, Fraudulent Use of Wire Services and Simulated Legal
Process.
1156. See id. § 709.1 (Larceny by Trick).
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elements are: (1) using "deception," either (2a) to obtain the labor or services of another or (2b) to obtain a transfer of possession, control, or ownership of another's "property" or (2c) to obtain beneficial use of another's
"property."1l1l8 However, the extremely broad, albeit all-inclusive, definitions
of "property"1U9 and "deception" make Theft by deception a broader crime
than its forerunners. First, the general term "property" means anything of
value. Next, the term "deception"1l80 is defined less restrictively than the
traditional concept of criminal fraud which was basically limited to "a false
statement of a material existing fact relied on by another to his
detriment. "1181
a. Acts of "Deception." Theft by deception can occur in six different
ways: (1) "knowingly"1l82 creating or confirming a false belief (either by a
statement or non-verbal conduct);1l83 (2) failing to correct a false belief previously created or confirmed by defendant;ll84 (3) preventing another from
acquiring information pertinent to disposition of property;1l811 (4) transferring or incumbering property without disclosure of a lien or other legal impediment therein;1l88 (5) promising either payment, delivery of goods, or
other performance with either no intent or ability to perform;1187 .and (6)
inserting unauthorized tokens into coin-operated machines dispensing goods
or services. 1188
b. Inference of "Deception." A new statutory inference of decep1l69
tion
arises regarding goods or services for which payment ordinarily is
1157. IOWA CODE § 714.1(3) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
1414-22; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 315; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note
398, § 90 (False Pretenses); R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 296-319 (False Pretenses).
1158. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 1415-21.
1159. See IOWA CODE § 702.14 (1979) and text accompanying notes 1066 and 204-06
Nos.

supra.
1160. [d. § 702.9. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 1415-21; J.
YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 30-36.
1161. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 30.
1162. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 230 and text accompanying notes 437-601 supra.
1163. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1416; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 31.
1164. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1417; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 32.
1165. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1418; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 33.
1166. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1419; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 34.
1167. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1420; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 35.
1168. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1421; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 36.
1169. IOWA CODE § 714.1(3) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
No. 1422; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 315.
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made immediately when the customer "leave[s] the premises" without either paying for goods or services received or making arrangements with the
owner or operator to make later payment. This, of course, is only a permissible inference and by itself can generate a jury question on the question of
deception.
One troublesome question of interpretation remains as to the parameters of the "premises." Are the premises of a restaurant confined to the inside of the building, such as inside the dining area itself, or has a customer
who is in a lounge area "left" the premises since he has passed the cash
register area without paying? It would seem not, since the premises should
include the entire building itself. What, however, if the non-paying customer
is accosted in a rest room which has an entry door from outside of the building? Is the parking lot to be considered part of the "premises?" This statutory inference, which could very well be inclusive in nature, certainly discourages a person from abortively returning to his automobile, without
"permission" of the operator or presumably his agent, to shut off the lights,
to get his checkbook out of the glove compartment, and so on. This latter
example raises another practical question of when the act of leaving must
occur. Presumably, the inference would not arise until the defendant had at
least received the goods or services.l17O This is because payment ordinarily is
not made in a restaurant until the meal is finished, and thus a customer
"caught" in the parking lot after he has ordered but before he has received
his order should not be subject to this inference. Moreover, he has not yet
"obtained" anything of value, and Theft is a specific result, as opposed to an
inchoate crime. It thus appears that this inference arises at an earlier stage,
and should be determined under the particular circumstances of the individual case. Of course, in most innocent circumstances there will be no prosecution, as the customer will return, finish his meal, and pay upon leaving permanently. The problem area will involve a wary merchant who has
frequently been victimized and who is determined to "make an example" of
any culprit "caught in the act." Such a situation will require the adoption of
a "common sense" approach by the prosecution in making the charging decision. Yet once the prosecutor has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the
requisite underlying facts, the inference should automatically arise, rather
than being discretionary with the trial court. The burden would then be on
1170. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1422. The requisite facts
for invoking the inference that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt are:
1.) The defendant obtained goods or services for which payment is ordinarily paid
immediately upon receipt of the goods or services.
2.) The defendant (refused to pay) left the premises without payment (or an offer to
pay).
3.) That when he (refused to pay) (left the premises) he had not obtained from the
owner or operator the right to pay at a later time.
[d.
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the defendant to convince the jury not to draw the inference in his particular case.
5.

Theft by Exercising Control Over Stolen Propertyl171

The pre-revised crime of Receiving and Concealing Stolen Property 1l78
was a separate offense, but was made part of Theft in the new Criminal
Code. The elements of the revised crime are: (1) exercising controlj1171 (2)
over stolen 1174 propertyj (3) with either knowledge 117& or a reasonable belief
that the property was stolen.1178 The constitutionality of permitting a conviction in the absence of actual knowledge by defendant that the property in
question was stolen was upheld in State v. Jones.1177
a. Inference of "Knowledge." There has already been a major Iowa
Supreme Court decision which has strengthened this statute in two ways. In
State v. Post,1178 the court upheld the constitutionality of the new statutory
inference 1179 that a person found in possession of property that had been
stolen from two or more persons on separate occasions knew or believed the
property had been stolen. 1180
b. Aggregation Value. Concerning aggregating the value of all the stolen property found under defendant's control,lI81 the court also stated in
Post: "At the time of arrest a person ... is exercising control over all that
property which is in his or her possession, and the total value of that property should be used to determine the degree of guilt. "1181
c. Defense of Intended Restoration. A new statutory defense ll88 concerning intended restoration is included in the new Criminal Code. This requires for exculpation that a person found in possession of stolen property
must have the purpose "to promptly restore it to the owner or to deliver it
1171. IOWA CODE § 714.1(4) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
Nos. 1423-30; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 316.
1172. See IOWA CODE § 712.1 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1173. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1425.
1174. The revised IOWA CODE thus retained the common law principle that the property
must remain in a stolen status at the time of the defendant's act of exercising control. See
LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 398, § 88.
1175. See id. at No. 230 and text accompanying notes 437-601 supra.
1176. See id. at No. 1426.
1177. 289 N.W.2d 597 (Iowa 1980).
1178. 286 N.W.2d 195 (Iowa 1979).
1179. IOWA CODE § 714.1(4) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
No. 1430; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 316.
1180. See also UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1429 (inference from
defendant's possession of recently stolen property that defendant stole it).
1181. See generally IOWA CODE § 714.3 (1979).
1182. 286 N.W.2d at 202.
1183. IOWA CODE § 714.1(4) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
No. 1427.

HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 379 1979-1980

380

Drake Law Review

[Vol. 29

to an appropriate public officer."1184 This essentially becomes an element of
the crime when properly raised by the defendant, with the prosecution required to disprove it. If the prosecution does not carry its burden then the
defendant will be acquitted since in effect criminal intent is lacking. Factors
to be considered as bearing on this alleged intent to restore are amplified in
the Uniform Jury Instructions 11811 as follows: "the nature of the property, its
ease of transfer, the location of the defendant and the property in regard to
the owner (appropriate authorities), the knowledge of who is the owner, the
length of time the property was in the possession of the defendant, together
with all other facts and circumstances shown by the evidence .... "1188

6.

Theft by Bad Checks 1187

The pre-revised crime of False Drawing and Uttering1188 was transferred in unchanged form into the Theft chapter in the new Criminal Code,
save for a 1979 amendment adding share drafts to the coverage of the offense. The elements of this crime are: (1) making, uttering, drawing, delivering or giving; (2) to any person; (3) a check, draft, or written order; (4)
knowing 1188 that it will not be paid when presented to the drawee; and (5)
obtaining "property" or service in exchange therefore. 11eo
The ten-day provision of the pre-revised law was retained.1l91 This provision permits an inference of the requisite culpable knowledge for the offense when the defendant fails to redeem a bad check (and now, also a bad
share draft) within ten days of receiving notice from the drawee that payment has been refused because of insufficient funds in the maker's account.
Of course, this provision does not accord a ten-day grace period to make
good a worthless check. Indeed, the defendant is not entitled to a ten-day
notice; failure to afford a ten-day notice merely precludes the prosecution
from invoking the evidentiary inference. Thus, failure to make good a
worthless check after receiving a ten-day notice is not an element of this
crime. lIes
A second permissible statutory inference1l98 has been added to cover
IOWA CODE § 714.1(4) (1979).
UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1427.
1186. [d. at No. 1427.
1187. IOWA CODE § 714.1(6) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
Nos. 1435-38; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 318; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note
389, § 92.
1188. See IOWA CODE §§ 713.3-.4 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1189. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1437.
1190. For an analysis of the interrelationship between the offenses of Theft by bad check
and False Use of a Financial Instrument, see text accompanying notes 1294-1300 infra.
1191. IOWA CODE § 714.1(7) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
No. 1438; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 318.
1192. State v. Mason, 203 N.W.2d 292 (Iowa 1972).
1193. IOWA CODE § 714.1(6) (1979). There is no Un~form Jury Instruction, supra note 136,
1184.
1185.
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bad checks when the defendant-maker has no account with the drawee. No
provision is made for a ten-day notice, but none really is necessary in light
of the entire provision which states the obvious. 1194
7.

Theft by Misuse of Secured Property 1l96

Theft by defrauding a secured party is a separate type of theft. Its elements are: (1) taking, destroying, concealing, or disposing; (2) of "property;" (3) in which another person has a security interest; (4) with intent to
defraud the secured party. The principal statutory change is that the crime
under the new Code applies to any person whereas the pre-revised statute llM was directed only to the debtor whose debts were the focus of the
security interest. 1197

8.

Theft-Related Offenses

a. Operating a Vehicle Without the Owner's Consent.1I8e The pre-revised theft-related crime of Operating a Motor Vehicle Without the Owner's
Consent1l89 was changed in two respects: (1) the type of protected vehicle
was expanded from motor vehicles exclusively to any type of self-propelled
vehicle; and (2) the revised actus reus requires only the unauthorized taking
of possession or control of another's vehicle rather than requiring operation
of the appropriated vehicle.llIOo
This crime consists of (1) taking possession and control; (2) of another's
vehicle; (3) without the owner's consent; (4) but without the intent to permanently deprive the owner thereof. The fourth element which expressly
sets out the mental aspect of the crime (but in the negative) thus differentiates this crime from the greater offense of Theft of a Motor Vehicle. llol This
lesser crime, then, remains as merely a general intent crime. 1101
(1) Lesser Included Offense. lIoa As already noted in this Article, the
new Criminal Code codified the common law concept that Operating a Vehicle Without the Owner's Consent may be a lesser included offense on a
embodying this permissible inference.
1194. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 318.
1195. IOWA CODE § 714.1(5) (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
Nos. 1431-32; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 317.
1196. See IOWA CODE § 710.12 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1197. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 317.
1198. IOWA CODE § 714.7 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos.
1445-46; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 328.
1199. See IOWA CODE § 321.76 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1200. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 328. What constitutes taking possession and control is not defined in either the Criminal Code or the Uniform Jury Instructions.
1201. IOWA CODE § 714.2(2) (1979). See text accompanying notes 1091-92 supra.
1202. See text accompanying notes 437-601 supra.
1203. See generally text accompanying notes 619-714 supra.
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charge of Theft of a motor vehicle1204 (i.e., Theft in the Second Degree). The
use of the permissive term "may" in the statute, coupled with the supreme
court's first two interpretations of the general doctrine of lesser included
offenses under the new Criminal Code,120I1 means that no change will be
made in this area. Therefore, State v. Hawkins 1206 is still controlling in its
determination that Operating a Vehicle Without the Owner's Consent is not
automatically a lesser included offense of Theft of a vehicle. That is, even
though the legal or element test is met, the trial judge may not submit a
lesser included offense instruction unless the instruction is warranted by the
evidence in the particular case.
(a) Grading. The single grade of this offense has been downgraded to
an aggravated misdemeanor after being a felony under the pre-revised
law.llI07 This single grade approach corresponds to the fact that the gravamen of this offense essentially is unauthorized use of another's property as
opposed to stealing or damaging such property. Thus, the value of the property unlawfully "borrowed" has little legal significance for penalty grading
purposes.
b. Unrepealed Theft-related Offenses. l208 Four Theft-related offenses
were incorporated into Chapter 714 of the new Iowa Criminal Code. llDe All
four crimes were unrepealed provisions of the pre-revised Code. These commercial-fraud crimes relate to pirating of sound recordings through unauthorized reproduction,lZlo consumer frauds/Ill unlawful advertising and selling of courses of instruction,121l and selling more than one lifetime contract
to the same person. 12lS
B. Fraudulent Practices

The crime of Fraudulent Practices lZl4 represents a consolidation of nu1204.

IOWA CODE § 714.7 (1979).

1205.

See State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979) and State v. Sanders, 280 N.W.2d
375 (Iowa 1979) and text accompanying notes 619-38 supra.
1206. 203 N.W.2d 555 (Iowa 1973).
1207. Nevertheless, the maximum authorized penalty of confinement for two years under
IOWA CODE § 714.7 (1979) is greater than the one-year maximum under IOWA CODE § 321.76
(1977) (repealed 1978).
1208. See also IOWA CODE § 714.1(8) (1979) (residual Theft provision extending uniform
penalty schedule in § 714.2 to diverse Theft offenses outside the Criminal Code); J. YEAGER &
R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 319.
1209. There are no Uniform Jury Instructions, supra note 136, for any of these offenses.
See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 340-44.
1210. IOWA CODE § 714.15 (1979).
1211. [d. § 714.16.
1212. [d. § 714.17.
1213. [d. § 714.20.
1214. IOWA CODE §§ 714.8-.13 (1979); H.F. 685 (1980). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS,
supra note 136, at Nos. 1447-50; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 329-39.

HeinOnline -- 29 Drake L. Rev. 382 1979-1980

Iowa Criminal Code

1979-80]

383

merous fraud crimes contained in the pre-revised Code. InIl Specifically enumerated situations plus a residual provision U18 constitute this crime which
appears in the Code chapter on Theft and is to a large extent an attempted
Theft offense.I 117 The interrelationship between these two crimes is especially important in this regard in view of the fact that Theftll18 is a specific
result crime requiring that the thief actually obtain something of value.
1. Economic Underpinning

Fraudulent Practices definitely has a economic underpinning, with the
intent that the defendant perform the various proscribed acts in order to
make an unauthorized economic gain. Although such an intent is not an element of some of the proscribed Fraudulent Practices, nevertheless this economic-oriented intent should deter charging someone with the crime of
Fraudulent Practices when the circumstances do not suggest any pecuniary
motivation. For example, one type of Fraudulent Practice consists of
"mak[ing] any entry in or alteration of any public records, or any records of
any ... business enterprise ... , knowing the same to be false."1119 On its
face, this provision is not limited to, nor indeed does even mention, financial
records. Yet a practical reading of this statute in both its historical and contemporary contexts compels the conclusion that this crime is limited. After
all, its forerunner statutes were economic fraud crimes and the crime of
Fraudulent Practices appears in the Code chapter entitled "Theft." Moreover, to a large extent, it is basically an attempted Theft crime which fills
the void created by categorizing Theft as a specific result crime.

2. Particularized States of Mind
All but two of the various acts constituting Fraudulent Practices must
be expressly accompanied by one of two particularized states of mind. Some
of these acts must have been done merely with knowledge of their falsity;
others with the more specific intent to defraud.
These following "fraudulent" acts must have been done with .the offender "knowing them to be false":12lO
(1) making, tendering, or keeping for sale knowingly false bills of lading
or warehouse receipts; (2) knowingly attaching or altering labels on goods

1215. See IOWA CODE §§ 321.80; 709.7; 713.11-.16, .22, .26, .28, .35-.37, .43; 714.12-13;
718.3-4, .6, .19 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1216. The residual provision brings within the realm of the uniform grading scheme of
sections 714.9-.13 of the Criminal Code any other act expressly declared to be a Fraudlent
Practice by any other section of the Iowa Code. See IOWA CODE § 714.8(10) (1979).
1217. But see text accompanying notes 1226-43 infra.
1218. IOWA CODE § 714.1 (1979). See text accompanying note 1216 supra.
1219. [d. § 714.8(4).
1220. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1448.
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kept for sale so as to materially misrepresent as to such goods either
their quantity, quality, maker, or source; (3) knowingly executing or
tendering any false affidavit-or certificate which either is required by law
or is given in support of a claim for payment; and (4) making either a
knowingly false entry or a knowingly false alteration in any public or
business record. '1I1
The following "fraudulent" acts essentially are specific intent crimes
which must have been done with the intent to defraud. UlII
(1) manufacturing or keeping for sale any device usuable as a coin-machine slug, either with the intent that the device be so used or with the
representation that it may be so used; (2) manufacturing or possessing
any false or counterfeit label, either with the intent that it will be used
fraudulently or with the representation that it may be so used; (3) tampering with meters used in determining the value of property, with the
intent to defraud any person; and (4) soliciting contributions or other
assistance by falsely representing to be a veteran or a representative of
any fraternal, religious, charitable, or veterans organization;usa and (5)
knowingly participating in the transfer or assignment of a property interest with the intent to obtain public assistance for which a person is not
elgible. 1224

The two remaining types of Fraudulent Practices do not on their face
contain any requirement of either (1) knowledge of the falsity of the practice or (2) an intent to defraud. One consists of removing, altering, or defacing any identification number or mark from another's property, without any
mention of a fraudulent intent. Certainly such an intent is implied by the
entire thrust of the chapter which is entitled "Theft." After all, mere removal, alteration, or defacement--without more-would constitute the
crime of Criminal Mischief.'m The latter is a crime of vandalism whereas
Fraudulent Practices is a crime of intended economic gain. The other type
of Fraudulent Practice in this category consists of removing or tampering
with any vehicle component part .number or vehicle identification number
"for the purpose of concealing or misrepresenting the identity of the component part or vehicle." This offense, too, seemingly has an underpinning of
intended economic gain. Otherwise, the crime again should be merely labeled Criminal Mischief.

3.

"Involved"
As noted in this article, me Fraudulent Practices is to a large extent, an
1221. Id.
1222. Id.
1223. Id.
1224. H.F. 685 (1980).
1225. IOWA CODE §§ 716.1-.6 (1979). See text accompanying notes 937-56 supra.
1226. See text accompanying note 1217 supra.
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attempted Theft crime. The legislative intent was obvious, at least originally. This crime is included in the same chapter of the Code as Theft and
Theft-related offenses, all of which require an actual obtaining of another's
property. 1227 Requiring the same for the crime of Fraudulent Practices
would lead to considerable overlapping, as many - if not practically all consummated Fraudulent Practices would constitute Theft (by Deception}.1228 Moreover, there is not any language concerned with obtaining anything in the entire provision which sets forth the proscribed Fraudulent
Practices. This contrasts with the terminology used in the various Theft
provision,1128 viz. "takes possession or control;" "misappropriates;" "obtains" property by deception; "exercises control over stolen property;"
"takes, destroys, conceals or disposes" of secured property; and utters any
check and "obtains" property in exchange therefore. If the General Assembly had wanted to likewise make Fraudulent Practices a specific result
crime, it certainly could have followed its own lead from the Theft statutes
and employed some of the aforementioned terminology in the Fraudulent
Practice provisions.
The inescapable conclusion should be that Fraudulent Practices is not a
specific result crime, and thus covers certain attempted Theft situations.
However, Professor Yeager 1280 has concluded that Fraudulent Practices is
indeed a specific result crime, and thus the actual obtaining of something of
value is required. He bases this conclusion on the legislative history of an
amendment to the Code in 1977 .lIS1 As originally passed in 1976,1282 this
crime had a single grade; all types of Fraudulent Practices were punishable
as aggravated misdemeanors irrespective of the value of the property involved. In 1977, however, the Fraudulent Practices section of the new Criminal Code was amended to establish a five-degree crime tracking the grading
and penalty schedules for Theft.lIS8
Professor Yeager's cause for concern arises in the explanation accompanying the house file version of the bill which became the 1977 amendment. 12M The pertinent portion therein stated: "The degree of crime and
severity of penalty are primarily determined by the amount of money or
value of property or services obtained by committing a fraudulent
practice. "12811
The significance of this explanation and most particularly the reference
1227.
1228.
1229.
1230.
1231.
1232.
1233.
1234.
1235.

See text accompanying note 1065 supra.
See text accompanying notes 1240-41 infra.
IOWA CODE § 714.1(1)-(6) (1979).
J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 330.
H.F. 237, 67th G.A. (1977).
S.F. 85, 1976 Iowa Acts 2d Sess. ch. 1245, § 1409 (66th G.A.).
See text accompanying notes 1242 infra.
See note 1090 supra.
H.F. 237, 67th G.A. (1977) (emphasis added).
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therein to "obtained" lies in ascertaining the meaning of the word "involved" which is used in determining the grading of the offense.1I8e The basic point of differentiation is "the amount of money or value of property
involved,"1237 with the same schedules as apply to Theft (which, of course, is
a specific result crime). No statutory definition of "involved" appears in the
Code itself. This is a defect of constitutional dimensions, in Professor Yeager's estimation. 12ss He explains: "This is ambiguous language, in that reasonable minds may differ as to what is meant by the word 'involved' in this
context. This ambiguity would very probably have made these sections unconstitutionally vague,"1289 except for resorting to the abovementioned explanatory comment which defines "involved" as "obtained." Therefore, he
concludes that Fraudulent Practices does not encompass attempted appropriations (i.e., Attempted Thefts).
He concedes that this offense "was initially conceived as an attempted
theft provision. "1240 He also points out that each Fraudulent Practice act
"can also be prosecuted as a violation of section 714.1(3)," thus creating "an
unnecessary duplication" with the offense of Theft by Deception."ll41
I disagree with Professor Yeager's ultimate conclusion. As an initial
matter, the original legislative intent seems unambiguous. If the crimes of
Fraudulent Practices and Theft by Deception are in fact duplications, which
they appear to be, then the entire provision of Fraudulent Practices is rendered meaningless, which certainly was not the legislative intent. Moreover,
such a position flies in the face of the maxim of statutory construction that
each word (let alone each provision) is to be given effect. It also stretches
credulity to believe that the General Assembly would have changed positions so diametrically from the 1976 legislative session to the 1977 session.
Moreover, one would hope, if not expect, that such a fundamental change
would appear within the purview of the statute itself instead of being found
in the explanation portion of the bill (which is not an official part of the
statute itself). And, of course, the statute controls and any unofficial intrinsic parts of the statute such as the explanation can be taken into account
only when the meaning of the law is unclear.
The dispositive issue here is whether the statute is clear. I maintain
that it is, and thus further resort to the explanation is unwarranted. The
word "involved" certainly is not a word of art, and should be generally understood in its dictionary meaning as "[i]mplicated; affected or concerned in
some degree. "uu A taking is not suggested from the definitional context nor
1236. See IOWA CODE §§ 714.9-.13 (1979).
1237. Id.
1238. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 330.
1239. Id.
1240. Id. § 329.
1241. Id.
1242. BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 666 (3d ed. 1969).
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is it implied from a comtemporaneous context. As already pointed out, these
provisions appear in the Theft chapter and would be an unnecessary duplication of the offense of Theft by Deception if a taking was also required for
the offense of Fraudulent Practices. It bears repeating that it is evident that
the latter offense does not require a taking when the terminology of the
various acti rei of the two offenses is compared. If a taking was intended to
be required for Fraudulent Practices, the General Assembly should have
used terminology such as "take," "misappropriates," or "obtains" (as it did
in the Theft provisions) instead of the word "involved" (as it did in the
Fraudulent Practices provisions).ll148
A reasonable interpretation of the Fraudulent Practices provision is
that the value of the amount of money or value of property "involved" can
be reasonably determined and thus fair notice is given as to what constitutes
the crime. Under section 714.8(1), the value involved would be that of the
non-existent goods falsely represented in the warehouse receipt or bill of
lading. The value of a false affidavit or certificate under section 714.8(3)
would be the total amount of the claim if the claim is totally false but only
the excess of the fraudulent claim over the value of any rightful claim. This
same potential value differential would apply to falsification of public or
business records under section 714.8(4). The value of the property tampered
with by falsification of serial numbers and component part or vehicle identification numbers under sections 714.8(5) and 714.8(11), respectively, would
control in these related situations. "Value" for purposes of the false Solicitation of contributions provision in section 714.8(6) would depend upon
whether a specific amount (either in money or specific property) was improperly solicited or whether an open-ended or general request was made.
The former situation would be punishable according to the dollar "value,"
and the latter would be punishable in the third degree under the indeterminable-value provision in section 714.11(3). The degree of this offense
which occurs through manufacturing, selling, or keeping for sale coin machine slugs would quite logically correspond to the total amount of money
for which the total amount of slugs confiscated were intended to substitute.
Constrastingly, because of difficulty in determining the intended use or the
value of the property ultimately obtained or obtainable under sections
714.8(2), (8), and (9), the fraudulent practices involving falsely attaching or
altering labels on merchandise kept for sale, manufacturing or possessing
false or counterfeit labels and meter tampering, are expressly made punishable in the third degree under section 714.11(2).

4.

Grading
There are five degrees of Fraudulent Practices/ 244 ranging from a sim1243. See text accompanying note 1229 supra.
IOWA CODE §§ 714.9-.13 (1979).

1244.
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pIe misdemeanor to a class C felony. The basic point of differentiation is
"the amount of money or value of property involved,,,uftl with the same dollar-level schedules as applicable to Theft.llf. Whenever the amount involved
cannot be determined, a Fraudulent Practice is deemed to be in the third
degree. 12. , Other types of Fraudulent Practices expressly declared in the
statute1U8 to be in the Third Degree which do not depend upon the amount
involved are attachment or alteration of false labels on goods kept for sale;
manufacturing, possessing, or selling false or counterfeit labels; and fraudulently tampering with meters. In addition, a Fraudulent Practice in the Second Degree 12f9 occurs when the amount involved does not involve more than
$500 but the defendant has twice before been convicted of a Fraudulent
Practice. This latter provision can only have prospective application in light
of the fact that no comparable habitual offender provision in the pre-revised
law.l2tIo Finally, an amendment in 1980 made it a serious misdemeanor
fraudlent practice to knowingly participate in the transfer or assignment of
a property interest with the intent to obtain public assistance for which a
person is not elgible. 12t11

C. False Use of a Financial Instrument
The newly-styled crime of False Use of a Financial Instrumentlltll consolidates a number of pre-revised crimes, litiS the principal ones I I " being
Forgery,UtItI Uttering a Forged Instrument,lItIS Possession of Forged Instrument, Utl7 and False Use of a Credit Card. liN The elements of this new
crime l2tl9 are: (1) falsely using, (2) a "financial instrument,"IISO (3) with
1245.
1246.
1247.
1248.
1249.

ld.
ld.
Id.
ld.
ld.

§ 714.2. See also text accomppnying notes 1229-41 supra.
§ 714.11(3).
§ 714.11(2).
§ 714.10(2).
1250. Regarding the carryover application of the common thief provision during the statutory revision process, see text accompanying note 1104 supra.
1251. H.F. 685 (1980).
1252. IOWA CODE §§ 715.1-.7 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at
Nos. 1501-09. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 351-66.
1253. For an extensive discU88ion of the pre-revised law through the changes proposed in
the 1974 bill, see Note, False Use of a Financiallnstrument, 60 IOWA L. REv. 548 (1975) [hereinafter cited as False Use Note).
1254. The other consolidated pre-revised offenses included Gross Fraud or Cheat (repealed IOWA CODE § 713.40); Making or Uttering False Public Instruments (repealed IOWA CODE
§ 718.3); and the several counterfeiting offenses (repealed IOWA CODE §§ 718.4-.21). See False
Use Note, supra note 1253, at 548 n.6.
1255. See IOWA CODE § 718.1 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1256. See id. § 718.2.
1257. See id. § 718.5.
1258. See id. § 713.39.
1259. IOWA CODE § 715.6 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos.
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fraudulent intent, and (4) with knowledge of either the falsity of the instrument or the lack of a legal right to use a genuine instrument.
1.

False Use

The proscribed false use 1l8l of a "financial instrument" (together with
special attendant circumstances) can consist of any of the following: (1)
making or executing such an instrumentjlllli (2) endorsing such an instrument j1l88 (3) altering such an instrument so as to materially change its nature or its attendant obligationjllll4 (4) tendering or merely offering such an .
instrument, together with making false representationsjllllll or (5) possessing
such an instrument, knowing it to be false or knowing there was no right to
possession thereof. II118 The gravamen of this offense is making false use of a
"financial instrument" rather than actually obtaining anything. Hence this
is a specific result offense.
The false use can arise through using either a false instrument or a genuine instrument with no right to do so, provided that either type of instrument is used with a fraudulent intent. 118'1 An instrument need only appear
to be genuine on its face in order to be covered under this statute. llH

2. "Financial Instrument"
A "financial instrument" is defined comprehensively in Code section
715.1 to include diverse instruments and devices 1l811 in these four broad categories: (1) commercial instruments or "writings" evidencing either an obligation or release of an obligationjUl'lO (2) title instruments (e.g., a deed or a
motor vehicle certificate of title)jll'1l (3) testamentary documents (e.g., a
will);l271 and (4) credit devices (e.g., a credit card).lI'11 Additionally, the stat1501-05; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 365.
1260. [d. § 715.1. See text accompanying notes 1269-76 infra.
1261. [d. § 715.2.
1262. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1501; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 359.
1263. [d.
1264. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1502; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 359.
1265. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 1503-04; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, § 360.
1266. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos. 1506-06; J. YEAGER & R.
CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 361, 363.
1267. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 365.
1268. See id., § 357, which states that if the instrument "does not appear to be genuine
on its face, it has no legal tendency to effect.a fraud" (citing State v. Pierce, 8 Iowa 231 (1859».
1269. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 352.
1270. [d. § 353.
1271. [d. § 354.
1272. [d.
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utory definition includes certain ancillary writings (e.g., an endorsement of a
codicil) which purport to affect any of these "financial instruments. "1274
Whether a particular instrument or device is a "financial instrument"
is, of course, a question of law l2711 to be decided on the face of the statute.
Whether or not a particular instrument or device not enumerated in the
statute is nevertheless included within the statute will depend upon statutory interpretation of the several catch-all phrases under the canon of ejusdem generis.

3. Knowlege of False Use
A scienter requirement is expressly included in the False Use statute. 1I78 This limits the criminality to a person who knows of the falsity of
the instrument or knows that he has no legal right to use a valid "financial"
instrument." This scienter requirement can be satisfied either by actual
knowledge or by failure to make "a reasonable inquiry" although having "information which would put a reasonable person upon inquiry."1lI77

4. Fraudulent Intent
A particularized mens rea of a fraudulent intent U7S is an element of this
crime. mil This specific intent "to obtain fraudulently anything of value" is
defined simplistically in the Uniform Jury Instructions as "an intent to
wrongfully obtain. . . . "IIiSO
The lack of limiting or qualifying language in the statute signifies that
the prosecution need not prove an intent to defraud "any particular person," as noted in the Uniform Jury Instructions.IlIS1 Moreover, this is not a
specific result crime, as no actual loss need be sustained by anyone. IIISIi
Proof of the fraudulent intent must be independent of the mere act of
possessing either a falsified "financial instrument" or a valid instrument
which the possessor has no right to use. US8 Moreover, there is no statutory
inference as to intent. Indeed, other evidence must affirmatively show that
the offender possessed the instrument with the intent to fraudulently obtain
anything of value. One commentator has suggested that such proof "will
1273. [d. § 355.
1274. [d. § 356.
1275. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1507.
1276. IOWA CODE § 715.3 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No.
1509; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 362.
1277. [d.
1278. See note 1268 supra.
1279. IOWA CODE § 715.6 (1979).
1280. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No. 1508.
1281. [d.
1282. [d.
1283. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 363.
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usually be found in some act of the possessor, something that he says, or in
the circumstances of the possession. "1284
An expansive statutory provision expressly includes within the fraudulent intent phrase "the intent to deliver a financial instrument to another,
knowing that the other person intends to use the instrument to obtain
fraudulently something of value."11811 This covers a person in possession of
falsified or stolen "financial instruments" who intends to sell them to
others. 1288

5.

Grading

There is only one degree of this offense, unlike the related offenses of
Theft and Fraudulent Practices which are graded into five different degrees
depending upon the value of the property involved. 1I87 The probable explanation for this unusual treatment is that a broad range of "financial instruments" is included, many of which have little intrinsic value in and of
themselves. 1288
This offense is a class C felony,1I811 and obviously is not a "forcible felony."mo Although the new penalty schedule (i.e., an indeterminate term of
ten years) is the same as for the two major pre-revised offenses,lllli the new
Criminal Code does not provide for an alternative sentencing option of a
one-year jail term to be imposed in the sentencing court's judicial discretion,
unlike under the pre-revised law. Nevertheless, a sentencing judge can accomplish approximately the same type of alternative "short" term under the
new Criminal Code by exercising his right under Code section 902.4 to reconsider the sentence to imprisonment within ninety days (and thus grant
"delayed" probation). Of course, a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence,
and a suspended sentence are available options in all cases. lItIl Moreover, as
a "non-forcible" class C felony, this offense also is punishable by a fine either in addition to or in lieu of a term of imprisonmentll1l8 (whether sus-·
pended or not). The raising of the maximum fine to $5000 under the new
offense will facilitate a harsh penalty in those situations when neither a
prison term nor a suspended sentence is warranted. This compares under
1284. Id. at 95.
1285. IOWA CODE § 715.3 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No.
1508; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON; supra note 3, § 362.
1286. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 362.
1287. See IOWA CODE §§ 714.1-.2 and 714.8-.13 and text accompanying notes 1075-90 and
1244-51 respectively supra.
1288. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 351.
1289. For the sentencing options, see text accompanying notes 71-83 supra.
1290. See text accompanying notes 180-203 supra. Concerning the availability of a fineonly penalty, see text accompanying notes 84-92 supra.
1291. See IOWA CODE § 718.1-2 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1292. See text accompanying notes 69 supra.
1293. See text accompanying notes 75-102 supra.
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the pre-revised law to the maximum fine of only $1000 as an additional penalty accompanying the one-year jail term and to no authorized fine at all
when the ten-year prison sentence was imposed.

6. Interrelationship with Theft by Bad Check
Both Theft 1294 and False Use of a Financial Instrument relate to wrongful uses of checks. In some respects these two crimes overlap while in others
they do not. 1291i The main difference lies in the comparative penalty
schedules. 129B
The starting point in the analysis should focus on the effect of success
in at least initially obtaining anything of value with a bad check. An attempted, but· unsuccessful, passing of a bad check does not constitute Theft.
This is because Theft is a specific result crime. 1297 Indeed, a particular element of Theft by bad checks is to "obtain" property or service in exchange
therefor. On the other hand,' False Use of a Financial Instrument is not a
specific result crime, as evidenced by its comparable element being merely
"with the intent to obtain fraudulently anything of value. . . . "1298 Thus, a
bad check that otherwise qualifies as making a "false use" of a "financial
instrument" could fit within this latter offense even though the bad check
was not successfully "passed."
A defendant-maker of a worthless check commits Theft when he signs
his own name on a check for which he either has insufficient funds or no
account at all. The worthless check constitutes Theft, provided that defendant knows at the time of utterance that the check will not be paid when
presented. In this same set of circumstances, however, the crime of False
Use of a Financial Instrument does not occur. This is because the latter
basically is a crime of alteration, as evidenced by "false use" being defined
alternatively in terms of the financial instrument not being "what it purports to be" or of the defendant-user not being "the person authorized to
use" it. 1299 So, defined, a worthless check signed by the defendant (in his
true name) is still what it purports to be, that is, a promise to pay by the
defendant.
The crime of False Use of a Financial Instrument would occur in these'
situations: the defendant forges X's name as the drawer on a check made
payable either to the defendant or to bearer; the defendant alters an other1294. IOWA CODE § 714.1(6) (1979). See text accompanying notes 117-24 supra.
1295. Regarding the scope of prosecutional discretion in selecting a change from overlapping offenses, see note 1050 supra.
1296. The only degree of the crime of False Use of a Financial Instrument is a class D
felony. Comparatively, the three lowest degrees of Theft are misdemeanors and the highest
degree is a class C felony. See generally text accompanying notes 1075-1105 supra.
1297. See text accompanying notes 71-111 supra.
1298. IOWA CODE § 715.6 (1979) (emphasis added).
1299. [d.
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wise valid check made payable by X to the defendant or to bearer (by increasing the amount payable); the defendant impersonates Y and endorses·
and cashes a check made payable to Y which the defendant had either stolen or found.
Attempted, but unsuccessful, passing of an insufficient funds check may
not constitute any crime at all. This certainly would not constitute Theft
which is a specific result crime requiring the thief to actually obtain something of value. Moreover, a check is not included at all in the subject matter
of the crime of Fraudulent Practices. lSoo Finally, the crime of False Use of a
Financial Instrument would not occur in light of the check being signed by
the defendant (in his true name). Contrastingly, attempted but unsuccessful
passing of a forged check would be punishable as False Use of a Financial
Instrument, which is not a specific result crime .•
VI.

VIOLENT PROPERTY APPROPRIATION OFFENSES

A.

Introduction

Robbery and Extortion constitute the two forms of aggravated property
appropriation offenses. Unlike the totally "non-violent" property appropriation offenses of Theft, Fraudulent Practices, and False Use of a Financial
Instrument which merely consist of stealing as discussed above in part V,
Robbery and Extortion require, either actual or threatened violence, certain
other types of threats, or being armed with a dangerous weapon. Robbery
and Extortion also differ from the other property appropriation offenses by
not being specific result crimes, requiring instead only an intent to steal or
to make some other wrongful gain. Because no actual taking is necessary for
Robbery or Extortion, the grading of these offenses is not keyed to the dollar value of anything either taken or attempted to be taken, unlike for Theft
and Fraudulent Practices. The differences between Robbery and Extortion
are summarized at the end of this part of the' article,1801 following a detailed
individual discussion of these two offenses.
B. Robbery

The revised crime of Robberyl8Os "consists of an assault or threat of
physical violence made in aid of an intended theft"1808 or the offender's escape from the scene thereof. Combining the pre-revised crimes of Robbery 1804 and Assault with Intent to Rob,180I1 the revised Code expressly has
1300. [d. § 714.8. See text accompanying notes 1214-51 supra.
1301. See text accompanying notes 1362-67 infra.
1302. IOWA CODE § 711.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos.
1101-07. See generally J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, §§ 251-54; W. LAFAVE & A.
SCOTT, supra note 398, § 94; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 279-85.
1303. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 251.
1304.

IOWA CODE

§ 711.1-.3 (1977) (repealed 1978).
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omitted the traditional requirement that something of value be actually
taken,1806 requiring instead only a specific intent 1807 to commit a theft.180s
The apparent rationale for this change is that the gravamen of the offense is
"the use of violence or threat of violence as a means of accomplishing [or
attempting] a theft,"18oe rather than the degree of property appropriation.
The revised definition of Robbery has survived a constitutional two
prong attack based on due process grounds. Concluding that the Robbery
statute was not vague, the supreme court in State v. Pierce,1810 held it was
within the legislative perogative to eliminate "taking" as an element of the
revised crime of Robbery and the robbery statute "[was] no less clear merely
because the conduct proscribed overlap conduct which [was] also proscribed
under a separate statute"l811 (referring to Assault While Participating in a
Felonyl812 as it relates to·an unsuccessful or attempted Robbery).
Under the new Criminal Code, common law robbery has been enlarged
in several other ways. The time span in which the required assault or threat
of physical violence must occur now extends from the theft scene through
defendant's escape. Thus, force or intimidation can now occur after the taking of property rather than having to precede or be coterminous with the
taking. For example, a thief who secretly rifles the cash register at a filling
station and starts to flee, but is accosted by the manager and then pulls a
gun to effectuate his escape, now commits a Robbery under the new Criminal Code, but not under the common law nor under the pre-revised statute. l818 The revised Code more adequately characterizes the overall actions
of the offender who has used violence at some time during the theft.
Another revision is that the new offense refers to Theft181 ' as a broader
offense than the pre-revised crime of Larceny18111 with the former offense of
Robbery being considered as Larceny from the person by force or intimidation. Under the new Criminal Code, the use or threat of violence during the
attempted commisaion of any type of Theft (which incorporates and consoli1305. [d. § 694.7 (Assault With Intent to Commit Certain Crimes).
1306. "It is immaterial to the question of guilt or innocence of robbery that property was
or was not actually stolen." IOWA CODE § 711.1 (1979). See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra
note 136, at No. 1106.
1307. For a discussion of specific intent as a state of mind, see text accompanying notes
437-601 supra.
1308. See State v. Campbell, 214. N.W.2d 195 (Iowa 1974) (no intent to steal to support
Robbery conviction where defendant "took" gun away during an altercation).
1309. J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 252. For a discussion of robbery of a
business entity via threatened violence directed against an employee, see State v. Matlock, 289
N.W.2d 625 (Iowa 1980).
1310. 287 N.W.2d 570 (Iowa 1980).
1311. [d. at 573-74.
1312. See IOWA CODE § 708.3 (1979).
1313. See State v. Lewis, 173 Iowa 643, 154 N.W. 432 (1915).
1314. See IOWA CODE § 714.1 (1979).
1315. See IOWA CODE ch. 709 (1977) (repealed 1978).
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dates the former offenses of Larceny,1318 Embezzlement,1811 False Pretenses,1318 Receiving and Concealing Stolen Property,131e and False Drawing
and Uttering)lSIO will constitute Robbery. Thus, a person attempting to pass
a bad check who draws a gun, or even merely shoves the sales clerk, to effectuate his escape apparently commits Robbery.
1.

Felony Murder Rule

The principle that Robbery is an underlying felony for purposes of application of the felony murder rule to Murder in the First Degree has not
been changed. lslil The revision occurred because the revised crime includes
both the consummated substantive offense and the inchoate attempted offense, whereas the pre-revised "first-degree" felony murder rule also applied
to both Robbery and Attempted Robbery.lSlIli
2. Lesser Included Offenses
The aforementioned statutory changes in the revised crime of Robbery
have caused several accompanying changes as to the lesser included offenses
of Robbery. Specifically, Theft has already been held not to be a lesser included offense of Robbery, unlike Larceny under the pre-revised law. lSl8
Similarly, Assault no longer appears to be a lesser included offense of the
newly-constituted offense of Robbery, unlike under the prior law. Additionally, it has been held that an instruction on Accessory After the Fact should
not be given in a Robbery prosecution. 1814 These cases are discussed in detail in part II (D) of this Article.
3. Grading
Robbery is graded into two degrees, "[varying] with the risk to which
the robbery victim or others are exposed."lSl6 The three situations constituting Robbery in the First Degree l8ll8 are: purposely inflicting "serious injury,"IS1I1 purposely attempting to inflict "serious injury," and being armed
with a "dangerous weapon .... 8118 All other robbery is of the second degree. ule
1316.
1317.
1318.
1319.
1320.
1321.
1322.
1323.
1324.
1325.
1326.
1327.
1328.

[d.
[d., § 710.
[d., § 713.
[d., § 712.
[d., §§ 713.3-04.
See IOWA CODE § 707.2(2) (1979).
See IOWA CODE § 690.2 (1977) (repealed 1978).
See State v. Holmes, 276 N.W.2d 823 (Iowa 1979).
See State v. Sanders, 280 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1979).
J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 251.
IOWA CODE § 711.2 (1979).
See definitional clause at IOWA CODE § 702.18 (1979).
See definitional clause at IOWA CODE § 702.7 (1979).
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The new grading is an improvement over the pre-revised grading. 1880
Aggravating circumstances under the latter included having an armed confederate present or merely striking the victim or wounding him with a
weapon. The revised focus upon "serious injury" is much more realistic.
Moreover, the cumbersome pre-revised requirement (for Robbery With Aggravation) that an armed robber be shown to have the intent to kill or
maim, if resisted, was eliminated. 1881
Nevertheless, the revised grading has some defects. How is infliction of
serious injury to be equated with attempted infliction of serious injury?
Likewise, considerably more harm is done by infliction of "serious injury"
than merely by having a "dangerous weapon" in the robber's possession.
The weapon does not even need to be loaded l832 nor does it need to be
pointed at anyone. Three degrees of Robbery would have been more realistic, with the infliction of "serious injury" being reserved solely for the first
degree level.
Another questionable aspect of the grading system is that negligent infliction of "serious injury" is not of a first-degree nature, whereas intentional
attempted (i.e., unconsummated infliction of) "serious injury" is. First degree robbery should include infliction of "serious injury," whether purposeful or not. Sexual Abuse is of the first degree1888 whenever "serious injury" to another is caused whether intentional or not, and no rational
explanation for this distinction between Robbery and Sexual Abuse is
apparent.

4. Sentencing Options
Because both degrees of robbery are "forcible felonies,"1884 none of the
ameliorative sentencing alternatives (i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred
sentence, or a suspended sentence) are available. This means that the
twenty-five year prison term for Robbery in the First Degree must be imposed and is not subject to being suspended (i.e., a bench parole or probation) under any circumstances. BecaUse Robbery in the Second Degree is a
class C felony, there is uncertainty as to whether any prison term must be
1329. IOWA CODE § 711.3 (1979).
1330. See IOWA CODE §§ 711.2-.3 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1331. Robbery With Aggravation required not only that the offender be armed with a
dangerous weapon, but that he intended while so armed, if resisted, to kill or maim the person
robbed. IOWA CODE § 711.2 (1977) (repealed 1978); State v. Ashland, 259 Iowa 728, 732, 145
N.W.2d 910, 912 (1966). See also State v. Buhr, 243 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Iowa 1976) (intent to
commit larceny is necessary for robbery but is not the intent, if resisted, to kill or maim required in robbery with aggravation).
1332. See State v. Nichols, 276 N.W.2d 416 (Iowa 1979).
1333. See IOWA CODE § 709.2 (1979).
1334. See id. § 702.11 (1979).
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imposed, in light of Code § 909.1. 18811 One alternative reading of the latter
provision would permit a sentencing judge to impose a fine of up to $5000.
Such an approach, however, contradicts the mandatory imprisonment concept for persons convicted of "forcible felonies."
The hard-nosed approach in the new Criminal Code compares unfavorably to the pre-revised law. usli A suspended sentence was an available alternative for both of the former offenses (of Robbery and Robbery with Aggravation) under all circumstances. On the other hand, either a deferred
judgment or a deferred sentence was an available alternative only in the
absence of violence (i.e., serious injury inflicted or attempted, or dangerous
weapon involved). The pre-revised approach was better in light of the distinct possibility that a nonviolent purse snatcher could be convicted of
Robbery.
C. Extortion

The revised crime of Extortion 1887 has been expanded in the new Criminal Code to include four additional types of threats not previously criminal
under Iowa law. 1sss These include threats: (1) to expose another to hatred,
contempt, or ridicule; (2) to harm another's credit, or one's business or professional reputation; (3) to misuse one's public position to take or withhold
action in order to injure another, or to use one's influence with a public
servant to cause taking or withholding of action to injure another and (4) to
give or withhold information concerning another's legal claim or defense. me
The four pre-revised types of Extortion, retained in the new Criminal Code,
include threats; (1) to inflict physical injury on another; (2) to commit any
public offense against another; (3) to accuse another of a public offense, and
(4) to injure another's property.llUO Of course, anyone of these eight threats
must be coupled with a specific intentl841 to obtain something of value for
oneself or another from another, without any reasonable belief of a right to
make such threats, in order to constitute Extortion. I841
1335. Section 909.1 authorizes a court to impose a fine upon a conviction "of any public
offense for which a fine is authorized." A maximum fine of $5000 is authorized for a class 0
felony, in addition to an indeterminate 10-year term of imprisonment. See IOWA CODE § 902.9
(3) (1979).
1336. See IOWA CODE § 789A.l (1977) (repealed 1978).
1337. IOWA CODE § 711.4 (1979). See UNIPORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at Nos.
1107-09; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 255-56; W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTI', supra note
398, § 95, at 704·07; R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 367-75.
1338. See IOWA CODE §§ 720.1, 740.1 (1977) (repealed 1978).
1339. IOWA CODE § 711.4 (1979). None of these threatened activities would necessarily
otherwise be criminal in nature, except possibly for number three which "is on the periphery of
criminal activity." J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 255.
1340. IOWA CODE § 711.4 (1979).
1341. Regarding specific intent as a mens rea, see text accompanying notes 453-92 supra.
1342. See UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTJONS, supra note 136, at No. 1107.
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1. Nature of Requisite Threat

The crime of Extortion requires only a threat of some type of injury to
another, and thus no actual injury is needed for an extortion conviction.
Obviously, the Extortion 1848 offense is not dependant upon a specific result
(injury) occurring. For the same reason, it is not necessary for the intended
victim to actually respond to the threat, such as relinquishing extorted
money. An extortionist can be seeking to obtain from the victim "for oneself
or another anything of value, tangible or intangible, including labor or services."lM4 As Robbery, Extortion is not graded by the value of any property
involved.
Judicial interpretations of the nature and form of the prohibited threat,
necessary under the pre-revised code to constitute Extortion, should remain
viable under the new Criminal Code. "[AJ threat ... to be within the statute need not be made personally to the one threatened. In order to be a
'threat,' it must be so made, and under such circumstances, as to operate, to
some extent at least, on the mind of the one whom it is expected to infIuence."lMIi There must be sufficient evidence, however, to show that defendant intended his communication to be relayed to the party threatened. 1. . .
Moreover, a threat "need not ... be in any particular form or in any particular words, and it may be made by innuendo or suggestion. All that is necessary is that it be definite and understandable to a mind of ordinary intelligence . . . ."11147 Thus, "[tJhreats of physical harm need not be directly
expressed, but may be contained in veiled statements, nontheless implying
injury to the recipient when viewed in all of the surrounding circumstances.
What is controlling is whether a recipient of the communication would interpret it as a threat of injury."lM8
The requisite threat need not be of a physical injury, however, as evidenced by the seven other types of threats provided for in the statutory
crime of Extortion. Also, the truth of the extortionist's claim or allegation is
immaterial. For example, the crime of Extortion may be committed by a
person who unlawfully threatens to accuse another of a public offense, 11. .
even though the threatened party is guilty of the public offense. The
1343. Iow~ CODE § 711.4 (1979). See State v. Harrington, 260 A.2d 692, 699 (Vt. 1969) (a
lawyer's demand for settlement of a civil action accompanied by a malicious threat to expose
the other party's criminal conduct, if made with intent to extort payment, constitutes
Extortion).
1344. IOWA CODE § 711.1-.3 (1979).
1345. State v. Brownlee, 84 Iowa 473, 478, 51 N.W. 25, 27 (1892).
1346. [d. See also State v. McGinnis, 243 N.W.2d 583, 589 (Iowa 1976).
1347. State v. McGinnis, 243 N.W.2d 583, 589 (Iowa 1976), citing, State v. Wilbourn, 219
Iowa 120, 125, 257 N.W. 571, 574 (1934).
1348. State v. McGinnis, 243 N.W.2d 583, 589 (Iowa 1976) (citations omitted).
1349. IOWA CODE § 711.4(2) (1979).
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threatened party's guilt is wholly immaterial to the crime.18110 Similarly, a
policeman can commit Extortion even though he had the right, albeit the
duty, to arrest those persons he extorted from rather than arrested. lalll "It is
[the] misuse of these powers for malicious purposes and with intent to extort money which [the crime of extortion] is aimed at."lalll
2.

Grading

There is only one grade of Extortion, a class D felony.18l1a At first blush,
the fact that Extortion is not considered a "forcible felony" is somewhat
surprising in light of the fact that the related offense of Robbery in the
Second Degree is a "forcible felony."18114 The gravamen of both offenses can
be, in the alternative, a threat of violence, the only difference being that
immediate violence must be threatened for Robbery whereas Extortion involves threats of future violence.l8IIl1 The crux of the matter, however, is that
threats of physical injury or threats to commit any public offense are only
two of the eight types of threats which can constitute Extortion. Obviously,
the other six types of threats should not be the basis for making Extortion a
"forcible felony." Nevertheless, this leaves the similar offenses of Robbery in
the Second Degree and Extortion by threats of violence being treated dissimilarly for purposes of sentencing options. A practical solution would be to
eliminate Robbery in the Second Degree from the listing of "forcible
felonies. "
.3. Special Defense Based Upon Reasonable Belief of Right to Property

A special statutory defense to a charge of extortion arises when the accused person "reasonably believed" he had "a right to make such threats in
order to recover property, or to receive compensation for property or services, or to recover a debt to which the person has a good faith claim. "laN
However, this defense is unavailable in a situation where there is a threat to
commit a public offense, because no one can be privileged to make such a
threat.lSlI7
The Uniform Jury Instructions correctly place the burden of disproving
1350. Hall v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 252 N.W.2d 421, 424 (Iowa 1977).
1351. State v. Browning, 153 Iowa 37, 133 N.W. 330 (1911).
1352. [d. at 41, 133 N.W. at 333.
1353. A Class D felony is punishable by either an indeterminate term of imprisonment of
five years or a maximum fine of $1,000 or both. Because it is not a "forcible felony," a full range
of ameliorative sentencing alternatives, (i.e., a deferred judgment, a deferred sentence, and a
suspended sentence of probation) is also available. See IOWA CODE §§ 711.3, 907.3 (1979).
1354. See IOWA CODE § 702.11 (1979) and text accompanying notes 180-203 supra.
1355. See J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 251.
1356. IOWA CODE § 711.4 (1979). See UNlJI'ORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 136, at No.
1109; J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 256.
1357. IOWA CODE § 711.4 (1979).
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this defense upon the state. ISGS The state must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt either of the following: (1) that when the defendant made the threat
he was not entitled to recover property or other items of value from the
victim, or (2) "[t]hat he did not reasonably believe he had a right to make
such a threat."18G8 The standard appears faulty in that the first alternative is
directed toward a retrospective factual and legal determination, without
consideration of defendant's reasonable belief. Under the disjunctive test, as
set out above, all that the state need prove is that the accused actually had
no such right to make the threat, thus rendering nugatory the second alternative, even though the second alternative is the only standard actually designated in the statute. This author submits that the first alternative should
be eliminated altogether from the above instruction.
Under the second alternative described above, the reasonableness of the
defendant's belief is to be determined at the time of the threat. A defendant
is "not required to act with infallible judgment," but only, under the circumstances, as a reasonable man. IS80 It is sufficient if the defendant believed
he had a right to make the threat and such belief would be so viewed by a
reasonable person in the same light."1881

4. Robbery and Extortion Distinguished
Extortion differs from Robbery in several ways.18SS The most important
difference is that, unlike Robbery, the threat constituting Extortion "need
not be one of violence."1888 In fact, the Extortion crime was created "in order to plug a loophole in the robbery law by covering sundry threats which
will not do for robbery."18fU Moreover, an extortionist threatens only future
injury, whereas a robber threatens immediate injury or other violence.18811
Additionally, an extortion victim "consents to part with his money or property, although his consent is induced by the unlawful threat, whereas in robbery the intimidation is so extreme as to overcome the will of the victim and
cause him to part with his money or property without consent."18811 Finally,
"robbery requires that the property be taken from the person or presence of
the victim, while extortion ... has no such limitation."1887
1358.
1359.
1360.
1361.
1362.
1363.
1364.
1365.
1366.
1367.

UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS,

Id.
Id.
Id.
See J.

YEAGER

& R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 251.

TRAINING MANUAL,

W.

LAFAVE

supra note 136, at No. 1109.

supra note 43, at 56.

& A. SCOT!', supra note 398, at 707.

supra note 43, at 56.
R. PERKINS, supra note 398, at 375.
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOT!', supra note 398, at 707.
TRAINING MANUAL,
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5. Relationship of Extortion to Other Offenses
In addition to Robbery, Extortion relates to several other offenses. 18ea
a. Theft by Deception. As offenses involving wrongful appropriation of
another's property, Extortion and Theft by Deception1888 are closely related,
with the difference being that an extortionist operates through threats
whereas as thief lies or practices some other type of deceit to obtain success
peacefully. Moreover, a thief must succeed, whereas as extortionist is punishable with or without a taking.
b. Assault. Extortion by way of threatening to inflict physical injury
on another 1870 overlaps considerably with the simple misdemeanor offense of
simple Assault,1871 the difference being that an Assault must involve an act
intended to cause pain, injury, or offensive touching of the victim as opposed to a mere verbal threat by an extortionist. That is, a threat standing
alone does not constitute an Assault. Moreover, an Assault requires apparent ability of execution whereas Extortion does not. Of course, an extortionist's threat must have been made with the intent of obtaining wrongful gain.
c. Terrorism. Extortion by way of threatening to commit a public offense 1872 overlaps considerably with Terrorism by way of threatening to
commit a forcible felony.1878 Again, no intended wrongful gain is necessary
for Terrorism but it is necessary for Extortion. Terrorism is a crime of violence requiring an intent "to injure or provoke fear or anger in another,"1874
whereas this type of Extortion is not necessarily a crime of violence or even
of threatened violence (but more of a blackmailing nature). The difference
in violence contemplated in the two crimes is readily apparent on the face of
the statutes themselves. Only threats of a "forcible felony,"18711 by nature a
violent crime, are punishable for Terrorism. In contrast, wrongful threats to
commit any "public offense"1878 suffice for Extortion. Neither of these types
of Terrorism nor Extortion require any act beyond the making of the requisite threat. The threat for Extortion additionally requiies that it be made
"under circumstances raising a reasonable expectation that the threat will
be carried out,"1877 whereas there is no express comparable limitation concerning Terrorism.
d. Compounding a Felony. Extortion by way of threatening to accuse
1368.
1369.
1370.
1371.
1372.
1373.
1374.
1375.
1376.
1377.

See generally, J. YEAGER & R. CARLSON, supra note 3, § 255.
See IOWA CODE § 714.1(3) (1979).
[d. § 711.4(1).
See id. § 708.2.
IOWA CODE § 711.4(1) (1979).
See id. § 708.6(2).
[d. § 708.6.
See id. § 702.11 and text accompanying notes 180-203 supra.
See id. § 701.2.
See id. § 708.6(2).
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another of a public offense 1878 relates to the crime of Compounding a Felony.lS7e The latter is a specific result crime, however, unlike Extortion which
is punishable merely for making the threat irrespective of success. Moreover,
Compounding a Felony is a more passive crime, punishing the mere act of
receiving a wrongful gain, without requiring a threat nor even that the defendant initiate the matter.
e. Criminal Mishchief. Extortion by way of threatening to wrongfully
injure another's propertylS80 fills a gap left in the related offense of Criminal
Mischief. ls81 The latter is a specific result crime, with actual damage caused.
In other words, Criminal Mischief doos not encompass a mere threat to injure another's property, nor even an attempt to injure. On the other hand,
the mental states of the two crimes are quite dissimilar, one being to damage another's property (whether for the intangible benefits of revenge or for
a lark) and the other being to extract some wrongful tangible gain (e.g.,
money).
f. Malicious Prosecution. Extortion by way of threatening to accuse
another of a public offense l881 overlaps with the crime of Malicious Prosecution. ls8s Again, there are many significant differences. The offense of Malicious Prosecution requires that the perpetrator go beyond a mere threat for
Extortion and actually attempt to cause a prosecution. Moreover, there
must be no legitimate basis for the prosecution maliciously caused or attempted by a person charged with Malicious Prosecution, unlike Extortion
which punishes a person for threatening to accuse another of a public offense irrespective of the legitimacy of the accusation. The difference is that
an extortionist's claim must be coupled with the intent to make a wrongful
tangible gain.
g. Felonious Misconduct in Office. Extortion by way of misusing one's
public position, or by wrongfully influencing a public servant to injure another ls84 can be compared with the offense of Felonious Misconduct in Office. 1886 The gravamen of the latter offense, however, is falsification of public
records or documents. Contrastingly, Extortion can occur without any falsification, as the essence of Extortion is to threaten another in order to obtain
a wrongful gain, even when the extortionist's claim is true. Additionally, Felonious Misconduct requires success, instead of punishing the essentially inchoate activity of a threat by an extortionist. Moreover, Felonious Misconduct can occur irrespective of the public officer's or employee's intention in
1378.
1379.
1380.
1381.
1382.
1383.
1384.
1385.

[d. § 711.4(2).
See id. § 720.1.
[d. § 711.4(7).
See id. § 716.1.
[d. § 711.4(2).
See id. § 720.6.
[d. § 711.4(5).
See id. § 721.1.
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doing any of the enumerated acts, provided only that he did so knowingly,
whether or not intended for personal wrongful gain. Contrastingly, the extortionist wrongfully seeks personal gain.
h. Bribery and Accepting a Bribe. Extortion by way of threatening to
give or withhold information concerning another's legal claim or defense l88e
relates somewhat to the offenses of Bribery 1887 and Accepting a Bribe. l888
The latter offenses, unlike Extortion, are not tied to an intended wrongful
personal gain and do not require a threat by the offender.

1386. [d. § 711.4(6).
1387. [d. § 722.1.
1388. [d. § 722.2.
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